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Introduction 
 
 
 
I .  Disc ip l ines  
 
In 1666, the Oxford cleric, Samuel Parker (1640-1688), said: ‘’Tis an unpardonable 
Luxury and Wantonness for Wise and considering Philosophers, to spend their time and 
study to disclose distant and inscrutable Mysteries’, for they are ‘beyond the reach of 
human Cognisance, and such things as cannot be known but by Revelation’.1 According 
to Parker, philosophy dealt with subjects that the human faculties could access and 
comprehend. This ruled out divine mysteries, which derived from scripture, and thus 
belonged to theology. Further, each discipline had professional practitioners whose job it 
was to inquire into their respective subject matters. Parker thus set a disciplinary 
boundary between natural philosophy and theology, determining what could and could 
not be said (by particular people) about particular subjects. His remarks therefore 
indicate the way disciplines shape knowledge and define what is knowable. He also 
alludes to the social dimension to disciplines – that they managed and differentiated 
groups of people. Taking Parker at this word, this thesis contends that disciplines bring 
out the cognitive and social aspects of knowledge making, and consequently, that they 
are necessary tools for analysing the establishment and defence of knowledge.2 In what 
follows I will use these tools to unpack and understand knowledge in the seventeenth 
century.  
   In early modern England, disciplines were used for two purposes: one epistemic, the 
other, broadly, social and organisational. First, they set the rules and boundaries of 
argument, which meant knowledge was legitimised and made intelligible within 
disciplinary contexts. And second, disciplines structured pedagogy, dividing knowledge 
so it could be studied and taught. This pedagogical role explains why Joseph Mede (1586-
1639), tutor at Christ’s College, Cambridge, was praised for writing ‘Instructions and 
Advices about the study of Theology, the Arts and History’, which, had they been 
                                                
1 Samuel Parker, A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophie Being a Letter Written to his much 
Honoured Friend Mr N.B., (Oxford, 1666), pp. 79, 82. 
2 This is true of seventeenth-century disciplines as well as their (otherwise very different) modern 
counterparts. See Simon Schaffer, ‘How Disciplines Look’, in Andrew Barry and Georgina Born (eds.), 
Interdisciplinarity: Reconfigurations of the Social and Natural Sciences, (London, 2013), 57-81, p. 58. 
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recovered, would have been ‘advantageously instructive unto all…and copied out for the 
publick use’.3 
   This thesis asks questions about disciplines in general. However, my attention is largely 
focused on the nature and uses of natural philosophy and theology. Mediating these 
particular disciplines was important, as together they produced epistemic and ontological 
judgements about man, nature and the divine. Natural philosophy was the study of body 
or nature.4 According to the Catholic philosopher, Sir Kenelm Digby (1603-1665), it was 
concerned with (but not limited to), ‘those bodies we conuerse withall’, and it aimed to 
discover ‘by what course and engines nature gouerneth their common motions’.5 
Throughout medieval Europe, and into the seventeenth century, it was taught and 
studied using Aristotle’s (384-322 BC) libri naturales.6 Though valued in its own right, it 
was also regarded as preparation for higher disciplines, pre-eminently theology. Theology 
was the study of the divine. For Aristotle, it was neither a science (which was subject to 
reason), nor an art (which was subject to procedure), but was rather based on belief.7 
However, in school theology, taught in medieval and early modern universities, articles of 
Christian faith were usually explained and expanded using demonstrative Aristotelian 
metaphysics, (as well as scripture and the Church Fathers).8 
   Both disciplines underwent considerable change in the seventeenth century, and their 
relationship was changeable and multifaceted. By mid-century, scholasticism’s textual 
Aristotelianism was giving way to more experimental, mathematical and mechanistic 
accounts of nature.9 Natural philosophy was consequently vulnerable to accusations of 
materialism, even atheism.10 Theology remained interested in what Thomas Barlow 
(1608/9-1691) called ‘Knowledge of God, and our Duty, and that Divine Worship which is 
                                                
3 Joseph Mead, The Works of the Pious and Profoundly-Learned Joseph Mede, B.D. sometime Fellow of Christ’s Colledge 
in Cambridge. Corrected and Enlarged according to the Author’s own Manuscripts, (London, 1677), ‘The General 
Preface’, unpaginated.  
4 See Ann Blair, ‘Natural Philosophy’, in Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (eds.), The Cambridge History 
of Science, Early Modern Science, (7 vols., Cambridge, 2003), III, 365-406.   
5 Sir Kenelm Digby, Two Treatises. In the one of which, The Natvre of Bodies; in the other, The Natvre of Mans Sovle; 
is looked into: in a way of discovery of the Immortality of Reasonable Sovles, (Paris, 1644), p. 144. 
6 William A. Wallace, ‘Natural Philosophy: Traditional Natural Philosophy’, in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin 
Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, with Jill Kraye (eds.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, (Cambridge, 
1988), 199-235, pp. 202-3. 
7 Harris Francis Fletcher, The Intellectual Development of John Milton, vol. II, (Urbana, 1961), p. 197. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Christoph Lüthy, ‘What to do with Seventeenth-Century Natural Philosophy? A Taxonomic Problem’, 
Perspectives on Science, 8 (2000), 164-95, p. 165. 
10 Michael Hunter, ‘Science and Heterodoxy: an Early Modern Problem Reconsidered’, in Science and the 
Shape of Orthodoxy: Intellectual Change in late seventeenth-century Britain, (Woodbridge, 1995), 225-44. 
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due to Him’.11 But the relationship between different types of religious writing – patristic 
doctrine, ecclesiastical and civil history, school-divinity, casuistry, popery, Socinianism, 
and church doctrine – was constantly shifting. The fluctuations in both disciplines 
prompted many seventeenth-century thinkers to establish (or re-establish) an appropriate 
relationship between the two. As such, scholars like Nicholas Jolley posit their 
relationship as a symptom of, or a means of explicating, the intellectual upheavals and 
transformations of the period.12 In an essay entitled, The Usefulness of Philosophy to Theology 
(1676),13 which formed part of a larger defence of the Royal Society’s experimental 
programme, Joseph Glanvill (1636-1680) remarked that: 
 
‘there was never more need that the Priests should be Philosophers, than in ours; 
For we are liable every day to be called out to make good our Foundations against 
the Atheist, the Sadduce, and Enthusiast; And ‘tis the Knowledge of God in his Works 
that must furnish us with some of the most proper Weapons of Defence’.14 
 
As I will discuss, the relationship between natural philosophy and theology took many 
forms because the content and structure of both disciplines were fluid and contestable. 
But their mobile and dynamic relationship also reflected the competing interests of 
different (although often overlapping) intellectual groups – philosophers and clerics, 
according to Glanvill, but also lawyers, physicians and mathematicians. 
   These issues are discussed in two branches of scholarship. The first analyses disciplines 
(somewhat abstractly), the second reconstructs early modern natural philosophy and 
theology. To date, these pursuits have not been thoroughly combined. By and large, the 
study of disciplines is left to sociologists of knowledge and some historians of science. 
They rightly define disciplines as groups of propositions, deliberately associated with 
particular ways of learning and teaching requirements.15 Disciplines prescribe methods 
and objects of study, but also establish criteria for knowledge, arbitrate between 
                                                
11 Thomas Barlow, Αυτοσχεδιασµατα, De Studio Theologiæ: or, Directions for the Choice of Books in the Study of 
Divinity, (Oxford, 1699), p. 1. 
12 Nicholas Jolley, ‘The Relation between Philosophy and Theology’, in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, (2 vols., Cambridge, 1998), I, 363-92. Natural 
philosophy and theology are therefore more useful categories than science and religion. See Andrew 
Cunningham, ‘Getting the game right: Some plain words on the Identity and Invention of Science’, Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science, 19 (1988), 365-89. For an overview of the science/religion historiography, 
see John Henry, ‘Religion and the Scientific Revolution’, in Peter Harrison (ed.), Science and Religion, 
(Cambridge, 2010), 39-58. See also, R. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern Science, (Edinburgh, 1984), 
pp. 57-78. 
13 Also titled, The Usefulness of Real Philosophy to Religion. 
14 Joseph Glanvill, Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion, (London, 1676), essay 4, p. 42. 
15 Rudolf Stichweh, ‘The Sociology of Scientific Disciplines: On the Genesis and Stability of the 
Disciplinary Structure of Modern Science’, Science in Context, 5 (1992), 3-15, p. 5. 
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orthodoxy and heterodoxy, create sites of economic activity (researching, publishing and 
teaching), and define communities of practitioners.16 These functions are fulfilled 
descriptively – creating a canon of past efforts, achievements and personnel – and 
normatively – identifying present and future interests and concerns.17 As such, disciplines 
are conceptual as well as social categories, reflecting the conceptual/epistemic and social 
dimensions to knowledge creation.18 This analysis is correct and useful. Unfortunately, it 
primarily focuses on modern disciplines, or “disciplinarity”, and scientific disciplines in 
particular. Early modern disciplines are side-lined or ignored. For example, in a co-edited 
volume, Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, and David J. Sylvan argue that 
disciplines did not exist before the late eighteenth/early nineteenth century.19 
   The opposite problem occurs in histories of the seventeenth century. Historians talk 
about natural philosophy and theology, but talk far less about the nature of disciplines: 
how they were constructed, what purposes they served, or why they were necessary for 
structuring and legitimising knowledge. Early modern disciplines had various 
components – source material, doctrine, method, and authorities. However, despite this 
complexity, scholars often construe them as coherently bordered, and thus relatable to 
one another in clear, uncomplicated ways. This is too simplistic, dismissing the possibility 
that disciplines overlap with, and differ from, one other simultaneously. The result is a 
simplified view of the relationship between natural philosophy and theology, whereby the 
two are either straightforwardly connected or separate. This binary can set up an equally 
uncomplicated power dynamic. As Ian Maclean argues, if natural philosophy and 
theology are in some way connected, either natural philosophy is regarded as subordinate 
to theology (the traditional view of medieval scholasticism), or the two disciplines are 
deemed to collaborate (evidenced by the practices of the Hartlib circle – the eclectic 
correspondence network centred around the London-based intelligencer, Samuel Hartlib 
(1600-1662)). If, however, natural philosophy and theology are separate, they will either 
be in conflict (in the case of Averroeist Aristotelianism and Christianity), or they will 
exist in peaceful coexistence (as they did in Jesuit pedagogy).20 
                                                
16 Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, and David J. Sylvan (eds.), Knowledges: Historical and Critical 
Studies in Disciplinarity, (Charlottesville, 1993), pp. vii-viii. 
17 Schaffer, ‘How Disciplines Look’, p. 57. 
18 David R. Shumway and Ellen Messer-Davidow, ‘Introduction’, Poetics Today, 19 (1988), 331-3, p. 332. 
19 Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan (eds.), Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity, p. 
vii. A weaker version of the thesis says that scientific disciplines originated in the late eighteenth/early 
nineteenth century, see Stichweh, ‘The Sociology of Scientific Disciplines’, p. 4.  
20 See Ian Maclean, ‘Certainty and Uncertainty in Early Modern Theology and Natural Philosophy’, in Simo 
Knuuttila and Risto Saarinen (eds.), Theology and Early Modern Philosophy, 1550-1750, (Helsinki, 2010), 103-
18, pp. 105-6. 
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   Andrew Cunningham is a prominent advocate of the connected thesis, arguing that 
natural philosophy was primarily and necessarily interested in God and his attributes. A 
weaker version of this argument claims that natural philosophy was conceived as the 
study of nature, defined, explicitly, as God’s creation. In any case, Cunningham holds 
that natural philosophy was a pious activity, unavoidably engaged with divine topics.21 
Indeed, for many seventeenth-century philosophers, natural philosophy served an 
obvious and important theological function. For example, in part one of Some 
Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy (1663), the chymist 
and experimenter Robert Boyle (1627-1691) said ‘God has made some knowledg of his 
Created Book, both conducive to the beliefe, and necessary to the Understanding, of his 
Written one’.22 However, as well as being theologically minded, or interested in 
theological questions, it has also been suggested that natural philosophy borrowed 
concepts and theories from theology. So, according to Margaret Osler, religious 
scepticism gave way to philosophical scepticism; Boylean claims that theology was above 
reason resulted in philosophical nescience; and competing views of providence – say, 
Gassendian vs. Cartesian – produced different matter theories, epistemologies, and 
metaphysics.23 Ideas lifted from theology were repurposed in natural philosophy. 
   On the other hand, several scholars claim natural philosophy and theology were, or 
increasingly became, estranged in the seventeenth century. Rather implausibly, Stephen 
Gaukroger contends that seventeenth-century natural philosophy developed its own 
sources of non-theological justification. For example, he argues, Francis Bacon (1561-
1626) said natural philosophy was warranted by the possibility of controlling nature; 
René Descartes (1596-1650) relied on the persona of the honnête homme to make his 
philosophy credible; and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) argued that the disinterestedness of 
his courtly patrons granted his astronomy objectivity.24 Peter Harrison disagrees, arguing 
that seventeenth-century philosophers were overwhelmingly motivated by piety, and 
                                                
21 See Cunningham, ‘Getting the game right’. These views were developed during a debate between 
Cunningham and Grant about the terms ‘science’ and ‘natural philosophy’. See Andrew Cunningham, ‘The 
Identity of Natural Philosophy. A Response to Edward Grant’, Early Science and Medicine, 5 (2000), 259-78; 
Edward Grant, ‘God and Natural Philosophy: The Late Middle Ages and Sir Isaac Newton’, Early Science 
and Medicine, 5 (2000), 279-98. 
22 Robert Boyle, The Works of Robert Boyle, edited by Michael Hunter and Edward B. Davis, (14 vols., 
London, 1999-2000), III, p. 219. 
23 M.J. Osler, ‘Mixing Metaphors: Science and Religion, or Natural Philosophy and Theology in Early 
Modern Europe’, History of Science, 36 (1998), 91-113.  
24 Stephen Gaukroger, ‘The Autonomy of Natural Philosophy: from Truth to Impartiality’, in Peter R. 
Anstey and John A. Schuster (eds.), The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century: patterns of change in early 
modern Natural Philosophy, (Dordrecht, 2005), 131-63, pp. 136-49. 
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framed their philosophies as Christian.25 However, agreeing with Gaukroger, and thus 
disagreeing with Cunningham, Harrison says Bacon, Galileo and Descartes all began 
excluding theological considerations from natural philosophical inquiries. According to 
Galileo in The Assayer (1623), philosophy was ‘written in this all-encompassing 
book…that is the universe’ and composed ‘in mathematical language’.26 Theology, 
conversely, was based on scripture, which, because it was in large part figurative, ‘has 
never been [permitted] to teach us the astronomical sciences’.27 Natural philosophy and 
theology were non-overlapping bodies of knowledge, and, as such, theology had no right 
to impose on philosophy.28 Harrison claims that by the second half of the seventeenth 
century, this disciplinary separation was causing a backlash. Natural philosophy and 
theology were reconnected, he argues, via the new discipline, Physico-Theology, which 
deployed the tools of natural philosophy to reach theological conclusions.29 
   Finally, Jolley holds that both formulations of the disciplinary relationship were given 
equal backing during the seventeenth century. Although he points to various medieval 
precursors, he identifies both traditions with the legacy of Cartesianism. According to 
Descartes, philosophy (by which he meant his philosophy) could serve theology – by, 
say, explicating the Eucharist – but was also independent of theology – and thus had 
little to say about grace or free will. Subsequent thinkers adopted one of these positions. 
Thus, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and Blaise Pascal 
(1623-1662) argued that philosophy was categorically separate from theology, while 
Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) claimed they were 
connected, philosophy illuminating theological doctrine and theology justifying 
philosophical views and practices.30   
   None of these scenarios are outlandish. Viewed cursorily, disciplines appear either 
connected or separate. Moreover, as devices used to facilitate university teaching, they 
were sites of conflicting interest and authority. However, closer inspection reveals a 
messier, more complicated picture. Seventeenth-century disciplines were composite 
entities: including subject matter, source materials, cognitive principles, methods, and 
                                                
25 See Peter Harrison, ‘Physico-Theology and the Mixed Sciences: The Role of Theology in Early Modern 
Natural Philosophy’, in Peter R. Anstey and John A. Schuster (eds.), The Science of Nature in the Seventeenth 
Century: patterns of change in early modern Natural Philosophy, (Dordrecht, 2005), 165-83, p. 171. 
26 Galileo Galilei, The Essential Galileo, edited and translated by Maurice A. Finocchiaro, (Cambridge, 2008), 
p. 183. 
27 Ibid., p. 141. 
28 See Rivka Feldhay, ‘Religion’, in Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Science, Early Modern Science, (7 vols., Cambridge, 2003), III, 725-55, pp. 745-6. 
29 Harrison, ‘Physico-Theology’. 
30 Jolley, ‘The Relation between Philosophy and Theology’.  
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group practices. These elements combined to determine whether a discipline dealt in 
knowledge or belief – whether it was demonstrable or probable. Different authors 
stressed or prioritised these elements differently, and because disciplines interacted 
across several areas, authors sometimes presented inconsistent accounts of disciplinary 
relationships. The point is that disciplines related to one another in multiple ways 
simultaneously, both pulling each other together and drawing each other apart. This 
dissertation sheds light on this messiness and complexity. In doing so, it demonstrates 
the nuance and fluidity of early modern disciplinary relationships, and the relationship 
between seventeenth-century natural philosophy and theology in particular. I implicitly 
argue that, as disciplines store and organise knowledge, the placement and contestability 
of disciplinary boundaries is indicative of the negotiable and contested nature of 
knowledge. 
   In the remainder of this introduction I will flesh out the two functions performed by 
seventeenth-century disciplines. First, I will look at the structural characteristics of early 
modern disciplines. The intelligibility and legitimacy of knowledge-claims depended on 
disciplinary location. However, as disciplines were composed of various elements, they 
overlapped with, and alienated, one another simultaneously. Second, I will place 
disciplines in their university and social contexts. University and curricular structures 
reflected social hierarchies, which affected the division of knowledge into disciplines. As 
such, disciplines engaged questions of intellectual authority and hierarchy. Overall, the 
protean nature of disciplines meant disciplinary relationships were varied and author-
dependent; they were not, in short, reducible to a simple connected/separated 
distinction. 
 
 
II .  Knowledge and disc ip l inary boundaries  
 
Early modern disciplines housed collections of doctrine. But these concrete doctrinal 
commitments were related to, or derived from, more abstract, structural principles. 
Therefore, fundamentally, disciplines were the arenas in which knowledge and argument 
(pertaining to a designated topic or area) were structured and legitimised. Conventionally, 
disciplines married conceptual commitments with a particular methodology. This 
foundation established loose disciplinary parameters – prescribing source material, 
subject matter and epistemic status. Violating these boundaries meant moving from one 
 8 
disciplinary inquiry into another. (Harrison says repeat violations could prompt the 
creation of a new discipline – e.g. Physico-Theology).31 In other words, a proposition 
acceptable in one discipline could be totally incongruous in another. Although 
disciplinary boundaries were occasionally absolute, they were more often partial or 
overlapping.  
   Disciplines were modes of structured argumentation. They were usually governed by 
either method or subject matter, each informing the other. Take pre-Copernican 
astronomy, a discipline in close relation to mathematics and natural philosophy. 
Conventionally, astronomy used geometric principles to track and predict the motion of 
celestial objects. Astronomers could speculate about the causes of observed motions, or 
their place within a general physical schema. But their remit, established by the scope of 
astronomy’s mathematical method, debarred them from making definitive statements 
about the natural order. Such judgements were found in natural philosophy, and could 
only be reached by logical demonstration.32 Thus, in his prefatory letter for Nicolaus 
Copernicus’s (1473-1543) De Revolutionibus (1543), Andreas Osiander (1498-1552) said 
astronomers ‘cannot in any way attain to the true causes [of celestial motions]’, and must 
simply ‘adopt whatever suppositions enable the motions to be computed correctly from 
the principles of geometry’.33 
   As well as establishing a discourse’s starting point or first principles, disciplines set the 
general direction and end of argumentation. Without these parameters, disciplines would 
not function as useful discursive categories. For example, theological discussion was 
made possible by the shared assumption that theology was, in some sense, about the 
nature of God and religious belief. However, disciplinary parameters were usually flexible 
and subject to interpretation. Therefore, the content of a discipline was rarely universally 
agreed upon. So, although theologians all studied God, they disagreed about what could 
actually be known about him. This is apparent when (broadly) comparing medieval 
Thomists and Ockhamists.34 The former said it was possible to make rational inferences 
about God. They argued that man’s reason was analogous (though immeasurably 
inferior) to God’s essence, and was therefore capable of (weakly) partaking in God’s 
                                                
31 Harrison, ‘Physico-Theology’. 
32 See Robert, S. Westman, ‘The Astronomer’s Role in the Sixteenth Century: a Preliminary Study’, History 
of Science, 18 (1980), 105-47, pp. 108-9. 
33 Nicholas Copernicus, On the Revolutions, translation and commentary by Edward Rosen, (Baltimore, 
1992), p. xx. 
34 Edith Dudley Sylla, ‘Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of 
Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist’, in John E. Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla (eds.), The Cultural 
Context of Medieval Learning, (Boston, 1975), 349-77, pp. 73-4. 
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glory. Insofar as God imprinted his (rational) essence on his creation, man was able to 
analyse the world and learn something of God.35 The latter, on the other hand, held God 
to be inscrutable. ‘Theological truths’, according to William of Ockham (1287-1347), ‘will 
not be knowledge strictly so-called’, i.e. they will not be demonstrative, because 
‘attributes cannot be demonstrated of God’.36 Finite minds could not know or 
demonstrate the infinite; the divine was apprehended by faith alone.37 In both cases, a 
view about divine knowledge or understanding was articulated through a particular 
conception of the discipline, theology.  
      Fundamentally, then, disciplines legitimised argument. They showed, for example, 
that knowledge derived from appropriate source materials and operated within known 
cognitive limitations. As such, argument or discussion could only coherently take place 
within a disciplinary context. As disciplines differed from one another, arguments 
acceptable or valid in one discipline might be unacceptable or invalid in another. 
Therefore, how and what one argued for, depended entirely on which discipline one was 
engaged in. Consequently, the same phenomena could be interpreted – i.e. argued about 
– from different disciplinary perspectives, resulting in radically different accounts of 
nature. This is demonstrated by the Jesuit Gabriele Beati’s (1607-1673) various responses 
to Galileo’s sunspot observations. Writing natural philosophy in 1650, Beati cited 
Averroes (1126-1198) to argue that, like lunar spots, the spots on the sun were examples 
of condensation or rarefaction, and therefore ‘do not contradict the [Aristotelian notion 
of the] incorruptibility of the heavens’.38 However, twelve years later, in a maths textbook 
that drew heavily on Galilean astronomy, Beati described the spots as clouds, and 
evidence of the heavens’ corruptibility.39 Beati had not changed his mind. He was merely 
respecting the disciplinary sources and parameters associated with each genre of writing: 
Galileo – an astronomer – was a legitimate reference in a maths textbook. According to 
Maclean, this tension was caused by early modern thinkers’ willingness to 
‘compartmentalize their minds’.40 That may be so. But mental compartmentalisation was 
itself a consequence of a two-fold disciplinary pressure. First, disciplines had particular 
                                                
35 Robert Hoopes, Right Reason in the English Renaissance, (Cambridge MA, 1962), pp. 73-85. 
36 John Lee Longeway (ed. and transl.), Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham: A 
Translation of Summa Logicae III-II: De Syllogismo, and Selections from the Prologue to the Ordinatio, (Notre Dame, 
2007), pp. 227, 230. 
37 See Hoopes, Right Reason, pp. 85-95; John Morgan, Godly Learning: Puritan attitudes towards Reason, Learning 
and Education, 1560-1640, (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 41-2. 
38 Beati, quoted in Renee Raphael, ‘Teaching Sunspots: Disciplinary Identity and Scholarly Practice in the 
Collegio Romano’, History of Science, 52 (2014), 130-52, p. 130. 
39 See Ibid., pp. 130-1, 140-1. 
40 See Ian Maclean, ‘The Science of Nature and the Science of God: Conflict and Collaboration in the 
Early Modern Period’, Filozofia, 63 (2008), 352-64, p. 356. 
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structures – epistemic and organisational features that differentiated one discipline from 
another. This meant the authorities, arguments, and conclusions useable in maths or 
astronomy were, for the Jesuits at that time, unusable in natural philosophy. And second, 
disciplinary communities enforced these distinctions. Jesuits demanded obedience to the 
Church and Order, and, as I will discuss below, university faculty members regulated 
disciplinary practices. Different disciplines had different ends, defined and policed by 
disciplinary communities. Copernicanism only gained acceptance as an accurate 
description of physical reality from the mid-seventeenth century, and the Jesuits, as a 
corporate body, did not approve this epistemic view until some time later. Jesuit 
astronomy served a particular purpose – observing and measuring celestial motions and 
making mathematical predictions. But by disagreeing with natural philosophy, it 
sacrificed – in the eyes of the Jesuits – its claim to truth. 
   Hobbes encountered similar issues when talking about natural philosophy and 
theology. In De Corpore (1655), he claimed philosophy exclusively engaged with ‘sensible 
things’, and could not account for, or accept, incorporeal substances.41 Consequently, 
although he said nothing could be known of God, Hobbes implied that God was 
corporeal. However, in an unpublished text, known as Anti-White, he remarked that, 
because it ‘cannot be known by natural reason whether any substances are 
incorporeal…what has been revealed supernaturally by God must be accepted as true’.42 
So, in a theological vein, God could be invoked non-philosophically as incorporeal.43 
Thus, the type of claim one could make about God – e.g. whether he was material or 
incorporeal – was determined by disciplinary context.  
   Disciplines were organisational devices that coherently combined doctrine, method, 
epistemic valuation etc. Grouping these and other attributes or elements, disciplines also 
made it easier to compare disparate bodies of knowledge. For instance, disciplines drew 
attention to incommensurate or contradictory argumentation. Conflict was mediated in 
two ways. Either, one discipline was granted the authority to overrule another. Or, 
noting the differences in each discipline’s foundations and concerns, their inconsistencies 
were accommodated by concluding that, to some degree, they worked at cross-purposes. 
The sixteenth-century Italian scholastic, Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), controversially 
                                                
41 Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, edited by William Molesworth, (11 
vols., London, 1839), I, pp. 75, 73. 
42 Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Hobbes: Thomas White’s De Mundo Examined, translated by Harold Whitmore 
Jones, (London, 1976), p. 54. For the original Latin, see Thomas Hobbes, Critique du De Mundo de Thomas 
White, edition critique d’un texte inédit par Jean Jacquot et Harold Whitmore Jones, (Paris, 1973), p. 127. 
43 See Cees Leijenhorst, ‘Hobbes, Heresy and Corporeal Deity’, in John B§rooke and Ian Maclean (eds.), 
Heterodoxy in Early Modern Science and Religion, (Oxford, 2005), 193-222, pp. 207-8. 
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took this approach in De Immortalitate Animae (1516). Before the translation of the 
Aristotelian corpus into Latin in the thirteenth century, the soul was widely assumed to 
be an incorporeal, immortal substance, capable of existing independently of body.44 
However, Aristotle complicated the issue by defining the soul as the form of the body. 
As a compromise or synthesis, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) claimed the soul was the 
form of body – and not an independent substance – but was also self-sufficient, and 
could exist separately from body.45 In his lectures and commentaries, Pomponazzi 
rejected the Thomist and Averroist position that the soul was immaterial.46 However, 
regarding the soul, as with much else, he expressed doubts about his own judgement.47 
On the one hand, he said, Aristotle classified the soul as an object of natural philosophy, 
which, like all changing, physical entities, was perishable.48 On the other, although ‘no 
natural reasons can be brought forth proving that the soul is immortal’, God ‘himself has 
made manifest in word and deed that the soul is immortal’.49 The tension derived from 
the different methods and standards of proof associated with natural philosophy and 
theology. Pomponazzi thus resurrected the Averroeist suggestion that Aristotelianism 
was unable to corroborate Christian truths. Still, he deferred to the theological view,50 
claiming that, because ‘the soul is immortal is an article of faith…it ought to be proved 
by what is proper to faith…revelation and canonical Scripture’.51  
   As well as exposing incompatibilities, disciplines also highlighted commonalities 
between bodies of knowledge. In the Thomistic tradition, for example, knowledge was 
divided into contemplative disciplines, like arithmetic, geometry, physics and 
metaphysics; and active disciplines, like morality, history and medicine. Many 
Renaissance humanists distinguished the arts, or practical precepts, from the sciences, or 
theoretical doctrines. In addition, disciplines could be grouped by object of study, e.g. 
                                                
44 Lorenzo Casini, ‘The Renaissance Debate on the Immortality of the Soul. Pietro Pomponazzi and the 
Plurality of Substantial Form’, in Paul J.J.M. Bakker and Johannes M.M.H. Thijssen (eds.), Mind, Cognition 
and Representation: The Tradition of Commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, (Aldershot, 2007), 127-50, p. 128. 
45 Ibid., pp. 129-30. 
46 Eckhard Kessler, ‘The Intellective Soul’, in Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, with 
Jill Kraye (eds.), The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, (Cambridge, 1988), 485-536, pp. 501-2. 
47 Ian Maclean, ‘Heterodoxy in Natural Philosophy and Medicine: Pietro Pomponazzi, Guglielmo 
Gratarolo, Girolamo Cardano’, in John Brooke and Ian Maclean (eds.), Heterodoxy in Early Modern Science 
and Religion, (Oxford, 2005), 1-29, pp. 10-17. 
48 Martin L. Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi: Radical Philosopher of the Renaissance, (Padova, 1986), pp. 8-9. 
49 Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall Jr. (eds.), The Renaissance Philosophy of 
Man, (Chicago, 1948), pp. 377, 378. 
50 Although this is disputed, see Pine, Pietro Pomponazzi. 
51 Cassirer, Kristeller, and Randall, Renaissance Philosophy of Man, p. 379. 
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human activities, nature, and the divine.52 This often created considerable disciplinary 
overlap. For example, John Locke (1632-1704) described theology as, among other 
things, ‘Knowledge of God’ and ‘the Honour and Veneration of the Creator’.53 However, 
he also included ‘God himself, Angels, [and] Spirits’ in his list of natural philosophical 
topics.54 
   This brings us to the issue of disciplinary boundaries.55 Boundaries took two forms. 
First, they established a cut-off point, beyond which discussions or arguments no longer 
belonged to a particular discipline. By straying into foreign topics or using incongruous 
methods of inquiry or reasoning, arguments violated disciplinary boundaries, and/or 
became a different discourse. This sort of boundary created strict disciplinary separation, 
ensuring disciplines were established on different principles, developed by different 
methods, and engaged in different subjects. Within the scholastic tradition, Duns Scotus 
(1266-1308) characterised the boundary between natural philosophy and theology in 
these terms. Opposing Aquinas, Scotus advocated a voluntarist theology that became 
influential throughout early modern Europe.56 He said ‘the first efficient cause [God] 
does not cause in virtue of something else, neither does this cause direct its effect to an 
end by reason of something other than itself, for otherwise it would not be first’.57 As 
such, divine actions were not performed in accordance with predefined notions of 
goodness or reason. God’s actions were good by virtue of him doing them. Further, 
because the ‘source of contingent action is…the will’, God was not a suitable subject for 
rational inference or calculation.58 Natural philosophy, which dealt in reason and logic, 
therefore had nothing to do with theology.   
   Perhaps the most extreme seventeenth-century example of this boundary setting is 
found in Hobbes, writing in the 1640s. In Anti-White, he defined philosophy as a 
linguistic activity constructed by syllogism. Words, he argued, were noises used to denote 
thoughts, which themselves resulted from the physical impact made on the senses by 
external objects. Therefore, for Hobbes, philosophy was a propositional description of 
                                                
52 See Richard Serjeantson, ‘Proof and Persuasion’, in Katharine Park and Daston Lorraine (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of Science, Early Modern Science, (7 vols., Cambridge, 2003), III, 132-75, pp. 136-7.  
53 John Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, with introduction by John Yolton, (Bristol, 1993), p. 66. 
54 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited with an introduction by Peter H. Nidditch, 
(Oxford, 1975), p. 720. 
55 For a comparison of two different conceptualisations of disciplinary boundaries, see Ann Blair, ‘Bodin, 
Montaigne and the Role of Disciplinary Boundaries’, in Donald R. Kelley (ed.), History and the Disciplines: the 
Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, (Rochester, 1997), 29-40.   
56 See Roger Ariew, Descartes and the Last Scholastics, (Ithaca, 1999), pp. 39-57; Roger Ariew, ‘Scotists, 
Scotists Everywhere’, Intellectual News, 8 (2000), 14-21. 
57 Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings, edited and translated by Allan Wolter, (London, 1962), p. 53. 
58 Ibid., p. 56. 
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physical things. This rendering cut it off, entirely, from theology. Theological matters 
defied philosophical presentation because man was ‘quite unable either to perceive them 
or to imagine them’.59 God was beyond man’s comprehension and thus outside the scope 
of syllogism. Philosophical matters were equally estranged from theology, for, ‘when a 
demonstration persuades us of the truth of any proposition, that is no longer faith, but is 
natural knowledge’.60 The boundary between natural philosophy and theology was 
therefore absolute, isolating both method and subject matter. 
   Before Hobbes, Bacon had tried to impose a similarly strict boundary between natural 
philosophy and theology. He claimed each discipline derived from a different cognitive 
process (reason and faith), and was developed by different methodologies (induction and 
deduction). Consequently, philosophical premises – inductive inferences made from 
sensory information – could not be lifted from scripture or theology. This was the 
theory. In practice, Bacon was slightly less rigorous. For instance, he engaged in 
mythopoetics – studying ancient fables for allegorical lessons in philosophy, politics and 
morality. Here – so, admittedly, when operating in a different disciplinary context – 
philosophy and theology were drawn far closer together. Fables, he said, were a ‘veil’ 
between lost ancient learning and modern traditions.61 They therefore contained 
fragments of wisdom, forgotten by posterity. Transgressing his own disciplinary rules, 
Bacon said one could extract philosophical positions from fables that were untested by 
induction and possibly lifted from sacred history.  
   This was only a minor aberration on Bacon’s part, but it demonstrates how hard it was 
to stringently keep the two disciplines apart. Total separation was incredibly rare among 
pre-modern thinkers. Either intentionally or inadvertently, most allowed some 
association between the two. As such, the second type of disciplinary boundary was not a 
clear delimitation, but involved a degree of overlap. The boundary consisted of the 
area(s) that disciplines had in common – where they addressed the same issue or relied 
on the same method. The subjects, principles, or practices unique to each discipline 
existed either side of the coterminous area. For Aquinas, natural philosophy and theology 
were bordered in this fashion. They were distinguished by their respective characteristics 
and intentions. The former derived from reason and queried natural substances; the latter 
was based on faith, for only revelation disclosed God’s nature.62 But, alongside these 
                                                
59 Hobbes, De Mundo Examined, p. 310. For the original Latin, see Hobbes, Critique du De Mundo, p. 312. 
60 Ibid., p. 306. 
61 Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas 
Denon Heath, (14 vols., London, 1857-1874), VI, p. 695. 
62 Jolley, ‘The Relation between Philosophy and Theology’, p. 364. 
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differences, there were many areas of overlap. Since its translation into Latin in the 
thirteenth century, the Aristotelian model of science – syllogistically deriving knowledge 
from indemonstrable first principles – had been used to systematise (philosophical) 
knowledge. Scholastics like Aquinas applied this methodology to theology, deducing 
doctrine from matters of faith, or indemonstrable theological first principles.63 Though it 
was not always possible to explicate a Christian mystery by reason alone, reason and 
mystery were considered compatible.64 Natural philosophy and theology also enjoyed 
some conceptual correspondence. The former could be studied in its own right, but its 
main task was to explicate theological doctrine. According to Aquinas, theological 
conclusions were derivable from the study of nature. God could be known – his 
existence manifested – ‘through his activity or effects’, i.e. the apparent intelligibility of 
the natural order.65 In addition, natural philosophy investigated the nature and operations 
of spirit. This Thomistic set-up, and its disciplinary cross-pollination, continued to find 
favour in the seventeenth century. For example, the English Catholic, Thomas White 
(1593-1676), argued that theology was produced by philosophically glossing articles of 
faith, a contention that brought him into conflict with Hobbes.  
   Several divines in seventeenth-century Cambridge – Henry More (1614-1687) and 
Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688) most prominently – envisaged even further disciplinary 
overlap.66 Both men drew on ancient and modern philosophical sources, pre-eminently 
Plato (428/7 or 424/3-348/7) and Plotinus (204/5-270), to engage theological 
propositions, and defend them against atheistical or religious attack. According to More 
and Cudworth, Platonism gave the best account of the soul, and provided a metaphysics 
capable of redeeming crude atomistic matter theories – the ‘Spirit of Nature’ for More, 
‘Plastic Nature’ for Cudworth.67 In More’s view, philosophy and theology both derived 
from a Mosaic prisca theologia, subsequently divided into different schools and disciplines. 
Along with true religion, philosophy and theology expressed a single rationality, and 
                                                
63 Charles H. Lohr, ‘Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy as Sciences: the Catholic and Protestant Views in 
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65 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Questions on God, edited by Brian Leftow and Brian Davies, 
(Cambridge, 2006), p. 157. 
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therefore ‘There is no real clashing at all betwixt any genuine Point of Christianity and what true 
Philosophy and right Reason does determine or allow’.68 
   For More, the points of overlap between natural philosophy and theology were 
extensive enough to form a distinct disciplinary subcategory – natural theology. In his 
Ecclesiastes (1669), the cleric and Royal Society member, John Wilkins (1614-1672), 
defined natural theology as divine knowledge derived from ‘the Principles of Reason, 
improved by Consideration and Experience, without the help of Revelation’. This 
distinguished it from revealed or ‘Instituted’ knowledge, which contained doctrines that 
were unknowable ‘unless they had been particularly revealed’.69 The former relied on the 
tools of natural philosophy, and, in some sense, was formed at its intersection with 
theology. Scholarship is undecided as to whether natural theology was a species of 
theology, a set of inferences derived from the study of nature, or co-extensive with 
natural philosophy.70 For our purposes, however, the mere existence of natural theology 
is important because it shows the potential for natural philosophy and theology to be 
tightly, sometimes comprehensively, interwoven.71  
   According to Harrison, Physico-Theology, or the use of philosophical expertise to 
demonstrate theological propositions, was a late seventeenth-century phenomenon, 
pioneered by Royal Society virtuosi, and Boyle in particular.72 Physico-Theology and 
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natural theology are basically synonymous.73 Both provide natural accounts of religious 
or theological doctrine, and constitute a point of disciplinary intersection, tended to by 
both philosophical and clerical thinkers. Nevertheless, the range of arguments included 
under the banner of natural theology was not novel to the late seventeenth century.74 
(Although, it is arguable that they took on new significance in the seventeenth century 
because, generally speaking, natural philosophy and theology were less entwined than 
they were in, say, the thirteenth century).  
   Plato and the Church Fathers made natural theological excursuses: assuming that, 
because human and divine creations were similar, something about God could be known 
by analogy.75 Medieval authors also displayed a keen interest in acquiring knowledge of 
God through reason and experience. Anselm (1033-1109), for example, conceptualised 
God as that than which nothing greater can be thought.76 God must therefore exist in 
reality, he argued, for if he did not, any entity with existence would be greater than God, 
undercutting the original definition.77 As discussed, Aquinas was committed to various a 
posteriori arguments for God’s existence. Simple observation, he said, would make one 
aware, first, of the purposefulness of nature, and second, of the chains of causation that 
must logically end in an uncaused first cause. Aquinas acknowledged that ‘from God’s 
effects we do not come to understand what God’s nature is in itself’.78 But his natural 
theological arguments were enough to combat Averroism, which stressed the un-
Christian elements of Aristotle – the eternality of the world, the mortality of the soul, 
and the absence of sub-lunar providence – and the alienation of philosophy from 
theology.79 
   The ‘confessional age’ subsequently produced competing Catholic and Protestant 
natural theologies.80 But, still, the most fertile period for natural theological speculation 
                                                
73 John Brooke and Geoffrey Cantor, Reconstructing Nature: the Engagement of Science and Religion’, (Edinburgh, 
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began in the second half of the seventeenth century (perhaps explaining Harrison’s claim 
about the invention of Physico-Theology), and lasted well into the eighteenth, usually as 
a means of demonstrating the harmony between Christianity and Newtonian physics. 
Wilkins wrote extensively on ‘Natural Religion, which men might know, and should be 
obliged unto, by the meer principles of Reason, improved by Consideration and 
Experience, without the help of Revelation’.81 Boyle argued that rational religion was an 
antidote to English sectarianism. He also endowed a series of sermons – known as the 
Boyle lectures – commissioned to demonstrate the truth of Christianity, and highlight its 
compatibility with the new philosophy.82 More took a similar view to Boyle, although he 
co-opted more of the latter’s experimental research for theological ends than Boyle – 
famed for his epistemic cautiousness – was comfortable with.83 
   Natural theology therefore had various uses. As well as demonstrating (but more often, 
justifying) the existence of God; it served as an ecumenical basis for belief; acted as a 
vehicle for confessional doctrinarism; and helped deflect suspicion from philosophical 
doctrine, Aristotelian and mechanistic. These variables aside, natural theology was 
created when the coterminous elements of natural philosophy and theology were so 
considerable that they constituted their own disciplinary subdivision. So, although it was 
not put in these terms by seventeenth-century thinkers, natural theology was an extreme 
logical consequence of loose, porous disciplinary boundaries.  
   Alongside these two boundary models, disciplines could relate to one another in a third 
way: one discipline leading to, or acting as a condition for, another. The archetype for 
this type of relationship was Aristotelian metabasis – the use of methods associated with 
one discipline on the subject matter of another. In Posterior Analytics, Aristotle prohibited 
metabasis, saying it was impossible to ‘prove by any other science the theorems of a 
different one’. However, he argued, an exception was made when the conclusion of one 
science became a premise in another. These sciences ‘are so related to one another that 
the one is under the other’, and were known as subalternating and subalternate sciences.84 
Examples included geometry and optics – the former establishing theoretical principles 
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that were practically applied in the latter. In the fourteenth century, Ockham expanded 
the range of subalternation, which made metabasis a widely acceptable practice.85 
Consequently, mathematical principles began featuring in natural philosophy, ethics and 
theology.86 And, in the seventeenth century, mechanistic theories were transplanted into 
physics, cosmology, and even political theory.87 
   This sort of disciplinary relationship also had a less formal iteration, in which one 
discipline covered subjects or drew conclusions that freed or encouraged an inquirer to 
engage with another discipline. This is how More and Cudworth conceived the 
relationship between natural philosophy and natural theology. The former attempted to 
explain nature mechanically. However, mechanistic theories were unable to account for 
all natural phenomena, which implied, or demonstrated, the existence and operation of 
incorporeal substances.88 As such, More characterised natural philosophy as ‘the first step to 
the abstrusest mysteries in Natural Theologie’.89 
   In summary: disciplines were complex organisational categories that structured and 
legitimised knowledge and argument. Viewed plainly, they were bodies of knowledge. 
However, they were underpinned, and had their parameters set, by a range of factors – 
source material, method, type of cognitive apparatus, and epistemic status. These 
elements were variously combined and prioritised. A discipline’s parameters and content 
were therefore contestable, and disciplines related to one another in fluid, messy, 
sometimes inconsistent ways. The relationship between natural philosophy and theology 
was particularly mutable. Hobbes advocated total separation, but this was unusual. By 
and large, overlap was expected. However, the areas of overlap were various and 
complex, and determined by the interests of particular thinkers. More regarded natural 
philosophy and theology as similar, virtually coextensive, while White claimed the former 
led to, and explicated, the latter. Others, like Bacon, were inconsistent: advertising, then 
flouting, disciplinary boundaries. To say natural philosophy and theology were simply 
connected or separate is therefore reductionist. Disciplinary arrangements were 
variegated, mirroring the complexity and complication inherent in the nature of 
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disciplines. Beyond these structural issues, disciplines were also subject to institutional 
pressures.  
 
 
III .  Univers i t i es  and curr i cula 
 
As well as the relatively abstract function discussed above, disciplines had a concrete 
place within early modern pedagogy. University faculties and their disciplines were 
ordered hierarchically – theology at the top, the arts course and natural philosophy as 
propaedeutic. This allowed knowledge to be divided into teachable and learnable 
segments, but also articulated various social and professional conventions. Whether 
teachers and students worked within these curricular conventions, or tried to subvert or 
remake them – perhaps by teaching subjects not prescribed by the statutes – disciplines 
reflected, and were subject to, the authority of disciplinary communities and 
practitioners.90 Therefore, when groups of scholars contested issues of priority and 
authority, the content, stature and influence of disciplines were likewise contested.91  
   Medieval universities in northern Europe – like Oxford and Cambridge – followed a 
common scholastic format.92 The arts course was divided into two parts – bachelors and 
masters. The former consisted of the seven liberal arts – the trivium and quadrivium – 
the latter involved natural philosophy, ethics and metaphysics. Both parts were based on 
the Aristotelian corpus, and were regarded as groundwork for further graduate study. 
Doctoral work was offered in the three professional disciplines: theology, the highest 
discipline, medicine and law.93 
   In the sixteenth century, undergraduate courses took on additional material. Natural 
philosophy was introduced earlier, facilitated by the invention of the printing press, and 
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demanded by the increased need for educated clergy and state administrators.94 By the 
seventeenth, undergraduate curricula at Oxford and Cambridge – said to be in ‘essential 
harmony’ – had been expanded to include a range of arts and sciences, some drawn from 
the graduate curriculum.95 At the same time, English grammar schools provided 
sufficient grounding in the Roman poets and orators, and Oxford ceased instruction in 
grammar.96 According to the Bishop of Lincoln, Robert Sanderson (1587-1663), the arts 
were instrumental disciplines, like rhetoric or logic; while the sciences were either 
contemplative, like mathematics, physics and metaphysics, or active, like ethics, 
economics and politics.97 Notwithstanding curricular modifications in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, theology remained the pinnacle of learning, though not a major 
plank of undergraduate study. Thus, the Directions for a Student in the Universitie, attributed 
to Richard Holdsworth (1590-1649), master of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, 1637-
1643, recommended rhetoric, logic, philosophy – moral, natural and metaphysical – 
mathematics, history, poetry, and some theology.98 This breadth was a concession to 
humanistic notions of  “encyclopaedic” learning.99 But it was also designed to allow 
students from noble backgrounds – many of whom did not finish their degrees – to 
cover as many subjects as possible.100 Consequently, students were exposed to competing 
intellectual viewpoints. In seventeenth-century Cambridge, for example, natural 
philosophy was taught using scholastic textbooks by Johannes Magirus (1560-1596), 
Johann Alsted (1588-1638), and Bartholomew Keckermann (1572-1608), but also works 
by new philosophers like William Gilbert (1544-1603), Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), 
Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655), Descartes, and Boyle.101 
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   In religious or theological terms, universities also catered for a range of perspectives. 
According to Nicholas Tyacke, academic communities generally reflected shifts in 
national politics and religion.102 As such, he argues, before the English Civil War, 
university appointees – to both teaching and governmental positions – tended to be 
Arminian: for example, William Laud (1573-1645), the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
became chancellor of Oxford in 1630.103 Puritans later flooded the universities as a result 
of the liberal religious settlement of the Interregnum.104 But they were eventually 
replaced with high churchmen following the Restoration, the Act of Uniformity (1662), 
and the Conventicle Acts (1664 and 1670).105 While not untrue, this history is somewhat 
broad brush. In fact, there were clear political and religious differences between 
colleges.106 Moreover, although university appointees reflected changing political and 
religious currents, at Cambridge there was still a high degree of religious plurality before 
the Civil War and during the Interregnum.107 
   Disciplinary hierarchies were established in two ways. In some cases, disciplines were 
ranked according to their instrumentality to other disciplines. This affected the order in 
which they appeared on curricula. For example, logic was taught to undergraduates as 
part of the trivium and then applied in other areas of study.108 Similarly, natural 
philosophy prepared students for more advanced, graduate disciplines. For Aristotle, 
physics was the theoretical science of body, or changing entities with separate 
existence.109 This definition was fleshed out in early modern teaching manuals. For 
example, Johann Stier (1599-1648) published a popular seventeenth-century textbook in 
1628 – used in Cambridge thereafter – which claimed physics ascertained principles and 
characteristics common to all bodies. However, he further argued, its specific inquiries 
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ranged from the heavens to the elements, imperfect and perfect mixed bodies, the 
human body and soul.110 
   As this list suggests, natural philosophy furnished medicine with principles usable for 
improving health.111 This disciplinary connection was particularly evident in the mid- to 
late-seventeenth century, when, as the Civil War damaged the reputations of law and 
theology, medicine became a popular graduate option in England.112 As Boyle remarked, 
anatomists must ‘be skill’d in some other things over and above that of dextrously 
Dissecting’. Namely, they must be proficient in natural philosophy. To understand parts 
of the body, one needs ‘competent knowledge of the Nature of those Juices that are to 
pass thorow them…And the Nature of these Juices will scarce be exactly known, without 
some skill in divers parts of Physiology, and especially in Chymistry’. In addition, ‘the 
Origination, Shape, Bulk, Length, progress, and Insertion of each particular Muscle, can 
hardly be well accounted for, without some skill in the Principles of Mechanicks’.113 As 
such, the Regius Professor of Physic in Cambridge, Francis Glisson (1599?-1677), 
championed natural philosophy as a means of defending William Harvey’s (1578-1657) 
anatomical discoveries.114 
   Homing back in on the subject of this thesis, natural philosophy was also integral to 
the discipline of theology. University curricula were based on the assumption that 
theological analysis drew upon techniques and concepts taught to students in natural 
philosophy. In his Directions for the Choice of Books in the Study of Divinity (1699), Barlow said 
revelatory theology ‘is to be understood by considering the Text it self’, along with 
commentators like Martin Luther (1483-1546), Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), John 
Calvin (1509-1564) for the Old Testament; and Theodore Beza (1519-1605), Juan 
Maldonatus (1533-1583), Henry Hammond (1605-1660) for the New.115 But Barlow also 
urged theologians to ‘be acquainted with School-Divinity…[namely] Lombard, and Aquinas’, 
for which natural philosophy and the arts were methodological and conceptual 
primers.116 School concepts helped illuminate Christian doctrine. For example, ideas of 
essence and person explained how the Trinitarian God existed in three persons, but one 
being; and concepts like substance and accident demonstrated that the bread in the 
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Eucharist could be transubstantiated but remain visibly unchanged.117 In addition, 
scholastics took the logic found in philosophical exposition, and re-used it to deduce 
doctrine from articles of faith, thus turning theology into a demonstrative science.118 This 
had widespread academic approval – for example, Keckermann, a philosopher of the 
schools who used philosophical reasoning in theology, was recommended to Christ’s 
College students by Mede.119 
   Nevertheless, the sixteenth century heralded a challenge to these curricular and 
disciplinary conventions, as Luther and Calvin sought to divorce theology from 
philosophy, and from Aristotle in particular. According to Richard Popkin, their 
campaign against reason was so fierce that western views of knowledge have never fully 
recovered.120 However, the Reformers’ attacks on reason were nuanced, and not an 
outright repudiation.121 Reason and philosophy remained instrumental to Reformist 
theology and pedagogy, and Protestant polemicists relied on technical Aristotelian 
terminology in disputes about justification, grace and the nature of Christ.122 These 
practices were reflected, and catered for, in Reformist curricula. For example, at the 
University of Wittenberg, although Melanchthon initially echoed Luther’s attack on 
Aristotle, he later advocated a natural philosophy that drew on Aristotle, Galen (c.130-
c.210) and others, and which was expressly designed to support Lutheran theology.123 
   The second factor effecting disciplinary hierarchies was the social status of particular 
chairs and professions. Within universities and outside them, some disciplines were more 
esteemed than others, and, as such, some disciplinary communities had more authority, 
and demanded greater deference, than others. Consequently, the scope and status of 
natural philosophy was not solely determined by its intellectual function as a primer for 
other disciplines, like theology. Natural philosophy was also socially inferior, and offered 
fewer professional outlets. Theologians, therefore, had more esteem and more authority. 
And natural philosophy was shaped and hemmed in by theological concerns. 
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   Universities fostered a degree of social mobility – Isaac Newton (1642-1727) was non-
gentry, for example.124 But they were largely hierarchic – attended by gentlemen, and 
viewed as a training ground for clerics.125 In Cambridge, the wealthy were entitled to the 
best places in lecture halls, and lecturers sat in raised seats, which intentionally recalled 
episcopal chairs.126 More relevant to this thesis: teaching personnel were also highly 
stratified, according to qualification and disciplinary affiliation. A doctor was obviously 
superior to a bachelor, but a student or chair in theology or law was superior to the same 
in logic or natural philosophy.127 This social food chain had a public dimension, 
exemplified in seventeenth-century Cambridge degree parades. Bachelors of the arts 
opened the ceremony, followed by bachelors of medicine and law. Then arrived masters 
in the same subjects, followed by the most senior members, theologians. As well as their 
place in the parade, a scholar’s style of dress identified their disciplinary speciality, degree 
level, and social status.128  
   Disciplines offered varying degrees of vocational credibility. As Locke discovered to 
his inconvenience, taking holy orders was the simplest way to guarantee university 
employment.129 Theological chairs were not only numerous, they were also prestigious 
and lucrative.130 Natural philosophy, on the other hand, offered few professional 
opportunities. Universities hired graduates to teach philosophy, usually while they 
studied for higher qualifications. For example, Barlow lectured in logic and philosophy 
while studying for his Bachelor of Divinity.131 The mathematical sciences gained a 
foothold in Oxford via the 1619 Savilian lectureships in geometry and astronomy, and a 
chair in natural philosophy followed seven years later.132 But teachers in disciplines like 
medicine continued to play a prominent role in philosophical instruction. Natural 
philosophers were therefore a smaller and less prestigious cohort than theologians, less 
able to shape curricula or set research agendas.  
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   Furthermore, the professional subjects – medicine, law and theology – led to esteemed 
careers beyond the universities. Not so, in natural philosophy. Boyle made a career as an 
experimentalist, but he was a wealthy peer who could forgo remuneration. Bacon, Locke 
and Newton all at some point accepted governmental jobs or honours, and studied 
around these commitments.133 For many, the best means to philosophical inquiry was 
secretarial or tutorial work for aristocratic families. For instance, Hobbes’s role as 
amanuensis and tutor to the Cavendish family allowed him to write on logic, natural 
philosophy and politics.134 In sum, the interests, claims and priorities of natural 
philosophy had fewer and less authoritative promoters than theology.  
   As university communities and curricula were structured in a way that consolidated the 
authority and dominance of theology, it is not surprising that the champions of a more 
independent, assertive natural philosophy often worked extramurally. Disciplinary 
relationships were shaped by a multitude of factors, as this thesis will demonstrate. 
Nevertheless, Bacon and Locke, who for the most part had non-academic careers, 
granted natural philosophy more freedom from theology than White and More, who 
took holy orders and taught in universities. However, greater freedom should not be 
confused with superior status. All four thinkers respected theology’s position at the 
pinnacle of learning.  
 
 
IV. Summary o f  the chapters   
 
The pedagogical function of disciplines has been widely discussed by the burgeoning 
scholarship on the layout, priorities and practices of early modern European 
universities.135 However, the structural components of seventeenth-century disciplines 
have been understudied or misunderstood. I address this lacuna here, providing four case 
studies demonstrating the varied and nuanced ways that natural philosophy and theology 
were constructed in seventeenth-century England. As we will see, the diversity within 
each discipline led, necessarily, to complex and multifaceted accounts of their disciplinary 
relationship.  
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   This thesis shows that ideas about disciplines were critical for defining and legitimising 
early modern knowledge and belief. Knowledge-claims occurred in disciplinary contexts, 
and were informed, sometimes determined, by the particularities of that discipline. 
Therefore, I argue, the contestability of knowledge was reflected in the contestability of 
disciplines. This establishes a methodological imperative. Any study of knowledge – be it 
a specific debate, or the development of an idea or theory – must be mindful of 
disciplines and disciplinary relationships. An awareness of disciplines can therefore 
enhance our understanding of thinkers, their ideas, and their arguments.  
   Francis Bacon, Thomas White, Henry More, and John Locke are the focus of the four 
chapters respectively, with Glanvill, Hobbes, other Cambridge divines, and a variety of 
medieval scholastic authors providing context, comparison and reinforcement. Though 
selective, the combined life spans of these case studies cover the entire century. They 
also offer a cross-section of seventeenth-century thought and belief: embodying different 
professional and institutional interests, and representing an array of philosophical, 
theological and religious views. This carries some historiographical interest. Bacon and 
Locke are canonical figures; White and More are more marginal. Each conceived of, and 
described, knowledge in terms of disciplines and disciplinary boundaries. But their 
understandings of disciplines were informed by different ideological commitments and 
polemical concerns. Thus, together, they hint at the contingent and tendentious nature of 
knowledge, belief, certainty and truth. 
   Although each chapter can be read independently of the others, there are several lines 
of influence, or connection, running between the subjects of each. Bacon used Hobbes 
as an amanuensis in the 1620s.136 Hobbes later wrote a critique of White’s natural 
philosophy, and was in turn upbraided by More and Cudworth for his materialism.137 
Glanvill made a sceptical attack on White’s demonstrative logic, and collaborated with 
More on natural histories of witchcraft.138 Finally, Locke met More’s colleague, Benjamin 
Whichcote (1609-1683), and was interested in the rational and tolerationist views of 
religion emanating from Cambridge. Crucially, each case study, in different ways, and to 
different effect, put the relationship between natural philosophy and theology at the 
heart of their intellectual endeavours. Collectively, they demonstrate the diversity within 
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both disciplines, and the negotiable and contested nature of their disciplinary 
relationship. 
   Chapter one focuses on Bacon. Alongside his fitful and ultimately disappointing 
political career, Bacon wrote extensively on the state of learning and inductive method. 
These writings are replete with religious and theological references and imagery. For 
Bacon, natural philosophy and theology had different source materials, and demanded 
different operations from the human understanding. Philosophy was the outcome of a 
specific type of rational judgement. The mind collated and ordered sensory impressions, 
creating natural histories that served as the basis for inferential reasoning. This method 
enabled man to sidestep the mental distempers responsible for ‘Idols…the deepest 
fallacies of the human mind’.139 Provided natural histories were exhaustive and 
sophisticated, and man’s reasoning slow and methodical, the understanding eventually 
acquired knowledge of the forms of nature. Theology, on the other hand, was based on 
faith in revelation. Further doctrine was deducible from articles of faith, but this practice 
proceeded by syllogism, not induction. The disciplinary relationship was so strict that 
Bacon said mixing the two would result in ‘Hereticall Religion; and an Imaginarie and 
fabulous Philosophie’.140 
   Bacon only violated his injunction against using theology as the basis for philosophical 
judgements in the vague disciplinary context of mythopoetics. However, reason – the 
cognitive faculty associated with philosophy – played a small role in theology, elaborating 
natural theology, and clearing up tricky definitional issues. Further, Bacon’s entire 
worldview – philosophy included – was shaped by religious themes to do with providence, 
charity and millenarianism. 
   The second chapter looks at White. White was educated in Europe, and his teaching 
career also took place overseas. Back in England, he became the head of a group of 
Catholic recusants, called the Blackloists. Though an Aristotelian, White was eclectic – 
marrying school metaphysics with new corpuscular matter theory, and infusing 
Aristotelian logic with a concern for definitions (borrowed from geometric 
methodology). Despite these idiosyncrasies, White cleaved to Thomistic disciplinary 
conventions, in which natural philosophy was a necessary, though not sufficient, 
condition for theology.  
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   Philosophy, he asserted, was formally demonstrable. Knowledge was produced when 
propositions were combined into syllogisms, and deductions made from the meaning of 
definitions. Theology was established by applying the same logical rules – in this case, 
making deductions from articles of faith. Natural philosophy and theology derived from 
different sources – reason and revelation. But their shared method meant they enjoyed 
some conceptual overlap. For example, White said the Eucharist was explained and 
accounted for by corpuscularian matter theory. Theology, in sum, was reliant and 
contingent upon philosophy. For ‘Philosophy [both] defines the words Divinity uses’, 
and ‘propagate[s] science out of it’.141 
   Like Bacon, White distinguished faith from theology. He argued that before articles of 
faith were subject to philosophical exposition, or had doctrine deduced from them, they 
must be certified as true. As a prominent Catholic polemicist, White challenged the idea 
that the Bible’s divinity straightforwardly established its truth and meaning. Articles of 
faith were true, he argued, because they derived from the Catholic oral tradition, which 
accurately conveyed apostolic teachings between generations of believers. This rule of 
faith rested on a historical argument. It was not philosophy, and did not hinge on a 
linguistic demonstration. 
   More, the subject of chapter three, articulated perhaps the greatest overlap between 
philosophy and theology. With other Cambridge divines, he was steeped in Platonism, 
particularly neo-Platonists, like Plotinus. Throughout his career, he was governed by two 
Platonic theological principles: a necessitarian view of providence, and an Origenist 
account of the soul. These presuppositions shaped More’s conceptions of natural 
philosophy and theology. Pointing to God’s goodness and rationality, he argued that 
both disciplines were rational and knowable. However, owing to the terrestrial condition 
of man’s soul, reason had a tendency to err. At the same time, the soul’s capacity for 
purification meant More also anticipated improvements in knowledge.  
   Although More regarded his philosophy and theology as rational, he did not claim they 
were certainly true. In fact, he argued that faith, which was proven by the historic 
fulfilment of biblical promises, was more certain than theology. As such, it was 
philosophy’s job to protect theology, which it did in two ways. First, philosophy 
demonstrated the conceptual necessity of incorporeality. For More, the mechanical 
philosophy was only tenable once balanced with an incorporeal, Platonist metaphysics. 
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In his natural philosophical-metaphysical schema, mechanical body was governed and 
regulated by an incorporeal divine agent – the Spirit of Nature. And second, philosophy 
defended theological doctrine from hostile forces – denominational and atheistic. 
Philosophy, in other words, erected ‘an Exoterick Fence or exteriour Fortification about 
Theologie’.142 More attributed the compatibility of natural philosophy and theology to their 
shared origin in the Mosaic cabbalist tradition. 
   The final chapter is on Locke. Though he studied and taught at Oxford, Locke mainly 
worked outside the university. His view of natural philosophy (as well as many other 
disciplines) was shaped by his extensive investigations into the limitations of the human 
understanding. Sense and reason could not fully comprehend substances. Therefore, 
Locke was a tentative corpuscularian, who championed experimentalism and accepted 
Newton’s non-mechanical theory of gravitation. His theology is harder to pin down, 
largely due to his reticence in print. For example, he appeared to reject Trinitarianism, 
but it is unclear whether or not he was a Socinian.  
   Locke’s view of the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy and theology 
changed over time. However, he consistently held that the latter had a higher epistemic 
status than the former. Natural philosophy was probabilistic because knowledge of 
substance was uncertain and derived from experiment and natural history. On the other 
hand, knowledge of God and morality was demonstrative and certain. In An Essay 
concerning Human Understanding (1689), the two disciplines had conceptual and 
methodological overlaps because studying nature elicited theistic conclusions about 
God’s existence and intelligence. However, in the Reasonableness of Christianity (1695) and 
other works, Locke changed his mind, becoming doubtful that reason could demonstrate 
God or construct natural theology. Theology, then, became a scriptural discipline, based 
entirely on faith in the proposition that Jesus was the Christ. It was therefore detached 
from natural philosophical practice. Still, as the more probable or epistemologically 
secure discipline, theology retained its governing position vis-à-vis natural philosophy. 
   This thesis demonstrates that the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy 
and theology formed a central part of how seventeenth-century thinkers understood the 
world, and their place within it. Broadly speaking, the case studies show some continuity 
or consistency. Whether or not the century witnessed the beginning of modern scientific 
thought and practice, it was certainly a fruitful and dynamic period in the history of 
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man’s engagement with nature.143 Yet, in the main, curricular priorities stayed the same. 
Theology engaged the loftiest ideas and principles, and retained its position as the most 
prestigious university discipline. Therefore, theologians – the community that marshalled 
and governed theology – continued to play an authoritative role in intellectual life. 
Natural philosophy was rich and varied, housing a diverse set of methods, concepts and 
propositions. But it was a subordinate discipline: either working for theology – 
explicating and devising doctrine – or being corrected or guided by it. White and More – 
both avowedly attached to old philosophical traditions – adhered to these conventions. 
But, in large part, so did Locke, who, in other respects, desired to break from the past. 
Bacon and Hobbes – who both reduced the role of theology in other disciplines – are the 
outliers in this thesis. However, in common with many others, Bacon posited natural 
philosophy as the basis for natural theological arguments for God’s existence. Natural 
theology – very prominent in the seventeenth century – was the name given to the 
considerable areas of disciplinary overlap between natural philosophy and theology. This 
is historically significant. Seventeenth-century disciplinary cross-pollination – for 
example, using natural philosophical methods, concepts and observations to corroborate 
theological truths, or setting the boundaries of what is knowable about nature according 
to theological doctrine – prefigures the sort of disciplinary collaboration known today as 
“interdisciplinarity”.144 
   However, despite their broad agreement about disciplinary hierarchy, thinkers 
disagreed about the exact remit of each discipline, and the influence one discipline had 
on the other. Both disciplines were variegated, and structured differently by different 
people. This complexity meant their disciplinary relationship was variable and rarely 
straightforward. Different conceptions of either discipline, or their relationship, implied 
or manifested competing notions of nature or the divine, as well as different criteria for 
knowledge and belief. In other words, each formulation reflected particular judgements 
about the nature of the world and man’s cognitive potential. This engendered different, 
sometimes mutually incompatible, claims about reality, stated with varying levels of 
epistemic assurance. There were, in short, various ontological and epistemic issues at 
stake. Consequently, in many instances, the disciplinary boundary between natural 
philosophy and theology was the keystone of broader systems of thought, and the basis 
for subsequent reasoning. As those boundaries differed or changed, so the world and 
conceptions of knowledge differed or changed also.  
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   Assessing what reality consisted of, and what we could know about it, also had some 
normative import: indicating how man should behave, and what he should engage in. In 
a basic sense, mediating natural philosophical and theological ideas and arguments 
established the margins between orthodoxy and heresy. The former was located within 
disciplinary boundaries – knowledge or belief produced by a sanctioned method, applied 
to a sanctioned subject matter or source material. (Needless to say, the rightness or 
wrongness of those sanctions was a matter of violent dispute). The latter was usually 
defined as a breach of those disciplinary protocols. Therefore, disciplines did not merely 
shape, or mirror, man’s understanding of the world, they also affected his view of truth, 
rightness, and rectitude.   
   Finally, this thesis draws attention to the role of disciplines in three important features 
of seventeenth-century intellectual life. First, chapters two and three attest to the 
diversity and continuity, throughout the century, not only of Aristotelianism (particularly 
in the case of White), but also Platonism (in the case of More), and the manner in which 
both adapted to the novelties of the age.145 Second, chapters one and four demonstrate 
that, although the century produced novel elaborations of experimentalism, 
corpuscularianism etc., novatores like Bacon and Locke still owed many debts to their 
philosophical predecessors, scholastic and humanistic.146 Each of these ideological 
negotiations was conveyed through the structure and priority of disciplines. In particular, 
they were expressed through the relationship between natural philosophy and theology. 
And third, all four chapters highlight the differences between seventeenth-century 
theology, which strove to establish the nature of God’s will, and religion, which aimed to 
follow it. As Wilkins famously put it: 
 
‘Religion may be described to be, That general habit of reverence towards the 
Divine Nature, whereby we are enabled and enclined to worship and serve God 
after such a manner as we conceive most agreeable to his will, so as to procure 
his favour and blessing. 
The Doctrine which delivers the Rules of this, is stiled Theology, or Divinity’.147 
 
                                                
145 This argument has been made in various ways by Charles B. Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance, 
(Cambridge MA, 1983); Edward Grant, ‘Ways to interpret the terms ‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Aristotelianism’ in 
Medieval and Renaissance Natural Philosophy’, History of Science 25, (1987), 335-58; Robert Pasnau, 
Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671, (Oxford, 2011).  
146 By and large, the historiography has focused on how new philosophers like Descartes and Hobbes drew 
upon their scholastic forbears. See Dennis Des Chene, Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and 
Cartesian Thought, (Ithaca, 1996); Cees Leijenhorst, The Mechanisation of Aristotelianism: the late Aristotelian setting 
of Thomas Hobbes’ Natural Philosophy, (Leiden, 2002); Michael Edwards, ‘Aristotelianism, Descartes, and 
Hobbes’, Historical Journal, 50 (2007), 449–64.  
147 Wilkins, Ecclesiastes, p. 121. 
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This distinction is crucial for the subject of this thesis. However, it is usually overlooked 
or unexplored in the scholarship.148 Philosophers were almost always anxious to convey 
the piety of their work, and religion weighed generally on thought as a whole. Theology, 
on the other hand, had a particular disciplinary relationship with philosophy.
                                                
148 Osler is one of the few scholars to point it out. ‘Mixing Metaphors’, p. 92. 
 33 
Francis Bacon 
 
 
 
In order to renovate natural philosophy, Francis Bacon placed it on particular epistemic 
and cognitive foundations. These foundations set it apart from theology. Knowledge, he 
argued, derived from sense or revelation, was established by reason or faith, and created 
philosophy and theology respectively. The manner by which each discipline acquired and 
comprehended information prescribed discrete subject matters: body and divine 
mysteries. In addition, Bacon claimed, both were governed by specific methods, each 
suited to the type of knowledge produced in that discipline. If either discipline 
encroached on the subject matter of the other, violating the disciplinary boundaries 
established by their different epistemic limitations, the result was speciousness and 
falsity.  
   This is remarkably neat. In practice, things were slightly more complex. For example, 
although Bacon wanted natural philosophy to operate independently of theology, he 
knew that, to some degree, theology relied on natural philosophy to establish natural 
theology. Moreover, when discussing the philosophical import of ancient fables, Bacon 
broke his rule that prohibited the development of natural philosophy from theological 
sources or principles. This chapter will explore these positions and tensions. I argue that, 
for the most part, Bacon kept natural philosophy and theology separate, largely to ensure 
the former was protected from the latter. However, to reconstruct clearly and accurately 
Bacon’s precise, but occasionally inconsistent, disciplinary arrangement, a ground-
clearing exercise is required.   
 
 
I .  Rel ig ious themes  
 
Bacon historiography is vast. It is therefore surprising so few scholars have written about 
the relationship between his natural philosophy and theology.1 Bacon’s religious beliefs, 
                                                
1 Many scholars speak of Bacon’s “science” rather than his “natural philosophy”. See Paolo Rossi, Francis 
Bacon: From Magic to Science, (London, 1968); Moody E. Prior, ‘Bacon’s man of science’, in Vickers, Brian 
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and their affect on his wider thought – and, specifically, on his philosophy – have 
attracted greater study.2 However, in some instances, the religious references in Bacon’s 
work are mistaken for theology.3 So, to understand properly the disciplinary relationship 
between natural philosophy and theology, we must take care to distinguish the latter 
from Bacon’s religion.   
   Casting him as an agent of modernity, some scholars deny Bacon a religious identity. 
Jerry Weinberger, for example, describes Bacon as ‘a central founder of the modern 
project’, by which he meant a prophet, partisan and critic of technological advancement. 
According to Weinberger, the manifest rationality of the project was suggestive of 
Bacon’s unbelief.4 Similarly, Robert Faulkner downplays Bacon’s religiosity in order to 
play up his social and political agendas.5 In a slightly more circumspect manner, Perez 
Zagorin describes Bacon’s mind as ‘overwhelmingly secular in its interests’.6 This strand 
of historiography is significant, but not as prominent as sometimes suggested.7 Most 
modern scholarship is not interested in telling a story of Bacon’s unbelief, because, as we 
will see, the presence of religious ideas in Bacon’s thought is so apparent.8  
   Determining which sort of Christian Bacon was is nevertheless problematic. His 
mother, Anne Bacon (1528-1610), was a fervent Puritan and supporter of various 
nonconformist ministers.9 Bacon was home schooled. He then went to Cambridge 
                                                                                                                                      
(ed.), Essential Articles for the study of Francis Bacon, (London, 1972), 140-63; Antonio Pérez-Ramos, Francis 
Bacon’s Idea of Science and the Maker’s Knowledge tradition, (Oxford, 1988). Those who favour the term natural 
philosophy usually stress Bacon’s materialist or atomistic ontology. See Fulton Henry Anderson, The 
Philosophy of Francis Bacon, (Chicago, 1948); Graham Rees, ‘Atomism and ‘Subtlety’ in Francis Bacon’s 
Philosophy’, Annals of Science, 37 (1980), 549-71. Others emphasise the apparently secular and statist 
motivations and aims of Bacon’s philosophy, and pay little attention to theology. See Stephen Gaukroger, 
Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-Modern Philosophy, (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 68-74. 
2 See John Gascoigne, ‘The Religious Thought of Francis Bacon’, in Carole Cusack and Christopher 
Hartney (eds.), Religion and Retributive Logic: Essay in Honour of Professor Garry W. Trompf, (Leiden, 2009), 202-
23. 
3 See, for example, Steven Matthews, Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon, (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 
viii-ix. 
4 Jerry Weinberger, Science, Faith, and Politics: Francis Bacon and the Utopian roots of the Modern Age. A commentary 
on Bacon’s Advancement of Learning, (Ithaca, 1985), pp. 9, 17, 111-15. 
5 Robert K. Faulkner, Francis Bacon and the Project of Progress, (Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), p. 99. 
6 Perez Zagorin, Francis Bacon, (Princeton, 1998), p. 51. 
7 Matthews argues that, in the eyes of most contemporary literature, Bacon was either an atheist, secularist, 
or indifferent to religion. Theology and Science, pp. vii-ix. Stephen, A. McKnight, The Religious Foundations of 
Francis Bacon’s Thought, (Columbia, Mo., 2006), pp. 1-2, concurs.  
8 Jerry Weinberger, ‘Francis Bacon and the Unity of Knowledge: Reason and Revelation’, in Julie Robin 
Solomon and Catherine Gimelli Martin (eds.), Francis Bacon and the Refiguring of Early Modern Thought: essays to 
commemorate The Advancement of Learning (1605-2005), (Aldershot, 2006), 109-27, disputes Bacon’s piety. He 
argues that Bacon was silent on a number of religious topics in order avoid exposing their nonsensicality, 
in particular, the notion of religious virtue. However, Weinberger does not account for the innumerable 
instances when Bacon spoke about how religious topics (like the Fall) conditioned his philosophy. He 
(Weinberger) also ignores the tracts that Bacon devoted to theological exposition – e.g. Confessions. 
9 Zagorin, Francis Bacon, p. 11. 
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between 1573-1575 where he was further exposed to Calvinist teachings.10 In the 1580s, 
he attended Puritan sermons at Gray’s Inn and Temple Bar, and was alarmed by both the 
threat of Catholicism, and the English Church’s aggressive anti-Puritanism.11 However, 
in manuscript pamphlets written in 1589 and 1603, Bacon defended episcopacy and 
attacked Puritan doctrine (although he argued against forceful or punitive treatment of 
Puritans). He was, moreover, very close to Arminians like Lancelot Andrewes (1555-
1626) and George Herbert (1593-1633).12 Bacon addressed his own beliefs in Meditationes 
Sacræ (published 1597) and A Confession of Faith (published 1648, but written before 
1603). The former was a series of essays, including ‘Of Atheism’, which, in Calvinist 
fashion, claimed atheism was an act of will rather than true thought. The latter was a 
statement of personal belief, which also contained no little Calvinist theology. However, 
neither text was purely or straightforwardly Puritan; the Confession, for example, claimed 
Christ’s death cleansed everybody of sin, not merely an elect.13 It has variously been 
argued that Bacon’s philosophical works – many composed in the 1620s – were inflected 
with, or undergirded by, Anglicanism, Calvinism, or the influence of the Church 
Fathers.14 Thus, the source and character of Bacon’s religious inspiration remains a vexed 
issue, and, as John Gascoigne remarks; ‘It is difficult to identify Bacon too closely with 
any particular religious movement’.15 
   What is clear, though, is that Bacon’s philosophy, or, more generally, his unfinished 
renovation of learning, the Instauratio magna, was informed by faith. Here, I will discuss 
three pertinent influences: the idea that the world was a divine creation; the motivational 
role of Christian charity; and the effect of the Fall on man’s relationship with nature. 
Religion looms large in Bacon’s writings because it set his intellectual parameters. For 
example, Graham Rees notes the conceptual restraint placed on Bacon’s philosophy by 
scripture, and particularly Genesis. Bacon’s natural philosophy, Rees argued, could not 
                                                
10 Gascoigne, ‘The Religious Thought of Francis Bacon’, p. 211. 
11 M. Peltonen, ‘Bacon; Francis, Viscount St Alban (1561-1626)’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
(Oxford, 2004). Online edition: 2007 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/990, accessed 9 June 
2016]. 
12 Gascoigne, ‘The Religious Thought of Francis Bacon’, pp. 212-13. 
13 For the way these texts both intersected and diverged from Calvinist teaching, see Benjamin Milner, 
‘Francis Bacon: The Theological Foundation of Valerius Terminus’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 58 (1997), 
245-64, pp. 245-55. For the Calvinism in Confession, see Brian Vickers (ed. with intro. and notes), Francis 
Bacon: the Major Works, (Oxford, 2002), p. 562. 
14 Bacon has been labelled an Anglican, albeit an unenthusiastic one. See C.D. Broad, The Philosophy of 
Francis Bacon: an Address, (Cambridge, 1926). Matthews says Bacon’s early Calvinism was replaced by an 
admiration for the Church Fathers, mediated by his friend Lancelot Andrewes. See Theology and Science. 
Peter Harrison, ‘Review: Steven Matthews. Theology and Science in the Thought of Francis Bacon’, Isis, 100 (2009), 
660-1, agrees that Bacon was interested in the Church Fathers, but says his theology was more Pelagian or 
Arminian than Matthews allows. 
15 Gascoigne, ‘The Religious Thought of Francis Bacon’, p. 226. 
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be educed from scriptural evidence, but must, nevertheless, be consonant with it.16 That 
is not to say it was primarily and necessarily interested in God and his attributes.17 But 
Bacon’s natural philosophy was conceived as the study of nature, defined, explicitly, as 
God’s creation.18 In short, Bacon and other natural philosophers knew their natural 
inquiries would to some extent touch upon religious questions, and be shaped by them 
accordingly. It is therefore anachronistic (pace Zagorin) to describe his philosophy as 
secular.  
   As well as setting the intellectual parameters of Bacon’s natural philosophy, Christianity 
served as an important motivator, emphasising the common over the private good. In an 
epistolary tract composed sometime between 1596-1604, Bacon described religion as ‘the 
most sovereign’ influence on man’s will.19 Religion provided great moral impetus, for, as 
Bacon noted in De Augmentis (1623), morality consisted in knowing what was good, but 
also knowing how to move the will to realise it.20 Everybody, Bacon went on to say, 
identified with two types of good: individual or collective, virtue or duty. Undercutting 
the Aristotelian preference for private, contemplative virtues, Bacon said the will must, 
principally, be turned towards duty.21 Humanists in the vita activa tradition valorised ethics 
because it was other-regarding.22 For Bacon, duty was best fostered by Christianity, 
which advocated ‘Charity, which is excellently called “the bond of Perfection,” and 
which comprehends and fastens all virtues together’.23 Charity raises the human mind ‘to 
greater perfection than all the doctrines of morality’, and, unlike other inducements to 
virtue, which were vulnerable to distortion, ‘Charity alone admits of no excess’.24 Bacon 
used these principles to legitimise natural philosophy, arguing that, because it improved 
man’s estate, natural philosophy embodied the highest virtue. Thus, he said in Novum 
Organum (1620), to study nature, one had to ‘put off the zeal and prejudice of beliefs’ and 
                                                
16 Graham Rees, ‘Introduction’, in Graham Rees (ed. with intro., notes, and commentary), The Oxford 
Francis Bacon, VI: Philosophical Studies c.1611-c.1619, (Oxford, 1996), xvii-cx, pp. xlviii-li. As Jolley notes, all 
early modern philosophers were anxious to highlight the compatibility of their philosophy with Christian 
doctrine. ‘The Relation between Philosophy and Theology’, pp. 364-6. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
Bacon’s allusions to Greek and Roman authors – which were often laudatory – have rarely been 
interpreted as Bacon courting the classics. 
17 The reasons why Cunningham’s rubric does not entirely fit with Bacon will become apparent in the 
second section of this chapter. See ‘Getting the game right’ 
18 Grant, ‘God and Natural Philosophy’, p. 284, says that if God was merely present in natural philosophy 
as the acknowledge creator of nature, his effect on philosophy, substantively, was negligible. 
19 Bacon, Works, VII, p. 100. 
20 Ibid., V, p. 2. 
21 Ibid., pp. 7-8, 14-15. This locates Bacon within the vita activa tradition, which, though popular in the 
Renaissance, actually dated from Plato. See Brian Vickers, ‘Bacon’s so-called “Utilitarianism”: sources and 
influence’, in Marta Fattori (ed.), Francis Bacon: terminologia e fortuna nel XVII Secolo, (Rome, 1984), 281-313. 
22 Ibid., pp. 311-13. 
23 Bacon, Works, V, pp. 28-9. 
24 Ibid., p. 29. 
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‘think of the common good’.25 For these reasons, natural philosophy derived impetus 
from notions of Christian charity.26 The success of Bacon’s reform of natural philosophy 
was therefore predicated on its ability to enlist religious sentiment. 
   Finally, we can observe a more direct theological influence on Bacon’s natural 
philosophy; the doctrine of the Fall. In Novum Organum, Bacon said the task of his natural 
philosophy was to ‘recover the right over nature’ that man lost in the Fall, but ‘which 
belongs to him by God’s gift’.27 In this regard, Bacon exemplified what, for Peter 
Harrison, was the defining feature of early modern thought. According to Harrison, 
seventeenth-century epistemological debates can all be traced back to particular 
theological anthropologies, or issues relating to man’s expulsion from the Garden of 
Eden.28 Harrison defines two anthropologies, distinguished by the degree to which the 
Fall disabled man’s capacity to acquire knowledge, and the extent to which that loss was 
recoverable.29 Rather schematically, Harrison says theological anthropology was reflected 
in confessional divisions. So, for Catholics like René Descartes – who took their cue 
from Thomas Aquinas – the Fall stripped man of his supernatural qualities, but not his 
natural light. For Harrison, this explains why Descartes was able to base his philosophy 
on certain, a priori knowledge. Contrarily, in an Augustinian vein, Reformers said the Fall 
caused the corruption of man’s natural faculties. Natural philosophers in this tradition – 
Harrison cites Robert Boyle – sought knowledge by a posteriori methods, accepting that 
the mind was incapable of certainty.30  
   The problem with Harrison’s schematic is that anthropological beliefs did not perfectly 
mirror confessional divisions.31 The Jansenists, for example, are excluded from the 
analysis. Descartes, moreover, was not a representative Catholic – he had a checkered 
                                                
25 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, edited by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne, (Cambridge, 2000), p. 
13. 
26 However, this is not the same as McKnight’s view that Bacon self-identified as a priest, come to restore 
spiritual and natural order. Religious Foundations, p. 4. 
27 Bacon, The New Organon, p. 101. 
28 Peter Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science, (Cambridge, 2007). More controversially, 
Harrison also contends that such questions also prevailed over the post-Cartesian philosophical settlement 
up until Hegel or Kant. 
29 Ibid., pp. 1-9. 
30 Ibid., pp. 6-7, 54, 65, 87-8, 156-8  
31 For example, Harrison says Catholics in the Thomist tradition usually regarded Adam’s immortality as a 
divine gift, forfeited by sin. However, he argued, post-Reformation Christians, treated mortality as merely a 
part of man’s post-lapsarian corruption, and therefore something that could – at least in part – be reversed 
or revoked. This phrase – ‘post-Reformation Christians’ – enabled Harrison to speak simultaneously about 
disparate figures like Descartes (a Catholic) and Bacon (a Protestant) – both interested in the prospect of 
prolonging human life. However, curiously, on most other philosophical problems – the sort that Harrison 
associated with theological anthropology – Harrison differentiated Descartes and Bacon, citing their 
different denominational affiliations as the cause of their differences. Ibid., pp. 170-2. 
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relationship with the Jesuits, and his reading was not limited to Thomism.32 Boyle also 
was not a thoroughgoing Calvinist.33 Bacon is likewise hard to pigeonhole. In non-
Calvinist fashion, he dissociated the Fall from man’s attempts at natural knowledge. God, 
he said, had framed man’s mind to interpret nature freely.34 Rather, the Fall was 
occasioned when man ‘turn[ed] away from God and give [moral] laws to himself’.35 
However, in his Confession, Bacon described the consequences of the Fall in a Calvinistic 
idiom. First, he said, the Fall dulled man’s epistemic faculties, and second, it corrupted 
nature, making it less amenable to investigation.36  
   Despite the reductiveness of Harrison’s argument, many philosophers, Bacon included, 
posited their natural philosophy as a response to man’s post-Fall predicament. 
Reconquering nature, man would approximate the power enjoyed by Adam in Eden.37 
Bacon drew this association most explicitly in his early writings, encouraged by the 
fledgling successes of his political career. He knew his reformation of learning required 
state sponsorship and promotion.38 So, to further his philosophical ends he sought 
political office. However, for some time, his efforts were unsuccessful. In the 1580s, he 
petitioned his uncle, Lord Burghley (1520-1598), but was largely overlooked. He found 
patronage in the 1590s, but his patron, the Earl of Essex (1565-1601), was convicted of 
treason in 1601.39 Bacon’s political fortunes only really improved when James I took the 
throne. Thus, he was knighted in 1603 and he joined the King’s legal counsel a year later. 
Political ascendency stoked his philosophical optimism. In Valerius Terminus (1603?),40 
Bacon stressed the epistemic potential and restorative powers of his philosophy. The true 
                                                
32 See Roger Ariew, ‘Descartes and the Jesuits: Doubt, Novelty, and the Eucharist’, in Mordechai Feingold 
(ed.), Jesuit Science and the Republic of Letters, (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), 157-94. 
33 Michael Hunter, Boyle: between God and Science, (New Haven, Conn., 2009), p. 208.  
34 Curiosity was long regarded as a post-lapsarian vice. Bacon, however, dissociated natural learning and the 
consequences of the Fall, and thereby turned natural philosophy into a virtuous pursuit. See Peter 
Harrison, ‘Curiosity, Forbidden Knowledge, and the Reformation of Natural Philosophy in Early Modern 
England’, Isis, 92 (2001), 265-90. 
35 Bacon, The New Organon, p. 12. 
36 Bacon, Works, VII, p. 221. Neither does Bacon’s philosophy neatly accord with one side of Harrison’s 
dichotomy. Bacon eschewed a priori reasoning. See Harrison, The Fall of Man, p. 7). But he also thought 
nature’s essences could be known with certainty. See Peter Dear, ‘Method and the Study of Nature’, in 
Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, (2 vols., 
Cambridge, 1998), I, 147-77, pp. 153-60.  
37 Bacon, The New Organon, p. 221. 
38 Gaukroger, Francis Bacon, p. 6. 
39 Zagorin, Francis Bacon, pp. 5-15. 
40 The exact dating of Valerius Terminus is uncertain. James Spedding agrees with Robert Ellis that the bulk 
of Valerius was likely written before the Advancement, probably in 1603. However, according to Spedding, 
some parts of the text may well have been composed afterwards. See Bacon, Works, III, pp. 206-13. The 
most recent compositional history argues that parts of Valerius were written pre-1603. See Richard 
Serjeantson, ‘The Philosophy of Francis Bacon in early Jacobean Oxford, with an edition of an unknown 
manuscript of the Valerius Terminus’, The Historical Journal, 56 (2013), 1087-1106. 
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end of knowledge, he said, was the ‘restitution and reinvesting…of man to the 
sovereignty and power (for whensoever he shall be able to call the creatures by their true 
names he shall again command them) which he had in his first state of creation’.41 
Despite further professional successes, Bacon was impeached by parliament for 
corruption in 1621.42 His late philosophical works did not convey quite the same level of 
assurance and optimism – nevertheless, Novum Organum still referenced the restorative 
powers of natural philosophy.43 
   The Christian parameters, charitable motivation, and deferment to anthropology, show 
that Bacon’s natural philosophy was shaped by his piety. This religious influence was 
broad – insofar as nothing, really, escaped the purview of his religious beliefs – but also 
loose – circumscribing his thought, but rarely interfering actively in it.44 Bacon’s works 
were therefore pious, but they were not, themselves, religious texts. Two scholars, 
however, claim that they were. According to Stephen McKnight and Steven Matthews, 
the religious dimension in Bacon’s work took centre stage, to the extent that Bacon was 
essentially mixing philosophy and theology. Both stress what McKnight describes as the 
‘centrality of religious concepts in Bacon’s philosophical works’.45 And, noting the 
profusion of biblical imagery, characterise the Baconian canon as a statement of 
theological prophecy, and Bacon’s natural philosophy as a harbinger of the apocalypse.46 
For McKnight, ‘the overarching motif’ of Novum Organum was ‘one of apocalyptic 
transformation’.47 Bacon, he further argues, regarded himself as a priest of nature, tasked 
with returning man to a state of prelapsarian perfection.48 Matthews also associates 
Baconian natural philosophy with salvation.49 He says Bacon engaged with the 
intellectual heritage of Irenaeus of Lyon (130-202), and in particular, the concept of 
theosis – the idea that one can participate in God’s nature.50 According to Matthews, 
                                                
41 Bacon, Works, III, p. 222.  
42 Zagorin, Francis Bacon, pp. 22-3. 
43 Bacon, The New Organon, p. 101. 
44 Paul H. Kocher, Science and Religion in Elizabethan England, (San Marino, 1953), pp. 63-91, argues that 
Elizabethan scientists, including Bacon, were respectful of the boundaries placed on learning by religion, 
but were equally anxious to ensure the remoteness of theological boundaries so that philosophical inquiry 
was largely unconditioned and unfettered. 
45 See Matthews, Theology and Science; McKnight, Religious Foundations, p. 3. 
46 Matthews, Theology and Science, pp. 55-57; McKnight, Religious Foundations, p. 3. 
47 McKnight, Religious Foundations, p. 6. 
48 Ibid., pp. 155-7. 
49 Matthews, Theology and Science, pp. 64-77, 99-110. 
50 Matthews tells a developmental story in which Bacon abandoned his early Calvinist instruction – 
imparted by his mother and Cambridge tutors – and embraced the teachings of various Church Fathers. 
Ibid., chapters 1 and 2 
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Bacon’s obsession with developing natural knowledge was inspired by his desire to make 
man more God-like.51  
   The implication of these arguments – that Bacon elided natural philosophy and 
theology – is false and will be refuted throughout this chapter. However, in what remains 
of this section, I want to highlight the shortcomings of several specific elements of the 
above analysis. First, there is a hermeneutic problem. Most early modern philosophy 
contained biblical citations. These citations served many purposes: they highlighted 
authorial piety; appeased ecclesiastical authorities; and demonstrated the orthodoxy of 
philosophical doctrine. However, the presence or absence of religious themes need not 
affect a discourse’s subject matter, method, or epistemic status – the things that 
determined disciplinary identity. As such, the religious vignettes in Bacon’s writings do 
not provide an obvious window onto his disciplinary setup. Consequently, contra Matthew 
and McKnight, they do not prove or suggest that theology set philosophical agendas, or 
that philosophy appropriated theological areas of study. 
   The remaining problems are more substantive. Essentially, Matthews and McKnight 
overplay whatever apocalyptic or providential themes exist in Bacon, and efface – to the 
point of banishment – his worldly, social concerns.52 This overly theological reading 
assumes that Bacon viewed his Instauratio as the culmination of sacred history. According 
to this history, the Fall precipitated war, poor communication and idolatrous thinking, 
which accounted for man’s fitful attempts at knowledge. This pattern persisted until 
Bacon’s time, which was marked by general prosperity, geographical expansion, and new 
inventions like the compass.53 According to Matthews and McKnight, Bacon legitimised 
his natural philosophy by hitching it to these providential currents.54 Therefore, 
Matthews argues, his Instauratio had a ‘divine mandate’.55 Locating Bacon’s natural 
philosophy in this sacred history implies it was capable of either restoring man’s proper 
relation to God, or acquiring divine wisdom.56 In short, it suggests his philosophy was 
profoundly theological.  
   However, this somewhat overstates Bacon’s sense of his own destiny. Providence had 
a hand in all progress, and Bacon praised Elizabeth I and James I for fostering technical 
                                                
51 Ibid., pp. 30-50. 
52 See, for example, McKnight, Religious Foundations, pp. 155-6; Matthews, Theology and Science, pp. 99-105. 
53 Bacon, The New Organon, p. 60. 
54 See Matthews, Theology and Science, pp. 89-90, 92-8, 108-10; McKnight, Religious Foundations, p. 152. 
55 Matthews, Theology and Science, p. 51. 
56 McKnight, Religious Foundations, pp. 46-7; Matthews, Theology and Science, pp. 58-9. 
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and intellectual development.57 But he did not regard his own work as the inevitable 
climax to those developments. This deflationary sentiment was partly a reflection of his 
ailing political circumstances. Bacon was made attorney general in 1613. He joined the 
Privy Council in 1616, became Lord Chancellor in 1618 – the same year he received a 
peerage – and then Viscount St Alban in 1621.58 However, he was impeached by 
parliament later that year, losing his offices and royal favour. Though his fines were 
largely remitted, Bacon’s subsequent attempts to restart a career – as political advisor to 
the Duke of Buckingham (1592-1628), or provost of Eton College – were thwarted. 
Bacon spent the remaining five years of his life productively engaged in contemplation 
and writing. However, he was disillusioned by his political failures, and aware that his 
philosophical reforms lacked institutional backing.59 He also knew the Instauratio was far 
from complete. De Augmentis constituted part I; the unfinished Novum Organum provided 
a small portion of part II; various natural histories, published and unpublished, 
contributed to part III; and parts IV and V were no more than prefaces.60 Neither did 
Bacon expect his project or reforms to be completed in his lifetime. In the Abecedarium 
(the draft preface of part IV, written in 1622), he lamented that ‘my own words (as far as 
the work of instauration is concerned) could be accused of lacking an age or era to match 
them’. He was therefore ‘devoted to posterity…deal[ing] out work for ages to come’.61 It 
is a stretch, therefore, to claim Bacon was expecting the arrival of an imminent 
‘apocalyptic transformation’.62 
   This casts new light on Bacon’s contention that his natural philosophy would recapture 
the power over nature enjoyed in Eden. On one reading, natural philosophy delivered 
man from sin and returned him to a state of prelapsarian purity.63 However, Bacon 
realised he was not witnessing the final stage of sacred history; and thus it is unlikely he 
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thought his natural history would entirely rediscover Adam’s natural power. Even in his 
earlier works, Bacon’s philosophical pretensions were less exorbitant than they appear to 
be. In Valerius, he warned that ‘in two points the curse [of the Fall] is peremptory and 
not to be removed’ – these were: man’s vanity, and the corruption, or ‘reluctation’ of 
nature.64 Natural philosophy might battle these impediments forever and never eradicate 
them. Thus, restoring truly Edenic conditions – in which these impediments were gone – 
required more than the perfection of his natural philosophy.  
   Of course, millenarianism was an important feature of Bacon’s philosophy.65 No 
consensus existed on how to facilitate the thousand-year age of sacredness, or what to 
expect from it.66 But, generally, millenarianism signalled an interest in man’s current 
earthly predicament (as preparation for millennial transformation), not imminent divine 
communion.67 For Bacon, millenarianism had practical goals, based around manipulating 
and controlling nature. In De Augmentis, he warned against ‘men possessed by a false idea 
of exalting their nature’.68  To ‘dignifie and exalt knowledge’, he said in the Advancement, 
‘contemplation and action’, must be ‘more neerely and straightly conioyned and vnited 
together’.69 Thus, in Novum Organum, Bacon identified ‘the true ends of knowledge’ as 
‘the uses and benefits of life’.70 He also referred to the manner in which ‘discoveries 
make men happy, and bring benefit without hurt or sorrow to anyone’, distinguishing 
philosophical developments from, say, political ones.71  
   Bacon’s philosophical ambitions were practical. But he couched his project, 
specifically, in relation to scholasticism. Bacon derided learning that failed to escape the 
lecture hall or academy. The school of Aristotle, he said, was ‘more concerned with how 
one might explain oneself in replying…than of the internal truth of things’.72 It was 
verbal and disputatious, and, because it was mired in syllogism, ‘lets nature slip out of our 
hands’.73 In its place, Bacon championed an inductive method that worked from sense 
impression to general principles. This was a ‘form of demonstration which respects the 
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senses, stays close to nature, fosters results and is almost involved in them itself’.74 
Equipped with more potent reasoning directives, natural philosophy could be 
transformed into something truly useful. As Bacon said in Cogitationes de Natura Rerum (c. 
1604/1605): ‘it is not enough, nor indeed of any great use, to know of what things 
consist, if you know not the ways and means of their mutations and transformations’.75  
   In sum, the theological import of Bacon’s natural philosophy is less clear-cut than is 
sometimes suggested. Fulfilling God’s providential plan and reacquiring prelapsarian 
power are famed Baconian motifs, with obvious rhetorical power. They were 
nevertheless vague ambitions. Bacon’s actual intentions, though hitched to 
millenarianism, were less bombastic, more practical, and did not involve personal 
deification or divine communion. Bacon’s natural philosophy was not a species of 
theology, and, notwithstanding his presuppositions about the world as divine creation, he 
tried to shield natural philosophy from theological incursion. It is the aim of the 
remainder of this chapter to clarify this disciplinary arrangement. 
 
 
II .  Phi losophy and theology  
 
To understand how Bacon conceptualised disciplines in general, and natural philosophy 
and theology in particular, the obvious place to start looking is De Augmentis.76 Published 
in 1623 as part I of the Instauratio, De Augmentis was a survey of the state of extant 
learning, divided into disciplines. Its English language version, The Advancement of 
Learning, was published far earlier, however, in 1605. In these works, Bacon divided 
learning into history, poetry and philosophy, leaving space for theology as a mirroring 
adjunct. Despite its marginal role in this schema, theology was the foil for Bacon’s 
definition of philosophy. Reason and faith were the foundations of (natural) philosophy 
and theology, respectively, ensuring that each discipline remained largely independent of 
the other. There were, nevertheless, minor points of overlap. As we shall see, general 
theistic principles could be inferred from natural philosophical observations. Moreover, 
in order to make itself intelligible, theology drew upon select rational calculations.  
                                                
74 Ibid. 
75 Bacon, Works, V, p. 424. 
76 Bacon did not use the term ‘discipline’ which usually carried a pedagogical implication. But he divided 
and sub-divided learning into parcels of knowledge, tantamount to disciplines. 
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   The purpose of both the Advancement and De Augmentis was to identify areas of learning 
in need of further study. This called upon Bacon to establish disciplinary boundaries, 
which he did by associating areas of human learning with different human cognitive 
faculties. Bacon was not the first person to constitute disciplines psychologically.77 
Aristotle, who largely divided knowledge by subject matter, left some room for subjective 
classifications – those determined by principles internal to man. Medieval authors, 
Avicenna (980-1037) and Averroes, and Renaissance medical writers, Juan Huarte (1529-
1588) and Helkiah Crooke (1576-1648), also used combinations of objective and 
subjective classifications.78 However, according to Grazia Olivieri, Bacon was the first to 
group disciplines by the Galenic-Nemesian tripartition of the mind or rational soul.79 
Simplifying Aristotelian psychology, this tradition divided the rational soul into memory, 
imagination and reason, each part working through the brain, or specific ventricles.80 
Bacon’s debt is not hard to fathom. He said ‘History has reference to the Memory, poesy 
to the Imagination, and philosophy to the Reason’. History was established when sensory 
impressions of particular species were stored in the memory, while poesy was created 
when the imagination – which, unlike memory, was not limited by the specificities of 
sensory reality – combined particular impressions invented in imitation of history. Only 
philosophy raised the human mind to abstractions, producing general axioms by 
analysing sensory data and making rational inductions.81  
   However, Bacon further claimed that the tripartite classification of history, poesy and 
philosophy was mirrored in divine learning, splitting theology into sacred history, 
parables and doctrines or precepts. For Bacon, ‘The information derived from revelation 
and the information derived from the sense differ no doubt both in the matter and the 
manner of conveyance…[but] the human mind is the same, and its repositories and cells 
the same’.82 Theology and human learning used different media to reach the mind – 
revelation and sense respectively – but animated the same areas of the human 
understanding. This formulation is neat. However, by claiming a correspondence 
between human and divine learning, Bacon violated his own principles of cognitive 
psychology. In human learning, the understanding was engaged in different ways, 
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depending on the type of mental operation performed on sensory impressions. 
Consequently, different psychological faculties were responsible for different disciplines. 
In divine learning, however, this connection did not exist. Each sub-field of theology was 
decoupled from man’s mental faculty because theology was revelatory and not the 
product of human experience or evaluation. Divine learning had an incongruous place 
within Bacon’s classificatory schema because it did not engage the mind in the same way 
as human learning, and its sub-divisions could not be justified on the same psychological 
basis.83 
   Though somewhat careless, this inconsistency is not in fact surprising. Bacon’s texts 
betray various Christian presuppositions, but his direct engagements with theology were 
usually circumspect. Bacon discussed ecclesiology in An Advertisement touching…the Church 
of England (1598), and Certaine considerations touching...the Church of England (1604). But these 
tracts were largely political, avoided revealed theology, and, in the case of the latter, have 
a print history that suggests Bacon doubted its appropriateness for public consumption.84 
In his first publication, Meditationes Sacræ, Bacon recommended deferring to church 
authority on matters of scriptural interpretation.85 And later, when he turned to divine 
learning in De Augmentis, he curtailed his pretensions, declaring that ‘I will not…as in 
other like cases, either introduce examples or give precepts [in theology]. That I will leave 
to theologians’.86 Bacon’s respect for the clergy’s professional right to theology sits 
uneasily with Matthews and McKnight’s claim that Bacon saw himself as some sort of 
priest. He appeared happy to leave priestly status, and its intellectual prerogatives, to the 
priesthood. In all likelihood, his confused sub-division of theology reflects this deference 
to, and disengagement from, theological questions.  
   This is borne out by comparing other areas of Bacon’s classificatory schema. After 
surveying Bacon’s taxonomy of learning, Sachiko Kusukawa concluded that Bacon’s 
natural philosophy was more coherent and unified than his human philosophy. This, she 
argued, was because Bacon spent more time developing it than he did the latter.87 The 
same principle applies to Bacon’s treatment of divine learning. As theology was the 
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intellectual property of theologians, Bacon studied it less than disciplines he could 
legitimately contribute to. The purpose of the Instauratio was to reform the entire 
intellectual globe. But Bacon’s main concern – and his strategy for achieving such 
sweeping reform – was the reconstruction of natural philosophy, which in Novum 
Organum he described as ‘the great mother of the sciences’.88 The improvement and 
development of theology would not radically affect Bacon’s reformation of natural 
philosophy, which was why he was, or claimed to be, happy to defer to clerical authority 
on theological matters. 
   However, despite Bacon’s slightly sketchy account of divine learning, theology’s 
placement within his classificatory schema was highly significant. This was because, 
besides the (confused) relation between divine learning and human learning, theology, 
according to Bacon, had a direct, oppositional relationship with philosophy. Unlike other 
fields of learning, this relationship was defined, specifically, within the rubric of 
knowledge. ‘Knowledge’, Bacon said in De Augmentis, ‘admits of two kinds of 
information; the one inspired by divine revelation, the other arising from the senses’. 
This, he said, was reason enough to ‘divide knowledge into Divinity and Philosophy’.89 
Their contrasting foundations meant both disciplines were composed of opposing 
elements. The source of knowledge – revelation or sense – was intimately connected to 
the manner in which knowledge was cognised – by faith or reason.90 This, moreover, 
prescribed dissimilar disciplinary subject matters. Philosophy was born of reason working 
upon sensory information, and therefore discoursed on matters natural. Theology 
derived from faith and revelation, and thus dealt with divine mysteries.91 To confuse the 
principles or content of one discipline with the other would be a category mistake, and, 
as such, Bacon cautioned against their admixture.92 The consequences of their conflation, 
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he warned in the Advancement, were ‘Hereticall Religion; and an Imaginarie and fabulous 
Philosophie’.93 
   According to Bacon, philosophy’s disciplinary separation from theology was based on 
the cognitive limitations of the former. Speaking aphoristically in Valerius, he said ‘the 
sense[s] discover natural things, but darken and shut up divine’.94 He expanded this 
argument in the Advancement, claiming that, because the will and image of God were not 
divulged by reason, nor evident in nature, philosophy was disqualified from speaking on 
such matters.95 Theology, in short, was not subject to rational scrutiny. Bacon respected 
this injunction – flying in the face of certain philosophical trends – by refraining from 
discoursing, philosophically, on the substance of the soul.96 He also chastised the schools 
for making faith conform to rational dictates, which reduced theology to a form of art.97 
   Although Bacon placed limits on philosophy and reason, he was not trying to seriously 
disable philosophical inquiry. Rather, his main concern was to secure philosophy’s 
disciplinary boundaries. For, on the one hand, philosophy suffered various ‘descredites 
and disgraces’ due to ‘the zeale and iealousie of Divines’.98 And on the other, 
philosophers like Pythagoras (570-495) and Plato invited theological considerations into 
their reasoning. Consequently, Bacon debarred philosophy from subjects not amenable 
to sense or reason, which meant it operated without violating theology.99 But the 
disciplinary restriction cut both ways. Theology, which was constituted by faith, could 
not make any claims against philosophy. The upshot, for Bacon, was philosophy’s 
independence from theology.  
   This is how Bacon generically isolated philosophical investigation from theology. But 
the same principles applied as he negotiated a more specific fault line, between natural 
philosophy and theology. Bacon disdained thinkers who derived natural philosophy from 
scripture. Paracelsus (1493-1541) drew the majority of Bacon’s ire, but, as Michael 
Kiernan notes, he also targeted members of his school, like Gerhard Dorn (1530-1584) – 
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whose philosophy was elaborated from the books of Genesis and Job.100 Other adherents 
of “Mosaic Physics” included Lambert Daneau (1535-1590) and Conrad Aslacus (1564-
1624), who treated the bible, literally, as a work of natural philosophy (unlike Paracelsus 
who read scripture figuratively).101 Mosaic Physics tended to be admired by theologians, 
as it demonstrated the harmony between natural philosophy and theology.102 However, it 
was anathema to Bacon because it made scripture the source and judge of natural 
philosophic doctrine. 
   According to Bacon, natural philosophy must operate independently of theology. 
Nevertheless, it – natural philosophy – acted as the basis for some theological 
speculation. Bacon negotiated these twin goals by a deft bit of disciplinary fragmentation. 
In the Advancement, he divided philosophy into three branches (all connected to the 
‘stemme’ of Philosophia Prima), each with a different subject – God, nature and man.103 
The branches-meeting-at-a-stem metaphor indicates that each sub-disciplines was part 
of, or derived from, the same overarching disciplinary schema.104 They were nevertheless 
sufficiently distinct to warrant sub-categorisation. Consequently, philosophical inquiries 
into nature – the sub-discipline of natural philosophy – were, at least partly, bracketed 
off from philosophical inquiries into God – the sub-discipline of natural theology. 
Scholars disagree about how to classify natural theology e.g. as a sub-field of theology, or 
an offshoot of natural philosophy.105 Bacon, however, is clear: natural theology was a 
species of philosophy. 
   Natural theological arguments have a long history, dating at least to pagan philosophy, 
and finding particular prominence in medieval scholasticism and late seventeenth century 
apologists for the new philosophy.106 Bacon un-controversially defined natural theology 
as the ‘knowledge concerning GOD…obtained by the contemplation of his Creatures’.107 
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Put another way: it was a set of theistic conclusions derived from a suitably judicious 
natural philosophy. The latter was therefore prior to, and the foundation of, the 
former.108  As a means of acquiring knowledge of God by sense and reason, natural 
theology was distinct from theology proper, which was founded on faith in revelation. 
Nevertheless, natural theology was fundamental to faith, and its dereliction was an 
invitation to unbelief. According to Bacon, if one engages in the ‘contemplation of 
second Causes’ only superficially, it ‘doth derogate from our dependance vpon God, who 
is the first cause’.109 However, if nature is studied carefully and thoroughly, 
considerations of natural causation will lead to knowledge of God. Furthermore, he said, 
‘the works of God…doe shew the Omnipotencie and wisedome of the Maker’.110  
   The precise limits of this natural divine knowledge are not entirely clear. In his early 
essay, Of Atheism, Bacon said ‘depth in Philosophy, bringeth Mens Mindes about to 
Religion’.111 But in the Advancement, he claimed reason could not disclose God’s will, and 
that natural theology could ‘conuince Atheisme; but not…informe Religion’.112 The latter 
view is probably Bacon’s final word, and it reappeared in his more thoroughgoing 
treatments of natural theology. It also fits with his general view that religion was 
predicated, ultimately, on faith in revelation. Philosophy was capable of engendering 
belief, but extra-rational means were needed to establish the correct belief. 
   This disciplinary relationship between Bacon’s natural philosophy and natural theology 
undercuts two discussed historiographical viewpoints. Bacon’s natural philosophy 
worked within various religious constraints, and acted as a base for theological 
inferences. Yet, in its first analysis, natural philosophy did not query divine matters. 
                                                                                                                                      
materialist thinkers like Hobbes, the Platonists said natural phenomena proved the existence of spirits. 
This type of natural theology claimed to illustrate, not just God’s power – demonstrable by natural design 
– but also his wisdom. Bacon had more in common with the first camp – he thought empirical study of 
natural causes disclosed knowledge of God. However, he was not a clear-cut forerunner of it. For example, 
he did not advocate the sort of Boylean mechanism that tied in closely with this brand of natural theology. 
‘The Uses of Natural Theology’, pp. 451-2, 458-60, 466-9. 
108 According to Vidal and Kleeberg, early modern natural theology differed from medieval examples by 
dint of its reliance on natural philosophy. ‘Knowledge, Belief, and the Impulse to Natural Theology’, pp. 
390-1. 
109 Bacon, Advancement, p. 6. See also, Ibid. p. 37. 
110 Ibid., pp. 78-9. Bacon is consistent on this point, see Works, III, p. 221; Ibid., IV, p. 341. According to 
Milner, ‘Theological Foundation’, p. 263, Novum Organum was a departure from previous works because it 
was the first time Bacon claimed philosophy, rather than nature, revealed the power of God. However, the 
departure was not as stark as Milner supposes. In the Advancement – published fifteen years before Novum 
Organum – Bacon said that it was ‘the works of God [i.e. nature]; which doe shew the Omnipotencie and 
wisedome of the Maker’. He made this assertion as part of a discussion of divine philosophy or natural 
theology, which is ‘knowledge concerning GOD, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his 
Creatures [i.e. nature]’. Advancement, pp. 78-9. 
111 Francis Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, XV: The Essayes or Counsels, Civill and Morall, edited with an 
introduction, notes and commentary by Michael Kiernan, (Oxford, 2000), p. 51. 
112 Bacon, Advancement, p. 78. 
 50 
Cunningham’s claim that early modern natural philosophy was primarily interested in 
God is therefore too simplistic. For Bacon, natural philosophy aimed, first, to discover 
natural causes – ultimately formal causes – and second, to make the knowledge of natural 
causation operational by the production of effects. Turning the conclusions of natural 
inquiry into natural theology came afterwards, and fell within the ambit of a separate sub-
discipline: natural theology. It is also clear that Matthews’s contention that ‘The two 
pursuits of natural philosophy and theology were singular for him [Bacon]’, is false.113 
Bacon, in fact, created several layers of disciplinary fragmentation. First, he broadly 
established disciplines according to the faculty of the mind they animated – memory, 
imagination, or reason. And second, he sub-divided according to subject matter – in this 
case, nature and God.  
   Acknowledging these disciplinary distinctions, a third view, articulated by Tom 
Woolford, posits reason as the linchpin of theology. Woolford does not say Bacon 
conflated philosophy and theology, but he recasts Bacon as a theologian, and theology as 
a rational discipline. This argument rests on the assumption that Bacon subscribed, 
largely uncritically, to Aristotelian accounts of human psychology and cerebral 
physiology. Thus construed, Bacon was committed to a doctrine of the soul that posited 
vegetative, sensible and rational parts, each working through different ventricles of the 
brain. The vegetative and sensible components were both corporeal: the former was 
regulatory, dealing mainly with processes like digestion; the latter was perceptive and 
responsible for bodily motions. The sensible soul – which included the five external 
senses – also operated within the mental faculties of the memory and imagination, seated 
at the back and the front of the brain respectively. Only the rational soul, the source of 
intellection, was incorporeal.114  
   According to Woolford, Bacon constructed a careful, essentially Aristotelian, 
psychological epistemology. Knowledge originated from the phantasmata or sense-
impressions that affected the sense organs from the outside world. These corporeal 
impressions were relayed to the mind where, as sensible species, they were the objects of 
memory and imagination. The intellect produced rational or universal knowledge by 
abstracting sensory particulars. First, however, the imagination had to transform sensible 
species into intellectual species (partially abstracted impressions half-way between 
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phantasmata and full cognition). Then, finally, reason converted the intellectual species 
into abstract thought or philosophy. The rational soul was the only faculty capable of 
cognising abstract, immaterial universals because it was itself immaterial.115 From this 
Aristotelian framework, Woolford concluded that, because it was the job of immaterial 
reason to cognise abstract thought derived from the natural world, it was equally well 
suited to cognising theological truths derived from the spiritual world. He claimed that 
although immaterial theological truths bypassed the (corporeal) sensible soul, they were, 
for Bacon, available, and intelligible, to the rational soul that, because of its immateriality, 
dealt in abstractions.116 This, in sum, placed reason at the heart of Bacon’s theology, 
rendering faith a branch of rationality.  
   This reconstruction is certainly neat, but it has two main flaws. Firstly, it ascribes too 
much psychological detail to a theory that Bacon only treated superficially. Bacon’s 
account of the progress of sense impressions through various degrees of cognition was 
scant; the mind, he said, either ‘rehearses them’ (to make history), ‘makes fanciful 
imitations of them’ (to make poesy), or ‘analyses and classifies them’ (to make 
philosophy).117 Furthermore, although Bacon assigned the sub-fields of human learning 
to different mental faculties, this, as noted above, placed him more within a Galenic-
Nemesian tradition than a strictly Aristotelian one. In fact, despite having a more 
obvious affinity with Galenic psychology than Aristotelian theories – which posited 
variegated perceptions and different types of phantasms – Bacon was not entirely sold on 
either. He was virtually silent on the subject of cerebral physiology, and when he did 
touch upon it, he was circumspect, noting that the ‘proper seats and domiciles’ of the 
mental faculties were ‘disputed or slightly inquired’. Of the theory that the soul utilised 
different areas of the brain – a view integral to Woolford’s Aristotelian rendition, and 
Oliveri’s Galenic-Nemesian interpretation – Bacon was again hesitant, conceding that 
‘Neither…is…[the] arrangement of the intellectual faculties (imagination, reason, and 
memory) according to the respective ventricles of the brain, destitute of error’.118 
Apparently, Bacon was neither wholly committed to a particular epistemological 
tradition, nor had he fully developed his own theory.119 Thus, he urged further inquiry on 
the subject – for the ‘imperfect understanding’ of the sensible soul had ‘bred opinions 
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superstitious and corrupt and most injurious to the dignity of the human mind’, and of 
the physical origins of man’s faculties, ‘nothing of much value…has as yet been 
discovered’.120 Baconian psychology was therefore sketchy for two reasons. First, the 
subject was understudied, and second, Bacon was reluctant to speculate potentially 
‘injurious’ details. This did not stop him developing a clear philosophic method of 
discovery. But here Bacon was different from both his scholastic predecessors – whose 
logic treatises usually assumed that understanding method required a good grasp of 
psychology – and several of his mechanistic successors – for example Thomas Hobbes, 
whose epistemology developed a full picture of the mind’s interaction with the world. 
   The second problem with Woolford’s interpretation is that the importance of reason in 
theology is underdetermined. Bacon did not theorise the manner in which revelatory 
theology became or constituted knowledge. Theology was not obviously associated with 
any of the psychological faculties, and, as we have seen, its relation to other types of 
learning or knowledge was unclear. It is clear, however, that theological cognition was 
not, at root, rational. The human mind – its rational faculty and sensory storehouse – was 
simply not equipped to explore the niceties of Christianity. Bacon repeatedly warned 
against reason’s illicit incursions into matters of faith. Speaking of divine mysteries in De 
Augmentis, he said that ‘to inspect and sift them too curiously and search out the manner 
of the mystery [i.e. to subject them to reason], is in my opinion not safe’.121 They were 
beyond the purview of reason, and known only by faith. Thus, among Bacon’s various 
refrains was the maxim, first announced in Valerius, to ‘give unto faith that which unto 
faith belongeth’.122  
   Theology was not derived from reason, and reason was not its primary mode of 
cognition. In other words, it was not a rational discipline in the way Woolford claims. 
That being said, natural theology – which demonstrated God’s existence and power, and 
provided a (rational) foundation upon which theology could be built – was a sub-field of 
philosophy. Therefore, implicitly, Bacon granted reason a role, however small, in divine 
learning. Moreover, he argued, although ‘in matters of faith and religion our imagination 
raises itself above our reason’, theology still had ‘its seat…in the very citadel of the mind 
                                                
120 Ibid., pp. 398, 399. 
121 Ibid., pp. 341-2. 
122 Bacon, Works, III, p. 218. Bacon repeated this maxim more than once in Novum Organum. On one 
occasion, he used it to show that if the mind was properly ordered and mindful of the evidence of God in 
nature, rational inquiry would pose no danger to faith. The New Organon, p. 12. On another occasion, 
however, it acted as a warning not to ascribe too much (philosophical) significance to scripture, which 
should only be referred to for spiritual matters. Ibid., p. 53. 
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and understanding’.123 To gain traction in the understanding, divinity sometimes drew 
upon the mental faculties used to establish philosophical knowledge. In the Advancement, 
Bacon outlined two such instances. The first, he said, involved ensuring that divine 
mysteries were ‘sensible vnto vs’ despite our limited capacity for comprehension. This 
was achieved by God ‘grifte[ing] his Reuelations & holie doctrine vpon the Notions of 
our reason’.124 These theological first principles, or mysteries, would remain arbitrary and 
‘exempted from examination of reason’, but they would be sufficiently illustrated – by 
being made amenable to reason – to be graspable by our understanding.125  
   The second task of reason in theology was to deduce consequences, or further 
doctrine, from these first theological principles.126 Thus, reason used fundamental 
doctrine (which was beyond reason) to affirm or establish peripheral theological issues or 
positions not self-evidently addressed by original precepts. The theology thus elaborated 
was, in some sense, reasonable. This had important methodological implications, 
addressed in the following section.  
   Here, I will discuss the former instance. For, although it does not imply reason was 
able to fully understand divinity (which, again, was beyond reason), it suggests that 
divinity could be packaged in a manner that made it more comprehensible to man. This 
suggestion is given greater import in De Augmentis. Following the claim that God made 
divine mysteries as ‘sensible’ to the understanding as possible, Bacon urged people to 
operate and expand their reason, or ‘turn it every way’, so ‘that we may be more capable 
of receiving and understanding His mysteries’. As man’s reason developed, and ‘the mind 
be enlarged’, so the conveyance of divine mysteries – which were never more than 
approximations serviceable to man’s limited capacities – would be proportionately richer 
and more expansive.127  Bacon did not claim (as Woolford says he did) that reason 
cognised theological truths – they were, after all, ‘mysteries’. But, theology could be 
tailored to reason to secure its uptake in the human mind; and the more developed one’s 
reason, the greater the uptake. 
   So, although Bacon made philosophy virtually independent of theology, the reverse did 
not quite apply. Theology was not reliant on philosophy. But it was more fruitfully 
conveyed to the mind when man’s rational faculty – which was responsible for 
philosophising – was expanded, and divine mysteries had something larger to be grafted 
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onto. However, according to Benjamin Milner, early recensions of Bacon’s method and 
philosophy, namely Valerius, were theologically minded. It was only in Novum Organum, 
he argues, that natural philosophy became fully autonomous.128 It is true that, in Valerius, 
Bacon was more confident that philosophy would restore Adamic knowledge than he 
was in subsequent works. That is to say, his philosophy had some theological motivation. 
But, in large part, the influence between the disciplines went the other way. In both his 
early and late works, Bacon suggested that philosophy could and would facilitate 
theology. In the Advancement, he argued (in much the same way he did in De Augmentis) 
that theology was indebted to philosophy insofar as it was grafted onto reason. The 
Advancement was published fifteen years prior to Novum Organum, so the notion that 
theology drew upon reason predated the latter text. In the Advancement, Bacon also 
claimed the book of nature (which evinced God’s power) was a necessary hermeneutic 
tool for understanding the book of scripture (which contained God’s will).129 By better 
understanding nature, one became more receptive to God’s manner of communicating 
the incomprehensible. Bacon thus developed the claim that theology used reason to 
make itself intelligible, and that the best theology was, to some degree, based on natural 
philosophy (the study of the book of nature). 
   Notwithstanding these minor points of overlap or affinity, natural philosophy and 
theology had dissimilar cognitive foundations. Philosophy proceeded by sifting and 
dissecting sense data; theology was based on faith in revelation. Broadly speaking these 
cognitive differences prescribed different subject matter; natural philosophy studied 
nature (which, of course, could tell you something about God), and theology dealt with 
divine mysteries. To fulfil their respective functions, each discipline required a method 
suited to their different foundations and preoccupations. Bacon famously advocated an 
inductive approach to natural philosophy, discussed in the following section. Induction 
reflected and enhanced man’s natural epistemic tendencies. First, it valorised individual 
sensory observation, and second, it established rational ways to collate, compare and 
contrast those experiences, educing something more general and abstract about nature. 
As we will see, by contrast, theology relied on deductive, rather than inductive, reasoning. 
The disciplinary gulf between Bacon’s natural philosophy and theology is therefore 
embodied in, and demonstrated by, their separate methods.   
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III .  Induct ive  method 
 
Bacon’s inductive method was designed to redefine natural philosophy.130 As he said in 
Novum Organum: ‘before one can sail to the more remote and secret places of nature, it is 
absolutely essential to introduce a better and more perfect application of the mind and 
understanding’.131 As discussed, Bacon’s psychological taxonomy was not entirely 
watertight (because of theology’s incongruous placement), and his theory of cognition 
was not as rigorous as some of his scholastic predecessors or mechanistic successors. 
Both of these shortcomings – but particularly the latter – were, to some extent, casualties 
of Bacon’s preoccupation with method. For our purposes, however, Bacon’s method is 
significant insofar as it drove a wedge between natural philosophy and theology. 
Theology, according to Bacon, was also governed by a particular method – reason, after 
all, was used to elaborate divine doctrine. But, as we shall see, theological practice was 
dissimilar to the inductive method of natural philosophy.  
   Bacon’s early works express optimism that, within his lifetime, the application of his 
philosophical method would bear fruit. In Valerius, he said that ‘it [induction] cannot fail 
in much less space of time to make return of many singular commodities towards the 
state and occasions of man’s life’.132 However, by the end of his life, Bacon realised his 
reformation of natural philosophy had not properly been inaugurated, let alone 
completed. He therefore decided to identify and clarify his salient insights in order to 
ensure their use for posterity. Thus, he contended in Historia naturalis et experimentalis 
(1622), the central plank of the advancement of learning was not his novel manner of 
interpreting nature, but rather natural histories, without which no induction and no 
philosophy was possible.133 Understanding this priority gives some indication why the 
psychology of cognition was never Bacon’s major concern. He was of the ‘opinion’, he 
said in Novum Organum: 
 
                                                
130 Bacon’s method provided an idea platform from which to criticise and adapt principles of Aristotelian 
logic. See Michel Malherbe, ‘Bacon’s method of science’, in Markku Peltonen (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Bacon, (Cambridge, 1996), 75-98. Natural histories formed a key part of this method, see Paula 
Findlen, ‘Francis Bacon and the Reform of Natural History in the Seventeenth Century’, in Donald R. 
Kelley (ed.), History and the Disciplines: the Reclassification of Knowledge in Early Modern Europe, (Rochester, 1997), 
239-60.  
131 Bacon, The New Organon, p. 11. 
132 Bacon, Works, III, p. 250 
133 Francis Bacon, The Oxford Francis Bacon, XII: The Instauratio magna Part III: Historia naturalis et 
experimentalis: Historia ventorum and Historia vitæ & mortis, edited with introduction, notes, commentaries, and 
facing-page translations by Graham Rees, with Maria Wakely, (Oxford, 2007), p. 13. 
 56 
‘that men could hit upon our form of interpretation simply by their own natural 
force of intelligence, without any other art, if they had available a good history of 
nature and experience, and worked carefully on it, and were able to give 
themselves two commands: one, to lay aside received opinions and notions; the 
other, to restrain their minds for the time being from the most general principles 
and the next most general. For interpretation is the true and natural work of the 
mind once the obstacles are removed’.134  
 
Bacon supposed that man’s understanding would operate efficaciously provided it was 
free of ‘obstacles’. Good philosophy was therefore contingent upon one’s ability to 
overcome the mental conditions – innate, learned and environmental – that inhibited the 
mind’s rational functioning. Unlike most Aristotelians, whose methodologies took 
account of the physiology of the mind, Bacon’s method was simply a means of ensuring 
the mind was unencumbered, and operated in its normal fashion. Of course, the passage 
just quoted distinguishes histories from induction (the interpretation of nature), and 
suggests the latter – the truly philosophic part of Bacon’s method – was of marginal 
importance. However, two things should dissuade us from doubting the centrality of 
induction. First of all, it was slightly disingenuous of Bacon to dissociate natural histories 
from the inductive method; they were two sides of the same coin. Natural histories were 
only valued as the foundations of induction-based natural philosophy, and induction was 
only doable with proper natural histories. Bacon therefore justified the application of his 
method – ‘which proceeds by induction’ – to a variety of sciences, on the basis that one 
could make histories and tables of discovery for each of them.135 Second, despite 
suggesting that, in theory, the mind could intuitively interpret nature if it was denuded of 
corruptions and aware of good natural histories, Bacon denied that this was possible in 
practice. As we shall see, distempers might be lessened, but they were never obliterated. 
Philosophic method was always required to offset the ineradicable underpinnings of 
man’s idols, or mental misapprehensions. Thus, following his remark about 
interpretation being the natural act of an unencumbered mind, Bacon conceded that 
‘everything will certainly be more in readiness because of our instructions, and much 
more secure’.136 
   In his unpublished Descriptio Globi Intellectualis (1612), Bacon defined philosophy as 
whatever the mind digested into axioms from particulars. Philosophy, as such, was 
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constructed by induction.137 Bacon thereby inverted Aristotelian methodology, which 
syllogistically deduced particulars from universally and intuitively known general 
principles.138 Aristotle said general principles or causal definitions were guaranteed by 
simple experiences. For Bacon, this was nonsensical – normal experiences were 
contingent and particular.139 According to Bacon, the only way to properly establish 
axioms was by an inductive process that gradually distilled various sensory experiences 
into increasingly abstract propositions. 
   These methodological distinctions are played out in Bacon’s accounts of natural 
philosophy and theology. In the Advancement, he said that, once apprised of ‘the Articles 
and [first] principles of Religion…It is then permitted vnto vs to make deriuations and 
inferences from, and according to the Analogie of them’. In natural inquiries, however, 
this practice ‘holdeth not’.140 Theology, in other words, used conventional (syllogistic) 
logic to elaborate doctrine from divine mysteries, or theological first principles. 
Theological rationality was top-down; it started with revelation, or predetermined 
doctrine, and resulted in the particulars deduced from those first principles. 
Philosophical knowledge, on the other hand, was established from the bottom up, in a 
manner that Bacon repeatedly described as pyramid-like.141 At the base were natural 
histories. These histories were vast, empirical, and recorded in plain language; however 
data collection was not indiscriminate, and Bacon advised against obsessing over 
minutiae.142 Purposeful natural histories, he said, ought to deal with species, not 
infinitesimal, inconsequential natural differences.143 Correctly assembled natural histories 
were streamlined into elaborate series of tabulated particulars, which would, when 
compared and analysed, yield affirmative truths about nature. In Novum Organum, Bacon 
said ‘True induction is founded on exclusion, but is not completed until it reaches an 
affirmation’.144 The first step was to compile a table of instances (a list of instances in 
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which the simple nature being studied – say, heat – is present). Next, create a table of 
absence (instances where, though the simple nature in question is absent, other 
conditions are similar), followed by a table of variation (establishing degrees of presence). 
Finally, eliminate between the cases of presence and absence until what is called a ‘first 
harvest’ or preliminary interpretation of the particular simple nature or form is 
established.145 Only after the establishment of the three tables, known as ‘the 
Presentation of instances to the intellect’, can ‘induction itself…[be] put to work’.146 By a 
process of exclusion, natural histories disclosed, first, the material and efficient causes of 
natures (making physics), and later, their formal causes (making metaphysics). At the 
summit of the pyramid of knowledge was the law of nature. Natural knowledge therefore 
moved from analyses of particulars to higher and higher levels of generality. Bacon called 
this ascending the ladder of axioms. This was the diametric reverse of theological 
knowledge, which began from divine principles (derived from revelation), and later used 
logic to determine lower species of doctrine.  
   Allowing for the fact that Bacon said theology was not a science, the methodological 
distinction between theology and natural philosophy mirrors Bacon’s contention that 
there was ‘one method for cultivating the sciences [syllogism] and a different method for 
discovering them [induction]’.147 On this basis, there was a considerable discrepancy 
between the methodological rigour of natural philosophy and theology. Theology was 
based on principles that were revelatory and peremptory; they were not discovered, and 
their elaboration was done by simple deduction. In short, theology involved next to no 
art. Natural philosophy, on the other hand, invented its principles, guiding the mind 
from particular empirical information towards more abstract generalities. Problematically, 
this meant getting the mind to operate in a way contrary to its habituated fashion, which 
lurched to quick, appealing and familiar generalisations. By placing such great demands 
on the mind, natural philosophy needed a method capable of policing the recalcitrant 
mental habits that disrupted the search for truth. Theology, conversely, was a matter for 
clerical authorities, so – at least from Bacon’s perspective – the demands it made on the 
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mind were of less concern. He therefore denied it a method of comparable 
sophistication.  
   Mental distempers had acutely disabling effects on inquiries into nature. Self-adoration 
led to vain speculations and prideful obduracy; a propensity for ill-considered assent 
resulted in precipitous judgments and deference to authority; and preconceived 
conclusions and opinions held the understanding captive. These and other tendencies 
were causally responsible for the idols of the mind, which Bacon described in De 
Augmentis as the ‘ill-ordered predisposition[s] of mind’, which perverted ‘all the 
anticipations of the intellect’.148 Listed, they were the idols of the tribe (cognitive failings 
present in all humanity); the cave (cognitive failings specific to individuals); the 
marketplace (linguistic corruptions); and the theatre (erroneous theories).149  
   Bacon’s new logic or method was a response to the problems posed by these 
distempers. Stephen Gaukroger and, more recently, Sorana Corneanu have explored the 
nature of the relationship between Bacon’s method and the human mind.150 Corneanu 
argues, quite rightly, that because the aim of natural philosophy was a collective good – 
the improvement of man’s estate – it embodied the highest virtue.151 From this general 
view of natural philosophy, Corneanu makes two inferences about Bacon’s method. 
First, that it had a curative function, and was capable of purging or removing man’s 
distempers. And second, that it had a moral function, replacing the mind’s defects with 
virtues like modesty and humility.152 These two notions have some prima facie plausibility, 
but, starting with the putative moral function, I will demonstrate that both are reductive. 
It is of course possible that Bacon’s method had some edificatory potential. Making 
philosophy was a painstaking business – it involved the compilation of natural histories 
and careful induction. By ‘not flatter[ing] intellectual prejudices’, Bacon’s method may 
well have cultivated qualities like humility.153 It also discouraged idle speculation and stale 
fidelity to pre-held conclusions. However, Bacon did not think method was the principal 
or best way to inculcate virtue – he sought to replace distempers with virtues, but his 
weapon of choice was Christian charity, not a curative philosophical method.154 Acting 
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charitably was, according to Bacon, the most comprehensive way to combat the 
distempers – pride, vanity, self-adoration etc. – that subverted virtuous activities, not 
least inquiries into nature. It was by ‘relying and resting on God’s help’, he said in Novum 
Organum, that one’s mind could be ‘fortified…against violent attacks from the armed 
forces of opinion, and against our own internal hesitations and scruples’. However, it was 
only after acquiring this mental equanimity that one could ‘provide more reliable and 
secure directions’ for studying nature.155 So, to say Bacon’s method engendered humility 
is to put things the wrong way round. Compiling histories and conducting experiments 
were actually activities best pursued by those of an already modest disposition. 
Perturbations must be dislodged prior to, and independently of, any attempt to interpret 
nature, because, as Bacon put it, ‘we use humility in discovery’.156 This differentiated 
Baconian logic from syllogistic practices, which, by failing to address mental 
disturbances, acted as, ‘a remedy…applied too late’.157 
   Describing Bacon’s method as curative is similarly short-sighted, as it implies that the 
mind’s distempers were capable of total eradication. Bacon denied this in De Augmentis, 
saying that the idols of the tribe, cave and marketplace, (but not the theatre) ‘cannot 
wholly be removed’, springing as they did from defects inherent in man’s mental 
makeup.158 Elsewhere, he seemed more sanguine about man’s epistemic impediments – 
in Novum Organum he said that ‘true induction is certainly an appropriate way to banish 
idols’.159 These remarks appear contradictory, but they actually speak to the difference 
between overturning idols and falsity, and eradicating the distempers that underpinned 
and caused them. Bacon was optimistic about achieving the former. However, he gave 
scant indication that the latter was possible, bemoaning in Novum Organum that the mind 
has ‘no even, polished surface available to receive the true rays of things’.160 Bacon’s 
method was therefore palliative, not curative: a response to man’s mental diseases, but 
not a panacea. He claimed, for example, that it provided a way to ‘assist’ the senses and 
‘regulate’ the understanding.161 And he argued that the formation of axioms was 
impossible unless the mind was ‘governed and directed’.162 To aid something (the 
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understanding) in this fashion implied that, while it was not incapable of achieving its 
predetermined goal (the discovery of true axioms), it was, and remained, capable of 
erring; hence the aid.  
   Bacon wanted to liberate the understanding, as far as possible, from man’s mental 
distempers; but total emancipation was impossible. His method – a set of regulatory 
procedures that guided the understanding – did not shut down distempers (which were 
ineradicable), but sidestepped them, thereby avoiding the idolatrous thinking that sprung 
from them. Bacon said that in order to collect natural histories, compile tables of 
presentation, and eliminate instances by induction, people had to forego any (residual) 
impulse to either vainly speculate, precipitously generalise, or conform to known, or 
authoritatively endorsed, ideas. The prescriptiveness of Bacon’s method ensured man’s 
mental proclivities did not become epistemic hindrances; it did not ‘give men’s 
understandings wings, but rather lead and weights, to check every leap and flight’.163 The 
rules of induction would overturn idolatrous thinking. But the efficacy of these rules 
depended on them circumventing, not curing, man’s distempers.164 The regulatory (rather 
than curative) aspirations of this method are laid bare in Bacon’s claim that, in order to 
arrive at truth, the mind must be ‘constantly controlled’ and its ‘business done (if I may 
put it this way) by machines’.165 Knowledge production was mechanical, not by dint of an 
altered mind, but because it was the result of directed human behaviour and controlled 
thought processes. ‘Method’, Bacon concluded, ‘more or less equalises intellects’.166 
Every individual was subject to some degree of mental perturbation, but by charting a 
course that neutralised such instances, Bacon’s logic ensured all people were equally 
equipped to investigate nature.167 
   Given what we know about Bacon’s method, the question naturally arises: what, in 
Bacon’s view, was man’s cognitive potential? Put another way: what was the goal of a 
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natural inquiry guided by a suitable method? The answer to this question, and the subject 
of the following section, was formal knowledge. Forms illuminate the structure of several 
Baconian disciplines. They were the centrepiece and goal of his natural philosophy: 
clarifying its subject matter (forms were material) and method (forms were discovered by 
induction). But they also forced a split in natural philosophy – between metaphysics 
(which sought after formal knowledge), and physics (which investigated efficient and 
material causation). As such, forms demonstrate how Bacon grouped and ordered 
clusters of disciplines. For many scholastics, forms were metaphysical entities, and thus 
connected or related to theology. Bacon likewise situated forms in metaphysics. But 
because metaphysics dealt with physical subjects and was worked by induction, it was 
assimilated to natural philosophy; and both disciplines (along with forms) were detached 
from theology. The latter, after all, was concerned with non-material entities, and 
established doctrine deductively.  
 
 
IV. Forms 
 
In Novum Organum, Bacon said the purpose of natural philosophy was the discovery of 
forms.168 This complemented his oft-stated aim of (re)establishing man’s dominion over 
nature. To know the form of something was to have knowledge of its essence or 
fundamental character. Anyone who dissected nature in this way acquired the ability to 
fabricate that form at any time and in any material. This, Bacon argued, left the knower 
with virtually no practical restraints, and thus constituted the highest power over nature. 
Formal knowledge was therefore the aim of Bacon’s philosophy because it harvested the 
greatest operational potential. Furthermore, the practical use of knowledge – either in the 
establishment of more facts and works, or axioms – was a necessary (although not 
sufficient) condition for the truth of that knowledge. As the type of knowledge with the 
greatest practical application, forms were situated in a positive relation to truth.169  
   Because forms were the endpoint of Bacon’s natural philosophy, we can use them to 
better understand the character of that discipline. Thus, in the following analysis I will 
use forms to show how, in practice, Bacon was able to distinguish natural philosophy 
                                                
168 Bacon, The New Organon, p. 102. 
169 For Pérez-Ramos, this was a maker’s theory of knowledge. However, this is not quite right, as Bacon 
did not directly connect philosophical truth with the production of works. Instead, he made the production 
of works a criterion for truth, which meant axioms that failed to produce works were false. See Maker’s 
Knowledge. 
 63 
from theology. As evidence of their philosophical, rather than theological nature, I will 
discuss the materiality of forms, and their discovery by induction. I will also compare 
Baconian forms to similar scholastic doctrines to show how Bacon kept metaphysics tied 
to natural philosophy, but separate from theology.  
   Forms may be indispensible for understanding Bacon’s natural philosophy. But the 
scholarship on this area is not always clear. To some degree this is a symptom of Bacon’s 
unsystematic exposition. The bulk of his natural philosophic writing was programmatic. 
Bacon probed, noted and commented on the deficiencies of current learning, and offered 
an alternative model for acquiring, cataloguing and using knowledge. Concrete 
philosophical doctrines are scattered throughout his writings. But Bacon’s efforts were 
largely spent on devising a new approach to natural philosophy.170 As a result, forms have 
been variously interpreted as laws of motion, causal essences, material substructures, and 
the law of nature.171 In light of these and other discrepancies, Virgil Whitaker concluded 
that Bacon’s adumbrations of forms were at best inconsistent, and at worst incoherent.172 
   So, before using forms to analyse the disciplinary relationship between natural 
philosophy and theology, I will need to shed some light on what Bacon thought forms 
actually were. To this end, I will do three things. First, I will sketch out the intellectual 
tradition that influenced Bacon’s theory of forms. Second, I will gather Bacon’s remarks 
about forms from the Advancement, De Augmentis, and Novum Organum, and demonstrate 
how they may be reconciled. And third, I will rule out different interpretations of forms 
by showing that they have been confused with other parts of Bacon’s philosophic 
schema. Much of this exercise will be expository. But it should demonstrate that Bacon’s 
philosophy was more coherent than is sometimes assumed. Moreover, the payoff will be 
to show that Bacon’s natural philosophy was largely independent of theology.  
   The immediate context for understanding Baconian forms is the scholastic doctrine of 
substantial forms. The doctrine(s) Bacon and other so-called new philosophers most 
likely engaged with were those found in scholastic textbooks, dispersed widely in 
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sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe.173 These texts were written and received as 
contributions to the Aristotelian tradition. However, regarding forms (as with much else), 
the Aristotelian corpus was merely a starting point from which complex and rich 
variation ensued. For Aristotle, physics or natural philosophy dealt with the four 
elements and their qualities. Metaphysics was a separate discipline, concerned with more 
basic principles, like forms and prime matter.174 There was some open-endedness in 
Aristotle’s doctrine of forms, but basically, they were metaphysical principles that 
accounted for the essences of things.175 
   The “substantial” in substantial forms was a scholastic accretion. Though theorised in 
the fourteenth century by thinkers like John Buridan (1295-1363) and Marsilius of 
Inghen (c.1340-1396), it was only being vigorously defended in the sixteenth, by, for 
example, Domingo de Soto (1494-1560).176 During this period, some scholastics blurred 
Aristotle’s disciplinary distinctions, while others left them relatively intact. Therefore, 
substantial forms came to mean one of two things. Either, they were whatever 
individuated substances. Thus, forms abstractly determined the unity of substances in 
and across time, and explained why they existed in the way that they did. Or, they acted 
as internal efficient causes. As such, they arranged the parts already present in bodies, 
and produced particular properties.177 There is some disagreement regarding the 
respective successes of these two strands of thought. For instance, Norma Emerton – 
who described them as high and low concepts of forms – regarded both as featuring 
strongly throughout the scholastic period.178 Robert Pasnau, contrarily, argues that, 
despite certain terminological discrepancies, most scholastics assumed substantial forms 
were concrete causal entities responsible for accidental forms and properties.179 
   Bacon was linguistically indebted to this tradition. But, as Pérez-Ramos notes, the 
largely sympathetic reception of Bacon’s writings by critics of substantial forms suggests 
certain differences.180 The most obvious difference between Bacon and the scholastics 
was Bacon’s indifference to the forms of substances. Bacon acknowledged that the mind 
was wont to apprehend substances – lion, tree, gold etc. – and that substances had forms 
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or essences. But, as he said in the Advancement, forms of substances are like ‘Soundes which 
make wordes, which by composition and transposition of Letters are infinite’.181 For 
Bacon, all substances were composed of more basic entities, known as simple natures. 
These were qualities like heat, colour, density and sense. As such, while it was a ‘vaine 
pursuite’ to search for the forms of substances, the forms of simple natures were finite in 
number and like the ‘Soundes or Voices which make simple Letters…easily comprehensible’.182 
In Cogitationes de Natura Rerum, Bacon associated nature’s basic building blocks – the ‘few 
simple letters’ – with what he called simple motions.183 According to some scholars, 
simple motions were early versions of forms.184 However, this is not quite right, as, in 
Cogitationes, Bacon referred to the forms of simple motions.185 He also discussed forms in 
Valerius, which predated the composition of Cogitationes. Instead, simple motions were 
what, in his later works, Bacon called simple natures.186  
   Let us turn to forms themselves. There was a direct correspondence between forms 
and their respective simple natures. This was put most expressly in Novum Organum where 
Bacon wrote:  
 
‘the form of a nature is such that if it is there, the given nature inevitably follows. 
Hence it is always present when the nature is present; it universally affirms it, 
and is in the whole of it. The same form is such that when it is taken away, the 
given nature inevitably disappears. And therefore it is always absent when that 
nature is absent, and its absence always implies the absence of that nature, and it 
exists only in that nature’.187  
 
Forms were the sufficient and necessary causes of simple natures. As a result, they were 
equal in number and they were relatively few. Forms therefore constituted simple 
natures: the latter owing their existence and identity to the former. The form of a simple 
nature (like heat) was its ‘true difference, or causative nature or the source of its coming-
to-be’.188 Here we find echoes of the low, or physical, scholastic account of substantial 
forms as the internal cause of external qualities. As the constitution of simple natures, 
forms were embedded in the bodies they determined. Bacon made this clear in the 
Advancement when, having praised Plato for recognising the salience of formal knowledge, 
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he then admonished him for assuming that forms were ‘absolutely abstracted from 
Matter, & not confined and determined by Matter’.189 Although some late scholastic 
authors had blurred the boundary between substantial forms and material components in 
bodies, Baconian forms were identifiable by their physicality.190 This physicality meant 
that forms were amenable to natural inquiry. They fell exclusively within the ambit of 
natural philosophy, and outside the remit of theology.  
   However, in Novum Organum, Bacon expanded his notion of forms, saying that, 
‘nothing exists in nature except individual bodies which exhibit pure individual acts in 
accordance with law’.191 Somewhat confusingly, he identified these laws with forms; ‘It is 
[also] this law which we understand by the term Forms’.192 Here, forms were governing 
principles, ordering and exerting control over matter and motion. Taking these two 
definitions together, Bacon made forms both constitutive of simple natures, and the law 
that governed them. This duality has been likened to the tension within the scholastic 
understanding of substantial forms. Whitaker, for example, said that Bacon was claiming 
contradictory things. How, he argued, could forms inhere in bodies, and govern over 
them? This seemed to suggest both that matter controlled forms, and that forms 
conditioned matter.193 However, this problem largely dissolves if we remember that 
Bacon’s forms were entirely physical.194 Simple natures were material. So, as the cause or 
constitution of simple natures, forms were embedded in body, and thus limited by 
materiality. But forms were also the law by which one bit of matter was different from 
another bit. Therefore, forms could also be said to determine matter. As Bacon put it in 
Novum Organum: ‘When we speak of forms, we mean simply those laws and limitations of 
pure act which organise and constitute a simple nature, like heat, light or weight, in every 
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kind of susceptible material and subject’.195 He thus united his two definitions, and cast 
forms as the physical causes of simple natures, whose determinacy worked in a law-like 
fashion. 
   Having established that Baconian forms were not conceptually incoherent, I will now 
outline the process by which Bacon tried to discover them. This will highlight the 
methodological gap between natural philosophy and theology, as well as philosophy’s 
general estrangement from matters divine. For Bacon, natural philosophy was composed 
of two parts – speculative and operative – the former involved the ascertainment of 
causes, the latter, the operation of effects. Speculative philosophy comprised physics and 
metaphysics – both inquired after causation, the former, material and efficient, the latter, 
formal (and final).196 Formal knowledge was the pinnacle of his natural philosophy, and 
the outcome of Bacon’s inductive method. To acquire knowledge of forms was to 
pinpoint the most fundamental causal explanation of a given simple nature. However, to 
reach this level of understanding, an inquirer needed to advance through several stages or 
directions. ‘God alone’, Bacon said in Novum Organum, has ‘direct knowledge of forms by 
affirmation, and from the outset of…[His] thought’.197  
   Human inquiry began by discovering local, materially specific causes of a simple nature. 
With several experimental refinements, more general explanations were uncovered. 
These causes would be increasingly free from temporal, spatial and material specifics. 
Finally, at the highest level of abstraction, one would reach the form or definition of that 
phenomenon. In De Augmentis, Bacon said ‘the Common Forms of natures’ are ‘the 
proper subject of Metaphysic, which is itself a part of Physic, or of the doctrine 
concerning nature’.198 So, although formal inquiry ended in metaphysical knowledge, it 
began by considering more ordinary phenomena. In other words, the proper study of a 
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simple nature would pass through both physics and metaphysics; each stage becoming 
more certain and free, moving from manifest causation to increasingly imperceptible, 
universal causes. As Bacon put it in the Advancement: inquiring into ‘the true formes’ of 
simple natures is ‘part of METAPHISICKE’, although ‘PHISICKE doth make enquirie, 
and take consideration of the same Natures’.199 This way of apprehending forms – 
working up from particulars to first principles – was the methodological opposite of 
deducing theological doctrine by reasoning down from principles already known. 
   Bacon provided a partial demonstration of this procedure in Valerius, when he inquired 
into the nature of whiteness. Forms were not clearly or definitively analysed in Valerius, 
but Bacon had begun developing a method of discovery, later codified in Novum 
Organum. This procedure began with base, manifest causations; namely, the observation 
that whiteness was producible if ‘air and water be intermingled or broken in small 
portions together’.200 This direction was ‘very particular and restrained, being tied but to 
air and water’. Thus, the second direction required that air be ‘mingled as before with any 
transparent body’, and the third ‘exclude or remove the restraint of an uncoloured 
body’.201 After a long series of directions, Bacon arrived at a general definition: ‘all bodies 
or parts of bodies which are unequal equally, that is in a simple proportion, do represent 
whiteness’, adding that ‘the bodies or parts of bodies so intermingled as before be of a 
certain grossness or magnitude’.202 This was an approximate rendering of formal 
knowledge, and Bacon hoped to continue this refinement until he reached a cause of 
whiteness not contingent upon particular materials or conditions.203  
   Bacon’s various remarks about this process have not been properly heeded in the 
historiography, leading to two common misinterpretations; that forms were either, 
simply, material microstructures or bodily motions.204 During an inductive natural 
inquiry, one would generate knowledge of what, in Novum Organum, Bacon called latent 
processes and structures.205 Unlike forms, which were situated in metaphysics, both 
phenomena belonged to physics, and were discovered after physical causations, but 
before forms – latent processes led ‘from the manifest Efficient cause and the observable 
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matter to the acquired Form’, and latent structures were the ‘anterooms’ to the ‘inner 
chambers’ of forms.206 Knowledge of latent structures harnessed a different type of 
power than formal knowledge. The former enabled one to transform particular bodies 
into other particular bodies.207 The latter, ‘comprehends the unity of nature in very 
different materials’ and granted the power to superinduce any nature in any body.208 
Thus, although forms were both connected to, and a part of, material sub-structures, 
they were not one and the same thing.  
   Similarly, in De Augmentis, Bacon said the configuration and motion of matter were 
subjects of physics. However, he added, ‘all these above mentioned [configurations and 
motions] are to be no further handled in Physic than the inquiry of their Material and 
Efficient causes; for as to their Formal and Final causes they are rehandled in 
Metaphysics’.209 So, forms and motions were not synonymous because the latter had 
formal causes. 
   In sum, forms were causes or types of motion, bedded in material structures, 
constituting simple natures. This level of abstraction has led some commentators to 
conflate forms with the law of nature.210 Clearly, there are similarities – it is not entirely 
obvious where one begins and the other ends. Nevertheless, it is clear that Bacon 
distinguished them. Forms were located in metaphysics. The law of nature, however, was 
the most refined stratum of knowledge, situated above metaphysics.211 The latter was 
therefore more abstract than the former. Consequently, Bacon was far more confident of 
attaining knowledge of forms that he was knowledge of the law of nature.212 In the 
Advancement, he said the law was ‘The worke which God worketh from the beginning to the end’.213 
Later, in De Sapientia Veterum (1609), a work in which Bacon used allegorical 
interpretations of ancient myths to elaborate philosophical methods and doctrine, he 
broadly defined it as the primal motion or ‘impulse’ of matter.214 Most likely, Bacon 
regarded the general principle that matter had an original motive force as a crude 
rendering of the law of nature – hence its denotation as ‘supreame or summarie’.215 
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Individual forms – which varied from one another, and corresponded to particular 
simple natures – were unique manifestations of that tendency.  
   The procedural element to Bacon’s formal inquiries – refining causal explanations by 
moving between natural philosophy and metaphysics – flags up some disciplinary 
disparities with Aristotelian and, to a lesser extent, scholastic doctrines. In turn, this put 
some distance between Baconian forms and theology. Substantial forms were defined, 
either as what individuated substances, or as what accounted for the structure or physical 
properties of a thing. Advocates of the former – for example, Jean Fernel (1497-1558), 
who Bacon was familiar with – were metaphysically and theologically minded, and 
associating forms with God, the heavens and the soul (human or world).216 Advocates of 
the latter, on the other hand, tended to include substantial forms in natural philosophic 
discourse. However, crucially, for Aristotle, and then Aquinas and many of his followers, 
metaphysics was a disciplinary bridge between natural philosophy and theology.217 Bacon 
unmade this scholastic disciplinary setup, altering the character of forms, and separating 
them from theology. Like Aristotle and some scholastics, Bacon situated forms in 
metaphysics. Unlike the scholastics, however, Bacon did not regard metaphysics as a 
bridge between natural philosophy and theology. This was not just because their subject 
matter and methods were incommensurable. It was also because metaphysics was a part 
of natural philosophy, not distinct from it. Thus, despite being the object of metaphysics, 
Bacon’s forms – unlike various scholastic conceptions – had no disciplinary connection 
to theology. 
   The discovery (and use) of formal knowledge was the purpose of natural philosophy. 
Forms therefore embody whatever was distinct about Baconian natural inquiry, and 
provide a tool by which to compare natural philosophy with theology. Specifically, 
studying forms brings the subject matter of natural philosophy (physical nature) and its 
method (induction) into sharper relief. Both features clarify philosophy’s disciplinary 
separation from theology. Comparing Baconian forms with scholastic variants also 
highlights a peculiarity in Bacon’s disciplinary taxonomy. In many cases, scholastic forms 
were connected to theology by dint of their metaphysical status. However, Bacon 
assimilated metaphysics (and formal knowledge) to natural philosophy, isolating both 
from matters divine. Bacon’s primary philosophical ambitions were therefore insulated 
from theological considerations. However, not all Bacon’s philosophical interests could 
so easily make such claims. In De Sapientia Veterum (1609), he described and analysed 
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various ancient myths, claiming they contained lost wisdom – philosophical and 
otherwise. Because these myths derived from sacred history, mythopoetics offered a 
vehicle for philosophy, tinctured by theology. The credibility and implication of this 
suggestion is what we shall now, finally, turn to. 
  
 
V. Fables  
 
Bacon found theoretical grounds to differentiate natural philosophy and theology – 
according to their respective psychological underpinnings – which, in turn, annexed 
particular subject matter and methods to each discipline. In the previous section, we saw 
how those disciplinary components – in the case of natural philosophy – might play out 
in practice in the search for formal knowledge. There was one context, however, in 
which Bacon was less scrupulous in his efforts to guarantee the separation of natural 
philosophy and theology. Betraying his Renaissance heritage, Bacon made several 
excursions into mythopoetics.218 His first interpretations of fables are found in his 
unpublished Cogitationes de Scientia Humana (written in 1605 or earlier), and he publically 
defined parabolic poetry in The Advancement; following De Sapientia Veterum, he discussed 
myths again in De Principiis Atque Originibus (also unpublished), and De Augmentis.219 
Bacon used fables to convey difficult (philosophical) material to neophyte audiences, and 
play down the potentially dangerous novelty of his own ideas.220 As such, forms only 
became an essential part of the Instauratio in 1623, once it was clear that his philosophical 
reforms were not being comprehensively instigated.221 These allegorical expositions of 
ancient myths exposed Bacon to two charges. First, that the philosophy elaborated in the 
fables was drawn from a period of sacred history proximate to that described in the Old 
Testament and might therefore be sacred in some way itself. Second, and more 
importantly, analysing fables seemed to provide Bacon with an opportunity to violate his 
prohibition against lifting philosophical premises from scripture.  
                                                
218 According to John Harrison, ‘Bacon’s view of Rhetoric, Poetry, and the Imagination’, in Brian Vickers 
(ed.), Essential Articles for the study of Francis Bacon, (London, 1972), 253-71, p. 267, Bacon’s understanding 
and use of allegory was in keeping with various other Renaissances authors. Charles W. Lemmi, The 
Classical Deities in Bacon: A Study in Mythographical Symbolism, (Baltimore, 1933), p. 45, says he borrowed 
primarily from Natale Conti (1520-1582).  
219 Rhodri Lewis, ‘Francis Bacon, Allegory and the Uses of Myth’, The Review of English Studies, 61 (2010), 
360-89, pp. 364-5. 
220 Ibid., p. 368. 
221 Ibid., p. 375.
 72 
   To understand this properly, we must return to Bacon’s division of learning, and look 
in more detail at how he defined and used poesy.222 In the Advancement, Bacon split poesy 
into three parts; narrative (that imitates history), representative (that makes history 
present), and parabolical (which either teaches or conceals religious, political or 
philosophical doctrine).223 It is the latter which concerns us here, and also that which 
most exercised Bacon. In his extended treatment of poesy in De Augmentis, he recast 
parabolical poesy as having ‘a higher character than the others’, arguing that it was 
‘sacred and venerable…as religion itself commonly uses its aid as a means of 
communication between divinity and humanity’.224 Fables therefore contained 
fragmented theological insights. Bacon also saw fit – for the first time – to place ancient 
parables among the desiderata of his philosophical program.225 He had, however, already 
actively endorsed the idea that parables could act as vessels for philosophical truth when 
he published the collection of analysed fables, De Sapientia Veterum.226 
   Two recent articles on Bacon’s fables should help frame the following discussion. The 
first, by Rhodri Lewis, adduces Bacon’s fables to counter the suggestion that Bacon was 
uninterested in humanistic, textual research. Lewis also says that, although the fables did 
not disclose scientia or knowledge, they provided Bacon with access to ancient sapientia or 
wisdom. The second, by Anna-Maria Hartmann, claims Bacon used the fables to draw 
attention to, and instantiate, axioms of philosophia prima.227 Bacon’s adoption of fables into 
philosophic discourse was thus highly significant (though not, for the time, unusual) for 
two reasons. Firstly, it entailed the assumption that mythopoetics was a legitimate 
conduit for philosophical information of some kind; be it knowledge, wisdom or truth. 
Secondly, it was a medium whereby the philosophical information imparted bore a closer 
than usual relation to theology by dint of its sacred historicisation and/or derivation 
from scripture.  
   Bacon opened De Sapientia thus;  
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‘The most ancient times (except what is preserved of them in the scriptures) are 
buried in oblivion and silence: to that silence succeeded the fables of the poets: 
to those fables the written records which have come down to us. Thus between 
the hidden depths of antiquity and the days of traditions and evidence that 
followed there is drawn a veil, as it were, of fables, which come in and occupy 
the middle region that separates what has perished from what survives’.228  
 
The fables were compiled and documented by the Greeks, who were consequently 
ascribed authorship privileges. But the myths were actually far older – echoing a lost 
period of learning. As Bacon put it, they were ‘sacred relics and light airs breathing out of 
better times’.229 Referring to mythopoetics in De Augmentis, Bacon admitted that, in his 
opinion, the ‘secrets’ of philosophy and religion (as well as policy) were ‘involved in no 
small number of them’.230 Not only were fables parcels of ancient truth, they also 
provided knowledge whose origin was proximate to sacred learning.231 This, as Lewis and 
Hartmann rightly point out, suggests that Bacon thought myths or fables contained 
fragments of Edenic learning otherwise lost in the Fall.232  
   Fables, in other words, embodied bits of the prelapsarian truth that Bacon was trying 
to recover in his Instauratio. The only other vessel of knowledge of comparable historical 
placement was the Old Testament. Thus, the fables contained theological truth, but also 
natural philosophy that was either sacred or bore a theological stamp. In De Sapientia, for 
example, the three versions of the story of the birth of Pan (nature) were shown to 
represent the three-fold stages of material existence expounded in Bacon’s work of 
confessional theology, A Confession of Faith.233 Similarly, Bacon used a discussion of 
Coelum (the origin of all things), to highlight the closeness of Democritean matter theory 
to scriptural accounts of the creation.234 The fables, therefore, enabled Bacon to convey 
theological truths through the medium of ancient philosophy. Although this might 
suggest that Bacon was closing the disciplinary gap between philosophy and theology, a 
fairer assessment would recognise that early modern Christian thinkers had no reason to 
reject, and no plausible alterative to, the Hebraic account of the world’s origins. It was 
therefore habitually invoked. 
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   There were at least two instances, however, when Bacon appeared to extend the 
influence of theology over philosophy in a manner that contradicted his own disciplinary 
guidelines. Namely, he used mythopoetics to lift important philosophical premises from 
theological postulates. This would represent a considerable inconsistency, for as Bacon 
reminds us; those ‘that haue pretended to finde the truth of all naturall Philosophy in the 
Scriptures’ are guilty of ‘traducing all other Philosophie…Neither doe they giue honour 
to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much imbase them’.235 If the fables were an 
opportunity to abnegate this principle, they could be regarded as a Baconian variation of 
Mosaic Physics – the extraction of natural philosophy from scripture, and the partial 
elision of philosophy and theology.236 
   Let us turn to these instances. The first was the subject of a paper by Silvia Manzo, 
which – citing the fables of Pan and Coelum mentioned above – argued that Bacon used 
a particular biblical reference in his cosmogony because it furnished a philosophical 
principle that was necessary for his renewal of learning, but indemonstrable by its 
methods.237 Namely, present within both the Pan and Coelum myths – and derived from 
purely scriptural sources – was the idea that ‘the sum total of matter remains always the 
same and the absolute quantum of nature suffers neither increase nor diminution’.238 In 
Cogitationes de Natura Rerum, Bacon gave a clear account of why this principle was crucial 
to his philosophy. He began by outlining why, given that only God could reduce 
something to nothing, or make something out of nothing, the sum of existent matter was 
necessarily unchanging. Turning then to a discussion of experimentation, Bacon said that 
to induce the most profound transformations in matter, it was important to vex the 
subject matter considerably, without affecting its mass.239 This was especially pertinent 
for accessing forms – the heart of Baconian natural philosophy. Discovering the form of 
a simple nature required much experimentation, and the fruitfulness of such inquiry 
relied on the matter in question not disappearing in the process.240 
   The second, and perhaps less clear-cut example, concerns Bacon’s summation of the 
law of nature – the most refined type of natural knowledge. Bacon was usually sceptical 
of the law of nature’s epistemic accessibility. For example, he said in De Augmentis that ‘it 
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may fairly be doubted whether man’s inquiry can attain to it’.241 He was far more 
forthcoming, however, in his analysis of Cupid (the atom) in De Sapientia. Though he 
maintained the law could only be glimpsed, not fully taken in, Bacon nevertheless 
defined it as ‘that impulse of desire impressed by God upon the primary particles of 
matter which makes them come together, and which by repetition and multiplication 
produces all the variety of nature’.242 Bacon did not prefix this definition with the lengthy 
inductive reasoning required (by his own method) to justify such a claim. Nor did his 
inductive steps ever reach such heights on other occasions. He simply provided a 
(partial) definition of a key philosophical concept, worked up from a theological 
standpoint. Thus, in a mythopoetic context – a context informed by sacred history, and 
thus associated with theology – Bacon drew philosophical conclusions that elsewhere he 
was reluctant to commit to. 
   Bacon listed mythopoetics as a philosophical desideratum, and therefore the 
philosophical discrepancies between the fables and the Instauratio are worth considering. 
However, their significance should not be over-egged. For one thing, De Sapientia was 
published prior to, and was never intended to be a part of, the Instauratio. Moreover, two 
features of the Instauratio take the sting out of Bacon’s apparent violation of disciplinary 
boundaries. First, Bacon was unable to fully carry out his own inductive procedures. And 
second, he placed clear limitations on the role of fables within this schema. 
   Bacon’s Instauratio is an unfinished project. Neither Bacon nor his contemporaries were 
able to exploit his method and practices fully. Natural histories compiled by one man 
were necessarily limited, and inductions based upon such histories were limited also. In 
Novum Organum, Bacon adumbrated an inductive investigation into the form of heat. 
However, he called this ‘first attempt an authorisation of the intellect, or a first approach to an 
interpretation, or a first harvest’, not a full-blown interpretation of nature.243 Baconian 
methodology was incapable (at this moment in time) of supporting or validating various 
philosophical principles. However, that did not mean those principles were inherently 
unsupportable or impossible to validate. What Bacon owed to theology (on account of 
his project’s intellectual infancy) might later be explicable on its own terms, once natural 
histories were complete and inductions properly pursued. In other words, though the 
ancient philosophical truths delivered by the fables were not currently explicable, they 
might be so later, after further inductive research. For this reason, Bacon’s occasional 
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reliance on theology need not undermine the legitimacy of his philosophical programme 
(which avowedly eschewed reasoning from theological premises). 
   The idea that intractable philosophical problems might later be knowable – courtesy of 
advances in Baconian discovery – is suggested in Bacon’s treatment of the law of nature. 
Bacon’s remarks about the law were not entirely consistent. In the Advancement, he said 
‘wee knowe not whether Mans enquirie can attaine vnto it’.244 He went on to clarify: God 
‘did knowe foure things which noe man attaines to knowe’, one of which was the law of 
nature.245 The latter comment is curious, as it associates the unlikeliness of knowing the 
law of nature with the cognitive pretensions of one individual. It is possible, therefore, 
that Bacon was dismantling individualistic, rather than collective attempts at such 
knowledge. Further comments in the Advancement lend credence to this suggestion. First, 
Bacon said the law of nature ‘is not possible to be found out by Man; yet that doth not 
derogate from the capacitie of the minde; but may bee referred to the impediments as of 
shortnesse of life, ill coniunction of labours, ill tradition of knowledge ouer from hand to 
hand, and many other Inconueniences, whereunto the condition of Man is subject’.246 
These inconveniences were precisely what Bacon’s method, and his advocacy of cross-
generational collaboration, was designed to overcome.247 He later expanded this thought, 
saying that, ‘touching impossibilitie, I take it, those things are to bee held 
possible…which may be done by many, though not by any one: and which may be done 
is succession of ages, though not within the houre-glass of one mans life’.248 On this 
account, Bacon’s method made the impossible possible. The labours of one individual 
would never be enough to access the law of nature. But such knowledge might become 
available if Baconian practices were pursued collectively and for long periods of time.  
   This notion reappears in De Principiis Atque Originibus, which returned once again to the 
fables of Cupid and Coelum.249 Here, Bacon stressed that searching after the cause of the 
law of nature was futile because – beyond the obvious point that God was responsible 
for everything that existed in nature – the law of nature was uncaused.250 However, in his 
analysis of Cupid (the law of nature) – in which Cupid was hatched from an egg laid by 
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Night – Bacon gave some hope that the law might be amenable to inductive 
investigation:  
 
‘Now that point concerning the egg of Nox bears a most apt reference to the 
demonstrations by which this Cupid is brought to light. For things concluded by 
affirmatives may be considered as the offspring of light; whereas those 
concluded by negatives and exclusions are extorted and educed as it were out of 
darkness and night. Now this Cupid is truly an egg hatched by Nox; for all the 
knowledge of him which is to be had proceeds by exclusions and negatives’.251 
 
Bacon advocated a method based on exclusionary induction. And, as this passage reveals, 
knowledge of the law of nature ‘proceeds by exclusions’. Bacon was never totally candid 
about the epistemic potential of his philosophic method. But given the present 
reconstruction, it is not inconceivable that Bacon hoped human reason – guided by 
correct practices, and yoked to collective endeavour – would one day ascend to the 
highest knowledge of nature. 
   The second reason why one need not read too much into Bacon’s apparent 
commingling of natural philosophy and theology relates to the function Bacon ascribed 
to parabolic poetry in human learning. Bacon said that ‘the secrets and mysteries of 
religion, policy and philosophy are involved in fables or parables’.252 Moreover, the 
philosophical information found in fables bore a theological imprimatur – either by its 
sacred historicism or its direct derivation from scripture. However, whatever the nature 
of the learning parcelled in mythopoetics, Bacon was clear that the fables themselves 
were not philosophy. As he said in the Advancement: ‘I finde not any Science, that doth 
properly or fitly pertaine to the IMAGINATION…[and] as for Poesie, it is rather a 
pleasure, or play of imagination, than a worke or dutie thereof’.253 Poesy could not 
produce philosophic knowledge because the mental faculty it invoked – the imagination 
– had a different field of operation. Strictly speaking, then, mythopoetics was not a form 
of theological philosophy because the fables were a type of poesy.  
   Fables, therefore, were capable of containing philosophy yet did not constitute 
philosophy themselves. This paradox rests on a distinction Bacon made between two 
ways of transmitting knowledge. ‘The magistral [method]’ Bacon said, ‘requires that what 
is told should be believed; the initiative [method] that it should be examined’. 
Furthermore, ‘The end of the one [magistral] is the use of knowledges…of the other 
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[initiative] the continuation and further progression of them’.254 Bacon favoured the 
latter, saying that: 
 
‘knowledge that is delivered to others as a thread to be spun on ought to be 
insinuated (if it were possible) in the same method wherein it was originally 
invented. And this indeed is possible in knowledge gained by induction; but in 
this same anticipated and premature knowledge (which is in use) a man cannot 
easily say how he came to the knowledge which he has obtained’.255  
 
The knowledge begotten by induction was initiative – it was heuristic and probative, and 
designed to co-opt others into the task of learning. The knowledge furnished and 
transmitted this way was derived from identifiable chains of reasoning, and could be 
checked against its own method. This inbuilt reflexivity gave the initiative method a 
progressive character, and meant it encouraged further developments in learning. 
Conversely, knowledge delivered by the magistral method was peremptory. This method 
stated but did not explain the truth, and it made use of extant knowledge, without 
troubling to uncover further truths. The magistral method was capable of transmitting 
philosophical truth, but was unaccountable to a process of ‘cognition or consent’.256  
   According to Lewis, Bacon’s fables are an example of the initiative method. The fables, 
he argues, were probative devices that encouraged readers to infuse the myths with 
individual meanings.257 As a general point about the potential of fables to inhabit various 
meanings, this is correct. However, Bacon’s parabolic interpretations were not couched 
speculatively. Instead, he precisely outlined the meaning of the fables qua philosophy or 
theology, assuming that his interpretations would be accepted and used, not queried or 
tested. Bacon actually used mythopoetics according to the magistral method – vehicles 
for peremptory philosophical and theological postulates. This structure enabled him to 
import premises into his philosophy that were undemonstrated by induction. As 
discussed, these premises were not philosophically valid – because they were still awaiting 
inductive proof – but they may, nevertheless, be philosophically true; the product of a 
lost era of philosophising.258 
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   There is no getting around the fact that this represents a relaxation of Bacon’s 
disciplinary boundaries. However, Bacon’s view of the disciplinary relationship between 
natural philosophy and theology had not changed. He was merely exploiting the vagaries 
of another disciplinary context – mythopoetics – to push boundaries he would otherwise 
leave intact. Nevertheless, it was a minor aberration, and one with some pragmatic 
justification. Bacon said in De Augmentis that ‘those whose conceits are already seated in 
popular opinions, need but to dispute and prove; whereas those whose conceits are 
beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; first to make them understood, and then 
to prove them; so that they are obliged to have recourse to similitudes and metaphors to 
convey their meaning’.259 Fables, therefore, were a necessary way of communicating 
knowledge that might otherwise be resisted on account of its unfamiliarity. The passage 
quoted also explains why the magistral transmission of fables was acceptable. Sometimes 
the truth of a premise must be given to the understanding before its confirmation with 
proof. Fables fulfil the first part of that process, leaving the second to alternative 
methods. This does not absolve Bacon of the charge that he utilised premises in his 
philosophy that were untested by induction – quite the contrary. But the novelty of his 
philosophy was such that, in order to achieve any take-off, certain elements or 
justifications had to be smuggled in via mythopoetics. This was particularly true towards 
the end of Bacon’s career – as he recognised that his philosophical programme was 
incomplete. Thus, in De Augmentis, he made parabolic poetry a desideratum of his 
restoration project. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
In De Augmentis, Bacon characterised his writings as ‘offerings of the human intellect, 
seasoned with religion as with salt, and sacrificed to His Glory’.260 Taking him at his 
(metaphorical) word, Bacon’s work – usually natural philosophy – was not fundamentally 
shot through with religion. Rather, religion was supplementary, providing reinforcement 
and emphasis, much like salt. This, I think, is another way of saying Bacon’s natural 
philosophy reflected common religious sensibilities, but, by and large, was independent 
of theology. It is important to understand the distinction between pious inflection and 
disciplinary separation because much of the literature on Bacon assumes they were 
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mutually exclusive. The scholars who detect impiety or even unbelief in Bacon’s work 
often cite the estrangement of Bacon’s natural philosophy from theology. Likewise, 
scholarship that tries to draw out Bacon’s religious sympathies regularly concludes that 
his natural philosophy was perforce theological.   
   Bacon’s thought was motivated, shaped and impinged on by religious concerns – 
charity, the doctrine of the Fall, millenarianism etc. But this had little bearing on the 
nature of the relationship between natural philosophy and theology. Each discipline was 
elaborated from particular cognitive or epistemic principles. (Natural) philosophy was 
established by reason working on sensory experiences; theology derived from faith in 
revelation. These foundations prescribed discipline-specific subject matter (nature or 
body, and divine mysteries) and methods (induction and deduction or syllogism). Thus, 
the structure of both disciplines was based on a close connection between cognition, 
method, and subject matter. Breaking these chains by, say, imposing the methods of one 
discipline on the subject matter of the other, would force man’s mental faculties to assess 
notions beyond their capacity, and result in error and fallacy. So, in the main, Bacon 
respected disciplinary boundaries and kept natural philosophy and theology separate 
from one another. He did, however, offer a couple of exceptions. Theology, he argued, 
relied on natural philosophy for the development of natural theology, and was best 
served by an exercised and expanded reasoning faculty. Moreover, Bacon used fables to 
elucidate philosophical principles, legitimised by their proximity to sacred truth, but 
untested by induction. Aside from these mythopoetic excursions, however, Bacon 
refrained from drafting in philosophical premises from theology, which was perhaps his 
preeminent disciplinary injunction. 
   His decision to sequester natural philosophy from theology appears particularly 
important and innovative given his rebirth as the patron saint of the Royal Society some 
forty years after his death. In the History of the Royal Society (1667), Thomas Sprat (1635-
1713) felt obliged to ‘onley mention one great Man, who had the true Imagination of the 
whole extent of this Enterprize, as it is now set on foot; and that is, the Lord Bacon’.261 
The Society’s appropriation of Bacon was selective; its members largely eschewed 
Baconian interest in form, focusing instead on probable knowledge of appearances. Still, 
virtuosi like Boyle and John Wilkins (though not, in fact, Sprat), cautiously advocated a 
                                                
261 Thomas Sprat, The History of the Royal-Society of London for the improving of natural knowledge, (London, 1667), 
p. 35. For the history of Sprat’s involvement with the Royal Society, and his sometimes misleading, and 
frequently tendentious apologia, see Michael Hunter, Establishing the New Science: the Experience of the early 
Royal Society, (Boydell, 1989), pp. 46-67. 
 81 
corpuscular natural philosophy, governed by experience and observation, and free of 
other disciplinary or socio-political considerations. Whether or not they adhered to these 
principles in practice is debatable.262 What matters is that the Society, avowedly indebted 
to Bacon, purported to support natural philosophy’s disciplinary independence. 
   Of course, as well as inspiring a new philosophical culture, Bacon was also firmly 
tethered to Renaissance philosophical traditions.263 Alongside mythopoetics, he 
subscribed to animistic principles. Philosophers like Marsilo Ficino (1433-1499) and 
Bernardino Telesio (1509-1588) said the natural world was invested with spiritus, granting 
it purpose, and thus intelligibility.264 Bacon, similarly, argued that matter had the power of 
perception, even if it lacked sensory faculties.265 Unlike mechanists – Hobbes, for 
example – he claimed matter was not simply acted upon, but could elect to move itself.266 
This sheds additional light on Baconian forms.267 Identifying forms as the deepest 
metaphysical part of nature, Bacon assumed the existence of a type of motion that was 
deeper and prior to the type of matter in motion cherished by mechanists and which he 
himself identified with simple natures. Simple natures qua configurations and motions of 
matter had different layers of causation – physical and formal. The forms of the motions 
(and configurations) of matter that made up simple natures must themselves embody a 
more refined conception of matter and motion. Animism may well have accounted for 
this level of analysis. As ‘perception may take place without sense…there could be 
motion at discretion without sense’.268 Matter, in other words, would have a basic level of 
self-motion. As such, Bacon’s affinity to Boyle should not be overstated. Forms were not 
simply corpuscular sub-structures, and they were more abstract and less ontologically 
parsimonious than subsequent corpuscular matter theories.269 
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   Pigeonholing Bacon is therefore futile. His fairly strict separation of natural philosophy 
and theology upended scholastic convention. But, his disciplinary interest in 
mythopoetics, and conceptual commitment to animism, kept him partly rooted in other 
intellectual traditions. Thomas White offers an even starker reminder that early modern 
philosophers often drew upon a range of (seemingly antagonistic) sources. As both an 
Aristotelian and a corpuscularian, White defied easy categorisation. Nevertheless, despite 
his philosophical eclecticism, he subscribed, in outline, to familiar Thomistic disciplinary 
conventions.
 83 
Thomas White 
 
 
 
Today, Thomas White is remembered both as the leader of the “Blackloists” – a 
renegade Catholic group that took its name from White’s sometime pseudonym 
“Blacklo” – and as a friend and philosophical sparring partner of Thomas Hobbes.1 After 
his death, he was described by Anthony à Wood as a ‘noted Philosopher’.2 Yet, following 
his ordination in Douai in 1617, White was a theologian by education and training. 
Moreover, throughout his life he published religious polemics, neither entirely 
philosophical nor theological. White was not unusual among early modern thinkers in 
participating in philosophical, theological and religious discourses simultaneously.3 And, 
in common with his peers, he understood that different disciplines were structured 
according to different subjects, methods and priorities. 
   Francis Bacon was anxious to signal the piety of his philosophy, but lampooned his 
scholastic forbears for unduly mixing philosophy and theology.4 Many of his acolytes in 
the Royal Society subsequently adopted similar attitudes. Nevertheless, among the 
seventeenth-century’s self-conscious intellectual reformers, the relationship between 
philosophy, theology and religion was varied and uneven. This is demonstrated by the 
differences between two of White’s major philosophical interlocutors. Joseph Glanvill 
and Hobbes agreed that Aristotelian philosophy was inimical to Christianity. (Tellingly, 
both mistakenly treated Aristotelianism as a single entity). However, Glanvill thought the 
Royal Society’s experimental philosophy would secure religion against mechanistic 
atheism, while Hobbes claimed his mechanical philosophy accorded with Christian belief, 
but that proper philosophy was categorically distinct from theology.5 
   White was different from this sample of new philosophers in that he advocated a close 
intermingling of philosophy and theology. In fact, White’s understanding of the 
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philosophy/theology relationship highlights two countervailing historical trends. First, it 
illustrates the persistence (and mutability) of Aristotelian philosophy, despite – or even 
alongside – developments in the so-called new philosophy.6 This has been noted in 
philosophers who disparaged their intellectual heritage, like René Descartes,7 but it was 
also true of thinkers who acknowledged their indebtedness to the past, like White. And 
second, it shows that, in keeping with the Aristotelian tradition, the methods and 
concepts of philosophy were still being used in, or in support of, theology. Note, 
however, that White was not eliding philosophy and theology, as some commentators 
have suggested.8 Philosophy established definitions and guided theological reasoning. 
But, in proper Thomist fashion, White based philosophy and theology on different 
foundations – reason and revelation/tradition respectively. 
   In order to make White’s disciplinary set-up as clear as possible, this chapter will need 
to distinguish his view of religion from his view of theology. Theology, he argued, was 
elaborated from religion – the Catholic tradition – using the tools of philosophy. Religion 
and theology therefore stood in relation to one another, while remaining 
methodologically and epistemologically distinct. Religious discourse sought to establish 
the truth of faith. This was determined, in White’s view, by the oral transmission of the 
apostolic tradition. Theology, on the other hand, investigated the meaning of faith. 
Consequently, religious argumentation was concerned with the historicity of particular 
doctrines or matters of faith, and thus had no connection to philosophical practice. 
Conversely, theology, which sought to understand faith, relied on philosophy (specifically 
Aristotelian logic) to discern the meaning of words and propositions. This interaction 
between philosophy and theology – evident in White, as well as Blackloists like Sir 
Kenelm Digby and John Sergeant (1623-1707/10) – is suggestive of the endurance, but 
also transformation, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century of an Aristotelian-
Thomistic conception of the structure, priorities and purposes of knowledge.  
   This chapter is split into six parts, and will look at all White’s major English works of 
philosophy, theology and religion – Peripateticall Institutions (1656), Controversy-logicke 
(1659), Reason and Religion (1660), and An exclusion of skepticks (1665). I start by nuancing 
the common but simplistic view that White was an anti-sceptic. Although White argued 
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repeatedly with Glanvill about the extent and limitations of human knowledge, his first 
and foundational philosophical commitment was to Aristotle. The label anti-sceptic also 
obscures the variety of epistemic positions White developed in relation to different 
bodies of knowledge, or disciplines. In the second part, I sketch the logical foundations 
of White’s Aristotelian philosophy. Philosophy, for White, was structured by syllogism, 
but should also take heed of the causes embedded in definitions. To draw out the 
distinctly Aristotelian tenor of White’s logic, in the third section, I highlight parallels and 
dissimilarities with Hobbes’s logic. According to White, knowledge was logically 
verifiable, and, as such, was reducible to basic Aristotelian metaphysics. In the fourth 
part, I turn to White’s concept of religion. Religion was the skill of gaining salvation, or 
following God’s commands. However, White argued, before believing articles of faith, 
one must be persuaded of their truth. This sort of truth could not be demonstrated by 
logic or philosophy, but instead was guaranteed by the oral transmission of doctrine by 
Catholic institutions. As I demonstrate in the fifth part, it was necessary that both the 
learned and unlearned felt convinced in their faith, even though they had different 
criteria for belief. Finally, in the sixth part, I review White’s theology and its relationship 
to philosophy. I argue that when it came to understanding matters of faith – i.e. when 
doing theology – White drew upon the same logical tools that structured his philosophy. 
I conclude that, although theology did not originate in, or automatically grow out of 
philosophy, it was absolutely reliant on philosophy for its existence and coherence. 
 
 
I .  Anti -scept i c i sm and Aristote l ianism  
 
Beverley Southgate has construed White’s intellectual project as a constant, but doomed, 
effort to stem the flow of resurgent scepticism.9 This argument followed Richard 
Popkin’s thesis that, after the destabilising post-Reformation debates about the criteria 
for faith – in which both Protestants and Catholics were able to discredit the arguments 
of their rivals – all religious belief became doubtful. This sceptical current, Popkin 
claimed, was later transplanted onto debates about knowledge in general, thus 
undercutting all claims to certainty.10 In England, the story goes, there was a shift in 
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philosophical perspective, away from speculation about insensible essences, towards 
observation of sensible qualities, evident in the practices of the Royal Society.11 White 
was unusual and did not surrender to scepticism. For historians like Popkin and 
Southgate, he was therefore an interesting counter-cultural case study. 
   In outline, this narrative has much to recommend it: there was an upsurge in sceptical 
thought following the retranslation of Sextus Empiricus’ (160-210) Outlines of Pyrrhonism 
in 1562, and the epistemic disarray caused by religious conflicts.12 It does not necessarily 
follow, however, that every subsequent thinker was primarily or self-consciously engaged 
with sceptical arguments. In England, things were more nuanced than Popkin and others 
suggest. For example, it is doubtful (contra Richard Tuck) that Hobbes’s main intellectual 
objective was to formulate a systematic response to modern scepticism.13 Tuck claims 
Hobbes’s ‘major contribution to philosophy’, and what made him ‘succeed where both 
Gassendi and Descartes had failed’, was his demonstration of the necessary existence of 
material reality, despite the known fallibility of perception.14 But Hobbes’s anti-sceptical 
credentials are limited given his acknowledgement that little about the natural world 
could be known with demonstrative certainty.15 Tuck’s implicit and more plausible point 
is that anti-Pyrrhonism was a characteristically French story – sparked by the sceptical 
writings of Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and Pierre Charron (1541-1603). Hobbes’s 
prolonged stays in Paris had (for Tuck) involved him in this discourse, but he was the 
English exception that proved the rule. Bacon, for example, had read Montaigne, but his 
place in the history of scepticism is far from clear.16 Bacon was scabrously anti-scholastic, 
but he aimed to acquire (and then use) certain formal knowledge. The methods he 
proposed were laborious, but they presupposed that certainty was, in principle, possible. 
                                                
11 See Popkin, The History of Scepticism; Henry G. van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English Thought, 
1630-1690, (The Hague, 1963).  
12 Although it is possible Popkin overstates Sextus’ importance. For example, Montaigne’s scepticism may 
have owed more to his perception of the failure of his humanistic education than to his reading of Sextus. 
See Zachary S. Schiffman, ‘Montaigne and the Rise of Skepticism in Early Modern Europe: A Reappraisal’, 
Journal of the History of Ideas 45 (1984), 499-516.  
13 Richard Tuck, ‘Optics and Sceptics: the philosophical foundations of Hobbes’s political thought’, in 
Edmund Leites (ed.), Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge, 1998), 235-63.  
14 Ibid., p. 251. 
15 See Douglas Jesseph, ‘Scientia in Hobbes’, in Tom Sorell, G.A.J. Rogers, and Jill Kraye (eds.), Scientia in 
Early Modern Philosophy: Seventeenth-Century Thinkers on Demonstrative Knowledge from First Principles, (Dordrecht, 
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in the same way as Descartes. See Tom Sorell, ‘Hobbes’s Objections and Hobbes’s System’, in Roger 
Ariew and Majorie Grene (eds.), Descartes and his Contemporaries: Meditations, Objections and Replies, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 83-96, pp. 91-4.  
16 Bacon was ‘friends’ with Montaigne, according to M.A. Screech, ‘Introduction’, in Michel de Montaigne, 
An Apology for Raymond Sebond, translated and edited, with introduction and notes by M.A. Screech, 
(Penguin, 1987), ix-xxxiii, p. xxx. 
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In a technical sense, then, Bacon was not a sceptic. But labelling him an anti-sceptic is 
not quite right either; he was an anti-Aristotelian, which was not the same thing.   
   This distinction is worth bearing in mind when one considers White. Describing White 
as anti-sceptical is certainly not wrong – he was a vocal advocate of certain knowledge 
(and in support of Tuck’s thesis, he also spent some time in Paris). But over-emphasising 
the label is misleading, for it effaces or disregards White’s most pressing concern: to 
defend Aristotelianism (against sceptics, among others).17 White’s oeuvre therefore 
transcended, and was not bound by, an anti-sceptical outlook. The anti-sceptical cart has 
been put before the Aristotelian horse because Southgate overplays the importance of 
White’s response to Glanvill’s attack on philosophical dogmatising.18 White became 
embroiled in a polemical exchange with Glanvill – an Anglican divine – when, in 1663, 
he published a response to Glanvill’s The Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661) entitled Sciri 
(translated into English in 1665 as An Exclusion of Scepticks). Also in 1665 – partly in a bid 
to gain admittance into the nascent Royal Society – Glanvill reprinted Vanity under the 
Latin title Scepsis Scientifica. He also replied to White in Sciri tuum nihil est, which, tellingly, 
contained a digression on the demerits of Aristotle’s philosophy. Finally, in the year of 
White’s death (1676), Glanvill rehashed many of his arguments against White in an essay 
Of Scepticism and Certainty. 
   Glanvill consistently denied the charge of scepticism. He preferred ‘modest and wary’ 
knowledge to ‘bold, and presuming’ pyrrhonian ignorance.19 In Of Scepticism and Certainty, 
he said he was not prepared to suspend all judgement and undermine all knowledge.20 
His target was dogmatism, which injured knowledge by terminating discussion and 
choking off investigation. Instead of vainly pretending to absolute certainty or absolute 
ignorance, judicious people ought to proportion their assent to the weight of available 
evidence.21 Certainty, then, would acquire different meanings or degrees.22 White had no 
                                                
17 Of course, “Aristotelianism” was not a univocal designation. See Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance; 
Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes; Blair, ‘Natural Philosophy’, pp. 372-9; Edward P. Mahoney, ‘Aristotle and 
some late Medieval and Renaissance Philosophers’, in Riccardo Pozzo (ed.), The Impact of Aristotelianism on 
Modern Philosophy, (Washington, 2004), 1-34, pp. 2-6; Grant, ‘‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Aristotelianism’’, pp. 335-8; 
Heikki Mikkeli, An Aristotelian response to Renaissance Humanism: Jacopo Zabarella on the Nature of Arts and 
Sciences, (Helsinki, 1992). 
18 Southgate, ‘Excluding Sceptics’, pp. 71-85  
19 Glanvill, The vanity of dogmatizing, p. 226. 
20 Glanvill, Essays on Several Important Subjects, pp. 40-1. 
21 Ibid., p. 46. 
22 Glanvill posited two variants. Certainty could either be indubitable – whereby one has no reason to 
doubt the truth of something – or it could be infallible – whereby one’s conceptions of something could 
not possibly be contrary to the reality of that thing. While only God possessed the latter type of certainty, 
the former – which, for Glanvill, encompassed such wide-ranging and apparently certain propositions as 
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truck for these qualifications. He said that sceptics (or people like Glanvill) rejected the 
possibility of certitude, assuming that the appearance of truth was sufficient. The 
problem, he argued in Exclusion, was that discerning the likeness of truth was impossible 
if you did not know what truth was, or rejected the concept outright.23 Scepticism could 
not even justify the denial of certainty, because, lacking criteria for any cognitive 
preferences, sceptics could not say why a particular tenet was illusory and why scepticism 
was necessary.24 The heuristic or mitigated variety of scepticism advocated by Glanvill 
was trying to have its cake and eat it. 
   According to White, man was uniquely endowed with reason, the faculty that enabled 
the mind to travel from certain, known things to things hitherto unknown and uncertain. 
To deny certainty was to rob man of his reasoning faculty. Scepticism, therefore, ‘utterly 
evacuates’ man’s nature, and is a betrayal of his humanness.25 This was particularly 
loathsome to White because it disabled pedagogy. How, he asked, could masters profess 
to impart what they did not know, or disciples search for something they did not believe 
in?26 Here we see evidence of the connection between disciplines and pedagogy. Not 
only did scepticism inhibit the development of philosophy, it threatened the general 
upkeep and maintenance of the entire learning establishment.  
   Pedagogy – especially the teachings of Aristotle – was critical to the embattled 
Blackloist religious mission. It was particularly important to White, who taught Catholic 
theology and Thomist philosophy at various Catholic seminaries on the continent.27 The 
Blackloists had few clerical allies. The Jesuit mission was ‘entrenched’ in England 
following the forced departure of the vicar apostolic, Richard Smith (1568-1655) in 
1631.28 And the secular clergy – Blackloists included – blamed the Jesuits for the state’s 
intermittently harsh treatment of English Catholics.29 Matters worsened when, in 1647, 
the Jesuits sabotaged a Parliamentary deal (supported by White and Digby) to grant 
                                                                                                                                      
Descartes’s cogito, logical tautologies, universal testimony and sensory data – fell within the human 
compass. See Ibid., pp. 47-50. 
23 Thomas White, An Exclusion of Scepticks from all title to dispute: being an answer to the Vanity of Dogmatising, 
(London, 1665), p. 11. 
24 Ibid., p. 15. 
25 Ibid., p. 16. 
26 Ibid., p. 14. 
27 See Robert I. Bradley, ‘Blacklo and the Counter-Reformation: an Inquiry into the Strange Death of 
Catholic England’, in Charles H. Carter (ed.), From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation: essays in honour of 
Garrett Mattingly, (London, 1966), 348-70, pp. 355-6; Beverley C. Southgate, ‘‘A medley of both’: old and 
new in the thought of Thomas White’, History of European Ideas, 18 (1994), 53-60, p. 54. 
28 John Bossy, The English Catholic Community, 1570-1850, (London, 1975), p. 60. 
29 Stefania Tutino, Thomas White and the Blackloists: between Politics and Theology during the English Civil War, 
(Aldershot, 2008), pp. 2-3; Alexandra Walsham, ‘‘Yielding to the Extremity of the Time’: Conformity, 
Orthodoxy and the post-Reformation Catholic Community’, in Peter Lake and Michael Questier (eds.), 
Conformity and Orthodoxy in the English Church, c.1560-1660, (Woodbridge, 2000), 211-36, pp. 214-17, 233. 
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Catholic toleration in exchange for rejections of Papal fealty.30 Further, the Blackloists’ 
hostility to any papal authority over the English clerical hierarchy eventually alienated the 
seculars as well. Estranged from Rome and other English Catholics, the Blackloists held 
tight to their particular ecclesiology and theology, supported, they claimed, by the 
teachings of Aristotle.31 For White, then, scepticism was an epistemological problem; but 
it also threatened his, already scant, sense of institutional security.  
   The White-Glanvill polemic dominates the White historiography (itself dominated by 
Southgate). Yet it constitutes only a fragment of White’s total output, and was written 
towards the end of his life. Moreover, White’s case against Glanvill was largely a 
summation of arguments set out in 1656 in Peripateticall Institutions (and available to Latin 
readers nine years earlier). Setting out the foundations and structure of his philosophy, 
Peripateticall Institutions was, as the name suggests, a contribution to the Aristotelian 
tradition. It was an idiosyncratic text – White married school concepts like matter and 
form to more contemporary (corpuscularian and heliocentric) principles.32 Still, it 
demonstrates that White’s philosophy was not, in the first instance, anti-sceptical. The 
same arguments could be deployed against Glanvill, but they were designed, in their 
original context, to show the compatibility of Aristotelian first principles and corpuscular 
matter theory.  
   White was an eclectic Aristotelian. But the Aristotelian tradition had never been 
hidebound or monolithic. Medieval and Renaissance Aristotelians were not identifiable 
by their advocacy of specific doctrines, but by their rough alignment with a loose 
Aristotelian heritage.33 Medieval Aristotelians were divided into Thomist, Scotist and 
Averroist schools (among others), each brimming with internal metaphysical and 
philosophical dispute.34 Subsequent humanist scholarship cultivated alternative readings 
                                                
30 See Bradley, ‘Blacklo and the Counter-Reformation’, p. 352; Bossy, The English Catholic Community, pp. 
63-65; Jeffrey Collins, ‘Thomas Hobbes and Blackloist Conspiracy of 1649’, The Historical Journal, 45 (2002), 
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(eds.), Insiders and Outsiders in Seventeenth Century Philosophy, (London, 2010), 43-75; Tutino, Thomas White and 
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of Aristotle based on Greek sources and his original commentators.35 Moreover, 
throughout the Renaissance, the schools responded to, and absorbed elements of the 
other recently refurbished ancient schools – Platonic, Sceptical and Epicurean.36 In the 
seventeenth century, several Aristotelians even accepted Copernican cosmology (either 
heliocentricism or a related, non-Aristotelian doctrine like elliptical orbits or celestial 
corruption). In Peripateticall Institutions, for example, White celebrated Galileo Galilei’s 
astronomical observations – referencing the satellites of Jupiter and sunspots – and 
argued in favour of heliocentricism, describing the bodies in the ‘Great Orbe’ as either 
orbiting the sun (like earth) or other planets (like the moon).37  
   To varying degrees, Aristotelians also became amenable to various types of atomism. 
White, again, fell into this category, describing the world mechanically, as a ‘Collection 
of…Bodies’, in which variation was caused by degrees of rarity and density.38 Glanvill 
derided White’s philosophical synthesis, claiming ‘our Author is one of the first that 
asserts Aristotle to have taught the Corpuscularian and Atomical Philosophy; for all the world 
hath hitherto taken his, to be the way of Qualities and Forms’.39 Of course, White was not 
the first. Averroes set a precedent,40 which was followed by alchemical Aristotelians like 
Niccolò Cabeo (1586-1650).41 Closer to White, and doubtless his greatest influence, was 
Digby. In his Two Treatises (1644), Digby argued that immaterial souls were immortal 
because corruption was only attendant on material substances.42 His argument hinged on 
a particular interpretation of Aristotle. ‘Lett any man reade his [Aristotle’s] bookes of 
Generation and Corruption’, and see ‘whether he doth not expressely teach, that 
mixtion…is done per minima; that is in our language and in one word, by atomes…[and] 
                                                
35 See Mikkeli, An Aristotelian response to Renaissance Humanism, pp. 9-10; Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance, 
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36 Charles H. Lohr, ‘Latin Aristotelianism and the Seventeenth Century Calvinist Theory of Scientific 
Method’, in Daniel A. di Liscia, Eckhard Kessler, and Charlotte Methuen (eds.), Method and Order in 
Renaissance Philosophy of Nature: The Aristotelian Commentary Tradition, (Aldershot, 1997), 369-80, pp. 371-3; 
Serjeantson, ‘Proof and Persuasion’, pp. 150-2.  
37 Thomas White, Peripateticall Institutions. In the way of that eminent person and excellent Philosopher Sr. Kenelm 
Digby. The Theoricall Part. Also a Theologicall Appendix of the Beginning of the World, (London, 1656), pp. 125-126, 
185-186. However, by some logical sleight of hand, White ensured that these doctrines never contravened 
or superseded his core Aristotelian beliefs. See Southgate, ‘Torn between Two Obligations’, pp. 114-18. 
38 White, Peripateticall Institutions, pp. 118, 200, 43. 
39 Joseph Glanvill, Sciri tuum nihil est: or The Authors defence of The Vanity of Dogmatizing; Against the Exceptions of 
The Learned Tho. Albius in his Late Sciri, (London, 1665), p. 67. 
40 Minima were not mechanical particles, however. See Christoph Meinel, ‘Early Seventeenth Century 
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that all the nature of bodies, their qualities, and their operations, are compassed by the 
mingling of atomes’.43 The parallels with White are obvious. Taking his cue from that 
‘eminent Person and excellent Philosopher Sir Kenelm Digby’, White likewise attempted 
to refurbish Aristotelian concepts like matter, form, and the four elements, along 
corpuscularian lines.44  
   From White’s perspective, his dispute with Glanvill was basically an argument over 
Aristotelianism, with scepticism as proxy.45 He thus ranted against Glanvill and others, 
who ‘defame Aristotle…[so] that the ignominy of that one man may make way for them 
to tear Science it self out of the hands of the Learned, and throw it into the dirt of 
Probability’.46 Equally, although Glanvill condemned all variety of dogmatism, he usually 
had specific targets in mind.47 Namely, ‘those high pretenders…the voluminous 
Schoolmen, and Peripatetical Dictators’, whose science was nevertheless 
‘confin’d…within the compass of a penny’.48 Even in light of man’s deficiencies, 
scholasticism made an especially bad fist of philosophy. Thus, Glanvill remarked, ‘The 
Aristotelian Philosophy is an huddle of words and terms insignificant…its Basis and 
Superstructure are Chimærical…[and its] Verbosities do emasculate the Understanding’.49 
His conflation of scepticism and anti-Aristotelianism became most evident when, in his 
reply to White’s Exclusion, Glanvill appended a direct attack on Aristotle. 
   That White’s anti-scepticism was a byproduct of his Aristotelianism is clear from the 
parameters he set for philosophy. In Exclusion, he said that for knowledge to qualify as 
philosophy it needed to satisfy several interlocking methodological requirements. First, it 
had to be demonstrative; second, like Euclid’s method, it should start with self-evident 
propositions and develop into more complex ones; and third, it must interweave clearly 
established definitions with self-known truths. These criteria excluded scepticism from 
philosophical discourse. But their real import was that they ‘may be observ’d in Aristotle 
and his antient interpreters, though not express’d in Euclids form’.50 Philosophy was 
defined and legitimised by its demonstrative, geometric method. Other disciplinary 
components – subject matter, epistemic status etc. – were determined by this logical 
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foundation. White claimed the existence and identity of certain knowledge derived, not, 
say, from Descartes’s cogito, but from Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction, i.e. the 
truism, “what is, is”.51 Descartes discovered ‘the very first thing falling under knowledge’; 
namely, that we think. White, however, sought to ascertain the general principle 
underlying all knowledge – ‘what ’tis that fasten truth to our Minds, so that we cannot 
doubt or, as were, waver about it’.52 As I will now discuss, White’s esteem for Aristotle 
derived from the latter’s development of a rigorous and comprehensive system of logic.53 
 
 
II .  Logic  
 
For White, the foundation of philosophy must be Aristotelian. The governing principle 
of White’s philosophy, and what attached him to the Aristotelian tradition, was the 
assumption that the entire world and the entirety of learning could be mapped and 
organised by logic.54 Accordingly, philosophy was a linguistic practice – insofar as 
language accessed reality – based on the right ordering and explication of meanings and 
definitions. This is important, for it was White’s conception of philosophy as definitional 
that made it a necessary condition for theology.  
   According to White, logic, or ‘the Art of Discoursing’, was the means whereby the 
understanding ‘deduces and leads it self into the knowledge of something it was ignorant 
of’.55 Following Aristotle, White thought the deductive process proceeded from the 
correct construction and linkage of syllogisms. Perfect logical structure was a route to a 
priori demonstrability, according to Aristotle.56 Thus, the truth of a proposition was self-
evident by virtue of its structure. For example, if it was true that A belongs to everything 
to which B belongs, and B belongs to everything to which C belongs, then, necessarily, A 
belongs to everything that C belongs to. ‘This cannot be false’, Aristotle said in Prior 
                                                
51 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
52 Ibid., p. 6. 
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Analytics, ‘for then the same thing will belong and not belong at the same time’, which 
was impossible.57 
   According to Robert Bradley, White’s commitment to demonstration meant he 
regarded the late scholastics – prone to probable or dialectical logic – as ‘word-jugglers 
[who] were reducing truth into probability’.58 Those who refrained from proper 
judgement were, for White, ‘Apes cloaking themselves with Aristotle’s name.59 In keeping 
with Aristotle, White defended a propositional logic built from utterances that either 
affirmed or denied something. This logic begat scientia; knowledge that necessarily 
followed from established causes or principles.60 Aristotelian logic was therefore an 
obvious antidote to scepticism.  
   In Exclusion, White argued that all knowledge was founded on three types of basic 
certainty. First, it was ‘invincibly known…that what terminates and specifies an Identical 
Proposition as its Object is self-evident’.61 Self-evidence meant being reducible to the 
proposition “what is, is”, but could be worked up into statements like “the whole is 
greater than the part”. Second, ‘’tis equally determin’d that Propositions term’d self-known 
are evident: for, if they be look’d into, twill be clearly seen, that a self-known Proposition 
is in some sort composed of an Identical Proposition and another otherwise evident, or 
taken for evident’.62 Third, propositions that shared a particular term could be combined 
– their common term operating as a predicate in the first proposition and the subject in 
the second. This created a syllogism. White’s guiding principle was that ‘the light of an 
Identical Proposition shews it self both in self-known Propositions, and in those which 
are concluded by Sylogisms’. As such, either ‘the truth of an Identical Proposition is not 
evident, or else that self-known propositions, and such as are concluded by a legitimate 
Sylogism are Evident and most certain’. In White’s view, denying the truth of identical 
propositions foreclosed the very possibility of rational discourse; because this was the 
behaviour of a ‘Mad Sot’, syllogistic conclusions were basically unimpeachable.63 
   As well as these Aristotelian conventions, White’s logic also shows glimmers of more 
geometric concerns to do with meaning and definition. White was no mathematician. 
Nor, unlike Marin Mersenne (1588-1648) or Galileo, did he elaborate a mathematically-
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based natural philosophy.64 However, White was sympathetic to the idea that Euclidean 
order or method could be applied to subjects outside geometry. To some degree, then, 
he was aligned with thinkers like Hobbes (in Leviathan (1651)) and Baruch Spinoza (in 
Ethica (1677)). This view was compatible with orthodox Aristotelian logic because 
geometric reasoning could be formulated syllogistically.65 
   Geometric reasoning usually proceeded in two stages. First, one stated or established 
definitions and axioms, respectively expressing the essences of things (usually construed 
as their cause), and self-evident truths.66 Second, a proposition was posited, and then 
demonstrated using the premises already stated. Geometrically-derived conclusions 
therefore rested on self-evident or already established propositions.67 White’s 
demonstrations were more Aristotelian-syllogistic than geometric-axiomatic – certain 
truth was educed from the structure of logical demonstrations, (i.e. if A is B, and B is C, 
then A is C). But he was impressed by the geometric injunction that reasoning should 
unspool from definitions.68 He thus held that the conclusions wrought by syllogism 
should be implicit in the terms used in propositions. Logic, therefore, must take note of 
meaning as well as structure. As such, the geometric element in White’s philosophy, 
insofar as there was one, came from the stress he placed on definitions. 
   As he argued in Peripateticall Institutions:  
 
‘those things which are demonstrated concerning another are, either in the thing 
it self, or else are effects or causes of it…now, a Definition explicates the thing it 
self: ’tis clear, that whatsoever is demonstrable of the thing is rooted in the very 
Definition: Whence, a Definition is a certain principall Instrument of Science; and all 
the solutions of difficulties depend chiefly upon Definitions…[for] all the 
connection of Notions is found in Definitions, and the connection of Terms is 
what makes Science’.69  
 
It was philosophy’s putative demonstrability that enabled White – by his own account – 
to dodge a major plank of Glanvill’s sceptical critique. For Glanvill, scientific knowledge 
                                                
64 See Dear, ‘Method and the Study of Nature’, pp. 72, 76. 
65 For example, the Jesuit mathematician Christopher Clavius attempted to rewrite Euclidean propositions 
syllogistically. However, not all his Jesuit colleagues shared his view that mathematics should be regarded 
as a science. See Ibid., pp. 39, 65-9, 72. See also Paul Richard Blum, ‘Aristotelianism more Geometrico: 
Honoré Fabri’, in Studies in Early Modern Aristotelianism, (Leiden, 2012), 199-214. 
66 Gabriel Nuchelmas, ‘Logic in the Seventeenth-Century: Preliminary Remarks and the Constituents of the 
Proposition’, in Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century 
Philosophy, (2 vols., Cambridge, 1998), I, 103-17, p. 114. 
67 See Steven M. Nadler, Spinoza’s Ethics: an introduction, (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 48-51. 
68 For the lineaments of the geometric method, particularly in an Aristotelian context, see Blum, 
‘Aristotelianism more Geometrico, pp. 211-13. 
69 White, Peripateticall Institutions, pp. 23, 25 
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pertained to immediate and necessary causation. But, he said, because physical causality 
was imperceptible, causation was established by inference. Something was supposed to be 
the cause of something else by dint of their frequent companionship. However, this was 
unwarranted because ‘to argue from a concomitancy to a causality…is not infallibly 
conclusive’.70 After all, it was possible that the ‘causes’ identified were no more than 
‘uninfluential attendants’.71 We suppose fire to be the cause of heat because we 
frequently observe their concurrence. But we have no way of showing that one is the 
absolute and necessary cause of the other. He concluded, therefore, that because ‘we 
cannot infallibly assure our selves of the truth of the causes, that most obviously 
occur…the foundation of Scientifical procedure, is too weak for so magnificent a 
superstructure’ of certain knowledge.72 
   White acknowledged that to posit causality, it was not enough to have observed 
concomitancy. However, he circumvented Glanvill’s argument by rejecting its implicit 
empiricism. (Glanvill’s critique does much to unseat Bacon’s method, which purported 
to uncover causal knowledge by observing and comparing different instances of the same 
phenomena, e.g. whiteness.) White established causality via definitions. The peripatetics, 
he said in Exclusion:  
 
‘conclude not A. to be the cause of B. till, defining both, they find, out of their 
very Definitions, that A cannot be, but it must follow out of its intrinsecals that 
B is. For example, a Peripatetick collects that Fire is the Cause of Heat; because 
Heat is nothing else but Atoms flowing from Fire: and on the other side, he 
knows that Fire cannot exist, but it must send out such particles’.73 
 
For an Aristotelian, burning was the actualisation of a particular material’s 
potentiality to burn or produce fire. That same event, however, was also the 
actualisation of fire’s potential to cause heat. These two processes were not 
successive events that, according to Glanvill (and later David Hume (1711-1776)), had 
no necessary causal relation. Rather, they were constituents of the same event, which, 
depending on one’s perspective, drew attention to alternative processes of 
actualisation. Absent the explicitly Aristotelian conceptual machinery, White adopted 
a more geometric approach – demonstrating ‘out of…Definitions’. However, by 
claiming that two notions – fire and heat – contained one another in their respective 
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definitions, he mirrored both the Aristotelian attempt to view causality as working on 
a variety of levels simultaneously, and the geometric principle that demonstrations 
were made from definitions.74  
   Logico-linguistic certainty was the hallmark of geometry. Geometricians were ‘excus’d 
from any necessity to resolve the Equivocation of their terms’ because the meaning of 
geometric concepts commanded universal assent. To replicate this cogency, it was ‘the 
first task in the other [less lucky] Sciences…to make the question clear between the 
opposite Parties, not only in Term, but also in meaning’.75 By White’s estimation, it was 
this capacity to establish, and then work from, clear definitions that made Aristotle 
worthy of commendation. ‘If we consult Aristotles Works, or his ancient Emulators’, it is 
obvious that ‘none ever of the Philosophers so industriously, and by distributing so many 
of his Terms into obvious sences, took care for the clearness of his Dictates, and eluded 
the entanglement of Equivocations’.76 An Aristotelian established a definition by dividing a 
genus into contradictory parts until they reached the subject of definition: stripped of its 
accidents, only the subject’s essential predications would remain.77 Aristotle’s 
methodological influence on White was therefore twofold. First, he provided White with 
a logical system for making formal demonstrations. And second, he showed that, in 
order to secure the foundations of that logic, it was necessary to be mindful of the 
definitions in play. These methodological prescriptions had obvious applications in 
White’s philosophy. But they were equally important in the governance of his theology. 
As we will see, the purpose of theology was to clarify and explicate matters of faith, and 
then deduce further doctrine from them. To complete these tasks, theology relied on 
philosophy, first to discern correct definitions and make deduction therefrom, and 
second, to show the compatibility of faith with natural knowledge.  
 
  
III .  Hobbes and Aristot l e   
 
To elucidate the structure of White’s thought, it is useful to compare him with Hobbes. 
Both men were exiled together in Paris during the Civil War, and became members of 
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Mersenne’s salon.78 They also shared an admiration for Galileo, and, like him, advocated 
mechanism and the geometric method. However, fundamentally, they occupied different 
philosophical and theological spaces. Hobbes was an antic-clerical materialist; White was 
a Catholic polemicist and Aristotelian. Hobbes thus draws out the distinctly Aristotelian 
character of White’s logic and metaphysics. Crucially, their differences were circulated in 
manuscript form and thrashed out in person. Between 1642 and 1643, Hobbes wrote a 
critique of De Mundo (1642) – White’s first major statement of natural philosophy – 
known as Anti-White.79 It was probably commissioned by Mersenne, and in it, Hobbes 
poured scorn on White’s attempts to graft Galilean mechanics onto Aristotelian 
philosophical assumptions.80 Once repatriated, they remained in contact, meeting in 
London several times to exchange views on philosophy and theology. It was said that 
Hobbes ‘had a great respect for him [White]’, but that during their meetings they would 
‘squabble…like young Sophisters’. Intriguingly, those who witnessed their disputes ‘held 
that the Laurel was carried away by White’.81  
   In outline, Hobbes’s method of reasoning is similar to White’s. They both constructed 
knowledge by making inferences from definitions strung together in propositions. Both, 
in other words, thought the effects of a particular thing were embedded in its 
definition.82 In Anti-White, Hobbes described reason, or syllogising, as the ‘continuous 
linking of propositions’ or the ‘calculating of names’.83 This was akin to White’s assertion 
that ‘the connection of Terms is what makes Science’.84 Like White, Hobbes said this 
method guaranteed the certainty of its conclusions by a process of necessary deductions 
from clear definitions and self-evident propositions.85  
   However, notwithstanding these structural similarities, Hobbes and White built their 
logics on dissimilar foundations. Both advocated syllogistic reasoning. But they devised 
and used definitions (the basis of syllogisms) in very different ways. For White, logical 
tautology was the key to demonstration. All propositions were ultimately reducible to the 
Aristotelian truism that “what is, is”, or “what is, cannot simultaneously not be”. 
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Hobbes, on the other hand, was more geometric. Science, he said in De Corpore, was the 
demonstration of causes. To demonstrate a cause, i.e. to guarantee its appearance in the 
conclusion of a syllogism, it must be present in the definition of one of the syllogism’s 
premises.86 Definitions, therefore, must express the cause of the thing defined; and, in 
proper syllogisms, the causes of the things being reasoned upon must be known. The 
causes of particular, contingent things were compounded of more general, universal 
causes.87 And, according to Hobbes, ‘the causes of universal things…are manifest of 
themselves, or (as they say commonly) known to nature; so that they need no method at 
all; for they have all but one universal cause, which is motion’.88 For Hobbes, then, 
motion was the conceptual root of all demonstration, and natural philosophy was 
begotten by geometry, the discipline concerned with simple motion.89  
   A further difference between White and Hobbes was that, for White, language-based 
certainties reflected and encapsulated certainties that existed in reality. Generally 
speaking, the Aristotelian tradition regarded words as conventional signifiers of thought. 
Language varied, but individuals all engaged with and experienced the same world. The 
concepts generated by man’s experiences were therefore common or universal. 
Moreover, it was assumed, this shared mental discourse revealed something true about 
the external world. Thus, as well as signifying concepts, words also signified things.90 In 
medieval and early modern scholastic logic textbooks, the intricacy of this signification 
was often lost or hidden. As a result, concepts and things were sometimes elided, 
reducing what was a tripartite framework – of words, concepts and things – into a simple 
association of words and things.91  
   This haziness and elision was evident in White’s writings. Discussing logic in 
Peripateticall Institutions, he shifted between concern for what someone might ‘mean by 
such a word’ – i.e. what concept a word was signifying – and concern for ‘the thing as ’tis 
expressed by this word’ – i.e. what part of physical reality a word was signifying.92 White, 
it would seem, assumed language mapped both mental and physical terrains. Hobbes, on 
the contrary, carefully avoided this slippage, saying there was no guarantee that the 
linguistic signs used to denote conceptions of reality actually captured the essence of that 
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reality. ‘Names’, he said in Leviathan, ‘are imposed to signifie our conceptions’ only.93 
Hobbes agreed with White that truth or falsity resided in the validity or invalidity of 
propositions. But in Anti-White, he concluded that truth or falsity therefore referred 
‘not…[to] things themselves but [only] of names’.94 
   Hobbes, therefore, was a nominalist. If ‘in every demonstration the term that forms the 
subject of the conclusion demonstrated is taken as the name, not of a thing that exists, 
but of one supposed to exist’ it means that a ‘conclusion…has a force that is not 
categorical, but is merely hypothetical’.95 Famously, Hobbes said deductive 
demonstrations were logically sound and captured the nature of reality when used in 
geometry and politics, because these disciplines used man-made concepts and 
definitions, and so their causes were prescribed and known with certainty.96 However, 
outside these disciplines – for example, in natural philosophy – wedding logical certainty 
to physical existence and truth was more problematic. Hobbes was arguably more 
optimistic about natural philosophy’s potential in De Corpore. Yet he still observed that, 
‘concerning the causes of the phantasms of sensible things, it is not so easy to discern 
between the things themselves, from which those phantasms proceed, and the 
appearances of those things to the sense’.97 So, despite advocating a natural philosophy 
engineered by deductive logic, Hobbes did not think logical certainty translated into 
certainty about the nature of reality.98 White, by contrast, saw no problem with this, 
which helps explain the robustness of his anti-scepticism. 
   This disagreement over the relative gap between logic and reality was underpinned by 
more fundamental differences. For White, concepts and things had an unproblematic 
relationship because he subscribed to a theory of cognition whereby, after impinging on 
the sense organs, particles from external objects travelled to the brain and – after 
‘carrying away with them some little particle of the Brain’ – were stored in the 
ventricles.99 Hobbes rejected the notion that an external object could exist in the human 
mind (thus eliding things and thoughts). And, more fundamentally, he bridled at White’s 
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attempt to make (erroneous) Aristotelianism compatible with corpuscularian cognitive 
theory.100 Referring to his philosophy, or ‘Institutions’, White said, ‘I call them Peripateticall, 
because, throughout they subsist upon Aristotle’s Principles; though the conclusions sometimes 
dissent’.101 White was not slavishly Aristotelian – he absorbed elements of the new 
philosophy because he acknowledged that, in places, but always ingeniously, Aristotle 
had erred, and he recognised the importance of allowing ‘Philosophy its growing time’.102 
Unlike Hobbes, however, Aristotle remained the foundation of White’s thought. 
   White was clear about his disciplinary priorities, and the manner in which some bodies 
of knowledge gave rise to others. At the beginning of Exclusion, he said knowledge only 
qualified as certain if it developed from, or was reducible to, basic metaphysical 
principles. Unlike physics, which relied on experimentation, metaphysics worked by 
demonstration – i.e. it invoked the intellect over the senses. Physics was beholden to 
metaphysics, for ‘without her [metaphysics] help and Principles’, physics ‘is able scarce to 
demonstrate any thing and advance by Causes connectedly’. It was ‘ignorance of this necessity’, 
that produced erroneous science, for ‘there’s not a step can be made in Sciences without them 
[metaphysical principles]’. According to White, Aristotle was the only reliable source of 
metaphysical principles, and thus the only guarantor of certain knowledge. ‘They that slight 
Aristotle’s Grounds must of necessity, being always in quest of Principles, ever fall short of Science’.103 
Natural particulars were only intelligible in light of metaphysics, and the only source of 
proper metaphysics was Aristotle.104  
   Turning to what these principles were specifically, White referred to ‘those common 
truths which Aristotle has demonstrated: such as are Formal Divisibility, that what ever is 
mov’d is mov’d by another, that a Continuum or Bulk is divisible in infinitum, that there’s no 
vacuum: and such like’.105 White had already fleshed out these topics in Peripateticall 
Institutions.106 But his description of them in Exclusion as ‘what Aristotle has demonstrated’ 
was particularly telling. It suggests that Aristotelian principles were true and useful by 
virtue of their demonstrability. In other words, their truth and certainty was established 
by their status as products of formal logical reasoning. White’s Aristotelianism thereby 
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came full circle: Aristotle’s system of formal demonstrability produced metaphysical 
principles, which in turn provided the foundation for all subsequent knowledge, which 
itself was logically verifiable. This was summed up when, regarding the existence or non-
existence of vacuums, White simply reflected that ‘Metaphysicks declares [it] impossible, as 
for no-thing to be a thing’.107 The impossibility of a vacuum was self-evident: a 
consequence of the truism (at the fulcrum of Aristotelian logic) that something cannot 
simultaneously be and not be.   
   In virtually every discipline, truth and meaning were established in relation to these 
logico-metaphysical foundations. As we will see, theology owed its procedures and 
intelligibility to these philosophical principles. Only one area of learning claimed certainty 
on different grounds (and remained indifferent to the meaning of its propositions). This 
subject – which was of particular interest for White – was religion. 
 
 
IV. Rules  o f  fa i th 
 
Religious discourse served two purposes, according to White. On the one hand, it established 
the truth of faith; on the other, it provided a springboard for theological discussion. Religion 
and theology were therefore linked, but discrete, discourses. However, when the 
religion/theology distinction is noted in the literature, its full import, and possible tension, is 
not thoroughly explored.108 Southgate seems to reject the distinction in his discussion of 
White, either eliding religion and theology, or not clarifying whether whatever applies to, say, 
religion, also applies to theology (or vice versa).109 This is a mistake, for although White used 
terms like “religion” and “faith” interchangeably, he followed contemporary convention and 
regarded religion and theology as quite separate. In part, he prefigured the conventions 
elaborated in John Wilkins’s Ecclesiastes. Wilkins described religion as a ‘habit of reverence’ 
towards God in ‘a manner as we conceive most agreeable to his will’, and theology as ‘The 
Doctrine which delivers the Rules’ of reverence.110 White agreed that religion focused on 
reverence or obedience to God. Religious practice, he argued, did not require theological 
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knowledge. However, in order to follow God’s commands, other epistemic conditions had to 
guarantee their truth. Establishing these conditions was the main business of religion. 
   In many ways, the primary aim of this chapter is to explore White’s particular take on the 
distinction between theology and religion. Not only did this distinction mediate White’s 
understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology, it also throws his broader 
intellectual agendas – namely, his post-Reformation polemical objectives – into sharper 
relief.111 For White, the Catholic oral tradition was a more rational and secure method for 
transferring doctrine than Reformist scripturalism. Blackloism, however, was far from 
conventional Catholicism. By distinguishing faith (which was universally accessible) from 
theology (which required philosophical acumen), while also holding that the former worked 
independently of the latter, White aimed to undercut Romanist priestly authority. 
   ‘Religion’, he observed in Controversy-Logicke (1659), ‘signifieth a skill or art of doctrine 
coming to aeternall blisse’.112 It was ‘the most important and the most necessary 
businesse, that belongeth to Mans nature and action’, because ‘if a man chance to 
mistake in it [religion]…he is lost for ever’.113 The promise of salvation superseded or 
encompassed the ends of other fields of learning, making the art of religion ‘more 
necessary and more esteemable’.114 However, as an art, religion was neither logical, nor 
demonstrative, nor philosophical. Skill in religion – or acquiring salvation – meant acting 
in accordance with faith. Only God knew anything of salvation, so ‘This science should 
be delivered us from God himselfe’, and ‘it should be done by way of command’. Thus, 
the ‘art of obtaining happinesse [religion], was now become a matter of obedience to 
Almighty God’.115 Religion, therefore, was no more than the skill of following God’s 
commands and acting rightly.  
   According to White, ‘Religion ought to take possession of our hearts, euen before 
Reason’.116 Parents and preachers should therefore inculcate faith in children as early as 
possible. For White, then, religion had a status similar to that traditionally attributed to 
logic. In the Port-Royal Logique (1662), Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) and Pierre Nicole 
(1625-1695) construed logic as the art of thinking, and a necessary preparatory for all 
subsequent learning. Likewise, in his Answer to the Lord Faulklands discourse of Infallibility 
(1660), White described religion as the ‘art of living, a rule of attaining unto eternall 
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blisse, [and] a practicall doctrine whose end is to informe our action’.117 At first glance, 
this seemed problematic. ‘How’, White asked in Controversy-logicke, ‘can it be supposed, 
that Religion ought to be studied and learned like a science or skill, when as, it ought to 
be possessed even then when we begin to study; and, that our very study ought to be 
regulated by it?’.118 The answer lay in a distinction between the method of delivering 
religion, and its uptake in the understanding. Religion, White argued, was ‘apprehended 
generally to be a knowledge above nature, and to be derived by authority from a source 
of higher understanding then ours’. Therefore, it was appropriate that it be instilled 
authoritatively by parents or preachers, rather than discursively or by rational 
argumentation. This, moreover, meant religious instruction could take place before, and 
subsequently inform, other fields of learning. However, it was equally true that religion 
‘can not be planted in us, otherwise then that the roote of it must of necessity be in 
Reason, seeing that Reason is our nature’. Further, because ‘the roote and basis of 
believing, is manifestly from this, that we are perswaded we ought to believe…[it] 
importeth as much, as that it is reasonable we should believe’.119 Religion was 
administered via authority, but was accepted because believing those authorities was 
reasonable. Faith and reason were therefore compatible.  
   This was not an altogether remarkable position. The dynamic between reason and 
revelation, or faith, had been the touchstone for religious controversy since Antiquity. 
Tertullian (160-220), for example, argued that rational inquiry was impious, detracting 
from man’s obedience to God. Augustine (354-430), on the other hand, although he 
denigrated vain curiosity, urged Christians to deploy humane learning against enemies of 
the faith.120 However, during the Reformation, the idea that reason and faith worked 
together came under sustained attack. The theologies of Martin Luther and John Calvin 
were based on the idea of God’s omnipotence, not the assumption of God’s 
reasonableness. Free will, according to Luther, was ‘a term applicable only to the Divine 
Majesty’.121 Man’s cognitive and moral faculties were sullied by the Fall, turning his will 
into ‘the permanent prisoner and bondslave of evil, since it cannot turn itself to good’.122 
Good works, rationally conceived, could not expunge the stain and earn salvation 
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because man was incapable of goodness.123 Salvation was bestowed by acts of divine 
mercy, meted out to the faithful. The recipients of grace may do good works as an 
outward expression of their faith, but it was not the works, or reason, that secured their 
salvation.124 
   Calvin also pressed for the decoupling of reason and faith, arguing that, for man, God 
would always be inscrutable, and appear arbitrary.125 God, he said, was the immediate 
(not merely secondary) cause of everything; thus, when he permitted something to exist, 
he willed it to exist. Consequently, God was directly responsible for (what humans 
designated) good and evil. This radical voluntarism undermined man’s attempt to fathom 
divine behaviour – ‘all of us born of Adam are ignorant and bereft of God, perverse, 
corrupt, and lacking every good’.126 Divine mercy, where it existed, was gratuitous, and as 
such the mysteries of salvation ‘cannot in themselves and by their own nature…be 
discerned’.127 It was not man’s place to understand God; all he could do was ‘serve him 
for his nature’s sake alone…keep his rule, accept his majesty, and in obedience recognize 
him as Lord and King’.128 
   However, by the seventeenth century, most English Protestants were distancing 
themselves from the early Reformers. Instead of denigrating reason, William 
Chillingworth (1602-1644) and John Tillotson (1630-1694) offered qualified 
endorsements of man’s cognitive potential. Not only was reason allowed a larger role in 
religious discourse, they also assumed reason took various forms. These claims were 
aired in the so-called rule of faith debates, in which different Christian denominations 
legitimised their faith-claims by appealing to different criteria for truth – Catholics cited 
papal infallibility, and Protestants relied on man’s native capacity to comprehend 
scripture.129 Speaking of these denominational fissures, White reflected that ‘their first 
Division must necessarily be, into Believers of the Word taught or delivered orally, and 
Believers of the Word taught or delivered in paper’.130 Thus, the rule of faith controversies 
                                                
123 Hoopes, Right Reason, pp. 52-3, 98-9. 
124 Ibid., pp. 100-3. 
125 See Ibid., pp. 106-114. 
126 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, translated and annotated by Ford Lewis Battles, (London, 
1986), p. 16. 
127 Ibid., p. 43. 
128 Ibid., p. 15. 
129 For the Rule of Faith debates, see Popkin, The History of Scepticism; van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty. 
For a particular Blackloist intervention, see Beverley C. Southgate, ‘‘The Fighting of Two Cocks on a 
Dung-Hill’: Stillingfleet Versus Sergeant’, Judaeo-Christian Intellectual Culture in the Seventeenth Century, 163 
(1999), 225-35.  
130 William Rushworth, Rushworth’s Dialogues, or, The Judgment of common sence in the choyce of Religion, last edition 
corrected and enlarged by Thomas White, (Paris, 1654), ‘Preface’, unpaginated. 
 105 
were not fought over the righteous source of faith – agreed to be God’s word, 
disseminated by the apostles. Rather, in England, Blackloists and latitudinarians131 argued 
about how, given the time that had elapsed since God’s revelation, doctrine could be 
verified as an authentic fragment of the divine word.132  
   English latitudinarians were wary of claims to absolute certainty – be it Catholic (via 
authority) or Reformist (via grace and scripture) – but opposed to full-blown scepticism. 
Therefore there was a strong conceptual connection between latitudinarianism and the 
sceptical-hypothetical philosophy espoused by Glanvill and others.133 God, they argued, 
was capable of infallible judgements. But man, whose fallible senses and erring reason 
frequently disclosed falsities, could never be totally assured of any truth. Instead, he must 
make do with probabilistic, or moral, certainty. Such assurance usually derived from the 
senses or testimony, and was capable of yielding indubitable belief, sufficient for use in 
everyday existence.134 For example, and most importantly, moral certainty was sufficient 
for religious belief. Chillingworth said the truth of scripture, ‘though not so certain, in 
some sort, as sense or science, may be able to sway our will to obedience’.135 Tillotson 
agreed. In The Rule of Faith (1666), he said it was not ‘impossible in the nature of the thing 
that this Rule should fail, that is, either that these [scriptural] Books should cease to 
descend, or should be corrupted’. Nevertheless, this ‘Rule of Faith, is…abundantly 
sufficient…to convey the Christian Doctrine to all successive Ages’.136 By presiding over 
miracles – enacted by God – biblical authors acquired unimpeachable credibility. In 
addition, scriptural testimony could be verified by correctly compiled ancient histories.137 
For both men, rational individuals ought to believe in the Bible. However, this did not 
mean – and this was a crucial distinction – that every doctrine found in scripture was 
obviously rational. 
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   White was familiar with, and hostile to, these sentiments.138 After debating 
Chillingworth, he wrote witheringly in Reason and Religion (1660) that he ‘has his Religion 
tackt on him with such slight pins that he may change it a la mode’.139 White and Tillotson 
also knew of each other, and latter wrote The Rule of Faith against White’s protégé, 
Sergeant.140 Latitudinarianism, in White’s view, was based on two related falsities. First, it 
mistakenly claimed that the Bible, alone, could serve as an adequate rule of faith; and 
second, it argued (dangerously) that moral certainty provided sufficient assurance of 
religious truths. Biblical criticism became particularly prominent in the seventeenth 
century. Hobbes and Spinoza famously questioned Moses’ authorship of the Pentateuch, 
while new geographical data, and research into Asian and Greek histories, challenged the 
monogenetic origins story found in Genesis.141 White’s Catholic judgment, recorded in 
the preface to (William) Rushworth’s Dialogues (1654), was that ‘private conceit’ was all too 
often used to interpret scripture, resulting in ‘as many Rules [of faith], as Heads’. He thus 
concluded that ‘the Letter…without a determinate sense, is nothing’.142 The problem, he 
argued, was that no one in good conscience could assent to, and wager their salvation on, 
something that was only probably true, and therefore possibly false. The truth of religion 
must be certifiable in order to generate right actions and a chance at salvation. Clerics 
who failed to provide absolute proofs for religious verities were abandoning their calling. 
For if religion was not known with certainty, it was possible that ‘the very way God 
himself has shewn to Heaven may possibly lead to Hell’.143 ‘Faith’, White argued in 
Controversy-logicke, was:  
 
‘of unchangeable verities…It is a parallel to science; I meane, to true science; 
such as we se exercised in Geometry…And to expect that faith should depend on 
probabilities, is no lesse ridiculous then to thinke the like of Geometry; since it is 
more necessary, and more important then Geometry…Therefore it were a great 
folly to imagine, that faith should not be as certaine, and as easy to arrive unto, as 
Geometry is’.144  
 
                                                
138 See van Leeuwen 1963, pp. 16-17, 37, esp. footnote no. 59. 
139 See Ibid., pp. 16-17; White, Reason and Religion, p. 5. 
140 See van Leeuwen 1963, p. 37, esp. footnote no. 59; Dmitri Levitin, ‘Reconsidering John Sergeant’s 
Attacks on Locke’s Essay’, Intellectual History Review, 20 (2010), 457-77. 
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(Oxford, 2002), 383-431. pp. 386-9; Popkin, The History of Scepticism, pp. 223-4. 
142 Rushworth, Rushworth’s Dialogues, ‘Preface’, unpaginated. For White, the ‘living voice’ of the Catholic 
Church provided this determinate sense – overcoming exegetical problems, and sorting truth from the 
corruptions cause by copy errors, translations and interpolations. Reason and Religion, pp. 117-18. 
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How, though, did White think faith could be made certain? Scripturalism was inadequate, 
and so, as we will see, was philosophical demonstration. After all, establishing and 
finessing meaning had no bearing on whether information could be transmitted, 
uncorrupted, over time. The only way to be certain that one’s beliefs were authentically 
God’s teachings, was to trace them back to the oral preaching of the apostles.145 Religious 
certainty was therefore found in ‘Tradition’, defined by White as ‘the delivery of the 
Doctrin preach’t and taught by our forefathers’, handed down from the ‘Doctrine 
universally taught by the Apostles’.146 In his Answer to Falkland, White said this doctrine or 
tradition was bequeathed to, and protected by, the Catholic Church: 
 
‘which layeth claime to Christ his doctrine, as upon this title, that she hath 
received it from his Apostles without interruption, delivered ever from Father to 
Sonne, from Master to Scholler, from time to time, from hand to hand, even 
unto this day’.147 
 
Tradition guaranteed the authenticity and authority of sacred doctrine. As White 
explained in Controversy-logicke:  
 
‘if the scanning of ambiguous wordes will not serve to settle the beliefs of 
Christian doctrine in the hearts of mankinde. It is cleare, that nothing but 
Tradition can performe that worke, since there remaineth nothing else that can 
pretend there to: and consequently, nothing but Tradition can be the meanes to 
plant and continue Religion in the world’.148 
 
Further, if religion originated in the ‘word of mouth’ preaching of the apostles, who 
‘propagated…[the] faith which themselues had learned from Jesus Christ’, it was logical 
that the ‘methode of the first institution’ would be ‘Ideall to the following 
continuation’.149 Thus, ‘the conseruation of Religion ought to be likewise effected by 
original deliuery; that is to say, by Tradition’ – i.e. oral transmission.150 
                                                
145 John Henry claims that from around 1660 – i.e. well after White’s objections to Falkland’s 
Protestantism had been answered by Falkland and Chillingworth – White (and Digby) toned down their 
emphasis on tradition. According to Henry, in order to achieve toleration for English Catholics, the 
Blackloists tried to devise a new ecumenical Christian faith, purged of overtly Catholic elements – 
purgatory, indulgence etc. – and less reliant on tradition. (Be that as it may, tradition remained the means 
by which White thought that religious truths could be known). See John Henry, ‘Atomism and 
Eschatology: Catholicism and Natural Philosophy in the Interregnum’, The British Journal for the History of 
Science, 15 (1982), 211-39, pp. 217-19. 
146 White, Reason and Religion, p. 81; White, An Apology, p. 44. 
147 White, An Answer, p. 8. 
148 White, Controversy-logicke, p. 48. 
149 Ibid., pp. 43-4.  
150 Ibid., p. 44. 
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   As Ruth Jordan notes, tradition did not shed light on the meaning of religious doctrine; 
it was merely a process that ensured the apostolic doctrine endured, unadulterated 
through time, and was capable of being received by people in the present day.151 This sort 
of religious argumentation was not based on definitions, and was not a formal 
demonstration. It was, instead, a form of historical reasoning, based on the transmission 
of knowledge, first from the apostles to their audiences, and then from fathers to sons. 
According to White, this guaranteed the certainty of faith in two ways: first, fathers 
would have no reason to dissemble to their children in matters they knew to be of grave 
importance (i.e. salvation); and second, by following the Apostles’ oral example, tenets 
could not be misinterpreted or misunderstood.152 Of course, for many, face-to-face 
communication was as potentially unreliable as textual transmission.153 Luther famously 
attacked Catholic tradition.154 And Hobbes later described ‘Traditions’ or ‘the unwritten 
Word of God’ as ‘old Wives Fables’.155 Similarly, the non-conformist and controversialist, 
Edward Bagshawe (1629-1671), likened tradition to ‘old stories, (which serve only to the 
advantage of the teller, and therefore may justly be suspected to be forged by him)’. 
Consequently, he argued, it was ‘unreasonable…to use them as Motives, to perswade us 
unto the belief of that, which in Reason is ridiculous; and in Scripture, the most 
authentick and allowed Tradition, is not so much as once mentioned’.156 Nevertheless, 
for White, tradition – shepherded by the Catholic Church – was the vehicle for Christian 
truth, and the best means to interpret scripture. 
   This had implications for the character of Church authority. For most Catholics, the 
Church was spiritually mandated to authenticate and verify tradition. White, however, 
claimed the Church acquired its authority by participating in the transmission of tradition. 
Human institutions were always capable of erring. Popes, fathers or councils were all 
fallible insofar as they were human. However, they cloaked themselves in infallibility if 
and when they limited themselves to the continued dissemination of tradition. As such, 
the practices of the church (conducted by potentially erring individuals or institutions) 
                                                
151 Jordan, ‘The Blackloists’, pp. 102-3, 107-8. 
152 White, An Answer, pp. 4-7. 
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155 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 473. 
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were separated from the tradition of the church (the doctrines infallibly transmitted 
down from the apostles to the present day).157 This (at least theoretical) distinction 
between the institutions of Christianity and the truth of Christianity, allowed White to 
dodge Tillotson’s wry observation that White and the Pope ‘have so manifestly declar’d 
themselves to differ in Points of Faith’.158 
   The advantage of White’s rule of faith was that it avoided circularity. Protestants 
usually cited the sanctity of the Bible to validate Mosaic scriptural doctrine. Traditional 
Catholics, on the other hand, said the Church must interpret the Bible because the 
Church had scriptural backing.159 White was different. Scripture, he said, was measured 
against and answerable to tradition, which, in turn, was supported by a cluster of 
historical and psychological presuppositions. White did not beg the question because 
tradition was not certain by virtue of its propagation by the Catholic Church.   
   However, some scholars reject the idea that White’s arguments for tradition were 
historical, and prefer to think of them as rational or geometric demonstrations. Dorothea 
Krook, for example, argued that White proved the apostles’ teaching had been 
transmitted in their entirety and without corruption to the present Church, by a 
deduction from self-evident definitions.160 Krook’s evidence for this claim is largely taken 
from the beginning of White’s An Apology for Rushworth’s Dialogues (1654). White praised 
the Dialogues for their method of reasoning; deducing conclusions from clear definitions. 
White specifically endorsed Rushworth’s definition of tradition as ‘the delivery of Christs 
doctrin from hand to hand’, and his definition of Christ’s doctrine as ‘that which was generally 
preach’d by the Apostles, and contains all such points as are necessary to the salvation of the 
World; not only in particular, to single persons, but [also] for government of the Church’. 
Proceeding from these definitions, Rushworth demonstrated the ‘general Position, that 
All Christ taught, of the Holy Ghost suggested to the Apostles, of this nature, is, by a direct 
uninterrupted line, entirely and fully descended to the present Church.161  
   At first glance, this lends support to Krook’s view that, for White, the success of the 
Catholic tradition was knowable by unpacking and uniting particular definitions 
apodictically. However, we must be careful not to overstate the importance of this one 
passage. Indeed, with a greater spread of textual evidence, a different picture emerges. 
                                                
157 White, Reason and Religion, pp. 72-3, 82; Jordan, ‘The Blackloists’, pp. 133-6. 
158 Tillotson, Works, p. 660. 
159 Reedy, The Bible and Reason, p. 53. 
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Important, too, is the fact that although White wrote the above passage, it was a 
summary of someone else’s argument for tradition, not his own. Clearly White approved of 
Rushworth’s method of framing the argument – it chimed so well with his philosophical 
method (outlined earlier in this chapter) that he wrote an apology for it. By flattering 
Rushworth’s reasoning, White flirted with a syllogistically reimagined version of this 
argument. But as I will show, it is clear that the argument was not, in the first instance, 
designed as a syllogism. 
   The notion that Catholic truths were guarded by tradition was bound up with a set of 
historical and political assumptions about the role of fathers in family life. Extracting the 
logical implications of terms like “tradition” or “doctrine” would not, and could not, 
adequately capture the historical principles responsible for the safe and uncorrupted 
transmission of information, across time, from one generation to the next. This comes 
across most obviously in White’s Answer to the Lord Falklands discourse of Infallibility. 
Explaining how the Christian tradition was created, White guided his reader through a 
speculative history, charting the transmission of doctrine from Christ to the Apostles; 
and its subsequent dispersal throughout towns, cities and countries. Here, White did not 
characterise the incorruptibility of tradition as an apodictic deduction, but rather as an 
intuition born of basic historical and psychological assumptions. Namely, White adhered 
to the notion that there existed no ‘better instrument to breed faith’ than having ‘heard 
him [Jesus] speak’, and that, more generally, ‘If Faith must be common to learned and 
unlearned, what better meanes, then by hearing?’.162 White recounted a history in which 
those who had ‘been taught by Christs own mouth’, then ‘preached over and over again 
the same doctrine’, in order that their listeners were properly ‘endoctrinated’, so that each 
generation ‘could not tell their children otherwise then what they had heard and 
understood’. Fundamentally, ‘what here is most evidently certaine, in the children of 
those who heard the Apostles, may be derived with as much evidence again in the grand-
children, and so in every age even to our present’. Without too much explanation, White 
endeavoured to show that the Catholic Church had, at some point, taken responsibility 
for this process. ‘The Church’, he claimed, had ‘for so many ages be[en] perpetually 
preserved in this principle, that what she received from her forefathers is, that she must 
beleive, and deliver unto her posterity’.163 This argumentation, though schematic, was 
decidedly historical, not philosophical. 
                                                
162 White, An Answer, p. 4. 
163 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 
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   Further, White’s story was littered with questions that, though assertively answered, 
remained speculative. For example, referring, hypothetically, to a period several 
generations after the original apostles’ preaching, White wondered whether, in debates 
about the content of doctrine, ‘will not there be a quick end of their dispute?’164 White 
assumed the affirmative. But he arrived at this answer via the empirical assumption that 
sense experience guaranteed comprehension, and the psychological/political assumption 
that fathers do not lie to their sons. It was not a definitional deduction, because rational 
demonstration did not proceed by question and answer. White therefore refrained from 
the language of demonstration, describing and championing the oral transmission of 
doctrine variously as ‘fitting’, ‘expedient’ and ‘efficacious’.165 
   A non-syllogistic formulation of the tradition argument accords with remarks made by 
White in Peripateticall Institutions. In lesson II, entitled ‘Of a Syllogism and its Conclusions’, 
White adumbrated the sorts of propositions amenable to syllogistic structure. He 
concluded that:  
 
‘such propositions are to be excepted which assume for proof the knowledge of 
another person: for, since Knowledge is adequate to the Thing it self; ’tis, as it 
were, a proper Accident: and the knowledge of a thing attain’d by these 
propositions is call’d Faith. Which kind of knowledge may arrive to a certainty, if 
the Authority assum’d be out of all question: yet it is not Science, because not 
evident; since the thing appears but in the knowledge of another’.166 
 
This passage highlights two things. First, unlike philosophical demonstrations – whose 
proofs or evidence were internal – faith had recourse to authority to prove its claims. 
White’s view of tradition as doctrine deriving from, first the apostles, then fathers (to 
their sons), and latterly also the Church, fitted perfectly with this model of authority-
driven faith. Second, faith could still be certain, despite shunning demonstrative proof. In 
Controversy-logicke, White said that it would be a ‘great folly to imagine, that faith should 
not be as certaine, and as easy to arrive unto, as Geometry is’.167 This was not, pace Krook, a 
call for geometric or logico-linguistic demonstrations in religion. It was a plea that 
certainty in religion – the nature of which was as yet unspecified – be as certain as 
geometry. 
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   This marks a fundamental point of difference between religious and theological 
argumentation. For White, the point of theology was to show the content of religious 
beliefs were logically verifiable and accorded with philosophical truth. Theology and 
philosophy were therefore methodologically interwoven and conceptually harmonious. 
Religious claims, on the other hand, were historical not logical, and thus fell outside the 
remit of philosophical demonstration. However, religious beliefs had to be certain, 
despite not being philosophical. To this end, White invoked tradition, which, though 
indifferent to (philosophical) meaning, was capable of generating certainty. The upshot 
was that there was no methodological or functional overlap between religion and 
philosophy, and neither, correspondingly, between religion and theology.  
 
 
V. The psycholog i cal  foundat ions o f  fa i th 
 
This leads us to two questions; how, exactly, should religious certainty be characterised, 
and what mental processes were involved in its generation? These themes have been 
touched upon already. But a more thorough examination will further illustrate why 
religious argumentation had to eschew philosophical demonstration and look elsewhere 
for sources of certainty. White’s answers to these questions ultimately stemmed from the 
notions that faith must be ‘for [all] humane kind, that is, for learned and unlearned…[and 
that] it should be a rule of our life and actions’.168 
   In Rushworth’s Dialogues – for which White wrote a preface and fourth dialogue – he 
argued that the cognitive state of certainty had particular psychological precursors or 
underpinnings. This was a commonplace assumption, and most logical treatises began by 
outlining the faculties of the soul involved in intellection. White characterised certainty as 
a quality of the understanding, not the will. One could will oneself into resoluteness – i.e. 
one could resolve to do something by force of will – but it was impossible to will oneself 
to certainty. White thereby differentiated actions (which were the product of the will), 
from assent (which was the movement of the understanding). He then identified the 
cognitive stimuli required for either event. Actions, he argued, were executed or avoided 
according to probabilistic judgments. Buying and selling, raising an army, and beginning a 
long journey were all actions based upon judgements or speculations – probable 
outcomes, in short. Assent, on the other hand, could only be stimulated by the 
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understanding’s recognition of certainty or truth.169 In daily life, it was often important to 
act on something without prior assurance of the truth of that thing. This meant 
decoupling the mental operations that occasioned actions (for which probability was 
enough) from the mental operations that occasioned assent (which was only moved by 
recognition of truth). Failure to do this could result in dangerous inertia. For example, if 
a general only raised his army when he was absolutely certain that an enemy was close, 
his actions would always come too late.  
   However, as discussed, when it came to faith (or acting in accordance with faith), 
probabilism – no matter how likely – was never enough. According to White, it was 
impossible that people would endure the sacrifices entailed by religious observation if 
they were not certain of the truth of religious precepts. Moreover, it was wrong and 
destructive to religion to assent to precepts not certified as true. To ensure one acted in 
accordance with the rules commanded for salvation (religion), the truth of those rules 
needed to be certifiable. Consequently, faith must spring from the understanding, never 
the will. Action, in this case, was contingent on assent. The learned, White said, 
understood the infallible underpinnings of the Church’s authority and the veracity of 
tradition. As such, they could assent to religious precepts and act in accordance with 
them. However, this appeared to leave scant chance for people of less advanced 
cognition to acquire faith or act righteously. Keen to avoid this implication, White 
proposed that faith was actually supplied to people in a manner ‘proportionate to their 
capacity’. Those not able to understanding the complex justifications for the authority of 
tradition could make do with lower, or less watertight grounds for certainty generated by 
the natural inclination to believe one’s parents or clergyman.170 
   This idea reappeared in Controversy-logicke, looking conspicuously like a concession that, 
for the unlearned – normally women, children, and men without leisure – moral certainty 
was all that could be hoped for in matters of faith. ‘Learning in Religion’ is the ‘skill of 
shewing the path to heaven’.171 But, White said, ‘he who is not of an art, must…trust 
those whose particular skill and profession that art is. And thus it is euident, that the 
People…must rely vpon an Authority, for knowing what is the true Religion, and what is 
not’.172 Still, provided they acted as instructed, the unlearned were as capable of salvation 
as their instructors. The reason for this parity – and also the reason why White could 
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group obedience to one’s father and obedience to the church under the same 
psychological category – was that each and every person’s religion was ‘delivered them by 
their Teachers’.173 Religion was bequeathed, not devised; thus White said in his Answer to 
Falkland, ‘no unlearnednesse can excuse [not knowing religion], nor learnedness be 
exempt’. ‘Children naturally believe what their parents tell them, unlearned men what 
Doctors teach them, absent men, what those who were present doe report’.174 
   On the face of it, these remarks call to mind the argument – associated with 
Chillingworth and Tillotson – that there existed a variety of certainties, each determined 
by the object of knowledge (its quantity of evidence) and the capacities of the subject or 
knower. Thus, Southgate says White differentiated vulgar religion from learned religion 
by holding that the former was merely a means to generate enough certainty in faith to 
produce action, whereas the latter was predicated on true understanding.175 Although this 
looks like a credible assessment, it actually distorts White’s understanding of religion. 
Religious actions were unusual in that their performance always required prior assent to 
their truthfulness. It was psychologically impossible to follow religious commandments 
until one had apprehended their veracity. The way of generating certain belief (capable of 
causing actions that accorded with faith), varied from person to person, depending on 
their capacities. But the purpose of religion was to ensure that everyone, not just the 
unlearned, acted in accordance with faith. White, therefore, rejected any qualitative 
difference between vulgar and learned religion, but argued that the vulgar and the learned 
assented to religion on different grounds. 
   However, neither was White saying that, due to their different grounds for assent, the 
unlearned felt less secure in their faith. Although they fell short of the absolute certainty 
sought by the learned, the unlearned – or anyone who had not meditated on why an oral 
tradition was a secure way of transmitting doctrine – were not aware of, or not effected 
by, their cognitive deficit. They knew that their understandings had been captured by the 
truth of faith, and, as such, their assent was as unerring, and their faith as genuine, as a 
learned person’s. As White explained in the preface to Rushworth’s Dialogues: ‘that which is 
necessary to Christian action’, which, unlike normal action, must be accompanied by 
assent based on certainty, was merely ‘the firm resolution of the assent to the verities 
believ’d’. A child could thus join their beliefs to the church’s and, without knowing why 
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the church was righteous, still understand – as well as they were able – that the church 
was indeed right.176 
   For religion to serve its purpose – to get all people to act in accordance with faith – the 
methods used to inculcate and persuade potential believers had to be more flexible than, 
for example, theological arguments that were strictly governed by philosophical 
demonstration. The threshold of one’s belief was set by the capacity of one’s 
understanding. For the unlearned that threshold was lower, and their assent was 
consequently provoked in a different manner to a learned person’s. White’s rule of faith 
was therefore theoretically sound (according to its own historical-psychological 
assumptions), and thus accepted by the learned. But it was also practically effective, 
allowing people with lesser capacities to feel certain in their faith, without understanding 
why exactly such faith was secure. Religion for the unlearned was therefore a matter of 
moral certainty. But moral certainty defined, not as ‘certainty that seldom fails, or such as 
human action is generally grounded on’, but as ‘a certainty as makes the cause always 
work the same effect, though it take not away the absolute possibility of working 
otherwaies’. This, according to White, was tantamount to ‘true certainty’, not 
probabilism.177 It obtained, both when fathers were passing doctrine to their sons, and 
contemporaneously, when the unlearned were instructed by their teachers. The advanced 
capacities of the learned would not yield assent on this basis. But learned assent, when 
eventually given, was no different in character to the assent given by the variety of people 
of lesser capacities. According to Chillingworth, the nature of assent (reflexive or 
deliberative) determined the type of cognition (knowledge or belief). But, he said, both 
were basically as certain as each other.178 White agreed with the second part of this claim 
– thus, the unlearned were as certain as the learned in matters of faith – but he rejected 
the notion that they underwent different cognitive experiences. By making do with moral 
certainty in matters of faith, the unlearned did not delegitimise their assent, nor diminish 
their faith. 
   White’s rule of faith was based on assumptions about humanity’s common relationship 
to authority. People were therefore affected by religious belief in an equitable manner. 
The parity between the learned and unlearned did not carry over into theology, however. 
The fundamental difference between religion and theology, and the reason why there 
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existed differences in theological ability, was theology’s close disciplinary connection to 
philosophy. 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. Theology  
 
In his Ecclesiastes, Wilkins said theology worked to establish God’s will (which could then 
be followed in religious practice or worship). This view of theology did not presuppose 
or guarantee a philosophical basis – exegesis might be its preferred method. In fact, 
according to Wilkins, acquiring divine truth or morality by reason was constitutive of 
natural religion (as opposed to instituted or revealed religion).179 White, however, made 
fewer distinctions. For him, theology derived from religious faith (transmitted by 
tradition), and was developed using the methods and principles of philosophy. This 
resulted in two discourses: historical religion/faith and philosophical or logical theology. 
On this basis, one might conclude that White’s theology was merely a gloss of faith, by 
which point the really important intellectual work – i.e. the acceptance of the truth of 
faith – was over. Indeed, Ruth Jordan claims that White’s concern with establishing a 
rule of faith all but eclipsed his interest in theology.180 Jordan rightly notes that “glossing” 
entailed a role for philosophy – to establish concepts and definitions necessary for 
understanding faith. However, as we will see, she misconstrues and oversimplifies the 
disciplinary relationship between philosophy and theology, and overlooks theology’s 
professional and practical significance. 
   In his Apology for Rushworth, White characterised theology as the practice of clarifying 
or defining faith. ‘Defining’, he said, ‘is nothing els but the acknowledging and clearing a 
Tradition, from the dirt and rubbidg opposers had cast upon it’.181 This appears to 
corroborate Jordan’s view of theology as a relatively unimportant subsidiary to faith. 
However, White’s comments are aimed, more broadly, at establishing correct intellectual 
practices, not the nature of theology. It was irrational, he argued, to define anything of 
uncertain verity; not only should the opinion one set out to define be ‘certain, before the 
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Definition’, it should be certain ‘on some ground precedent to, and independent of it; 
and so, not made certain by the definition’.182 Therefore, ‘what is defin’d, must be, before, 
certain, either by Scripture, or [in White’s case] by Tradition’.183 It was not simply that 
tradition/religion preceded definition/theology. Belief in the certainty of one’s religious 
tenets was a precondition for proper theological contemplation. In a word: theology only 
took place within pre-established religious certainties. This sequencing is laid bare in an 
undated manuscript, held in the Bodleian library, entitled ‘Of Transubstantiation’. 
According to White, the doctrine of transubstantiation was ‘held by us to be of Faith, 
[which] depends on Authority’, namely, the Catholic tradition. Thereafter, ‘all that 
Reason has to do…is to shew that tis Possible, without violating any Maxim, either of 
Logick, Nature, or Xanity’.184  The doctrine is shown to be reasonable or logical – i.e. it 
becomes an object of theological inquiry – only after it has been established as true. 
   Theology was also charged with extrapolating new doctrine from articles of faith. 
Again in his Apology for Rushworth, White described how ‘disputing [in religious matters] 
cannot chuse but bring to light some deductions, consequent to the first & principally-
defended Position’, or articles of faith. The result, he said, was that ‘the Church may 
come to know somwhat, which haply before she never reflected on. But then those new 
truths belong to the science we call Theology, not to Faith’.185 Because theological truths 
were consequences drawn from religious truths, they ought not to contradict one 
another. But because theology did ‘emerge from doctrines deliver’d by Tradition’, it 
could be said to transcend religion.186  
   This split in religious discourse created different theological vocations. Some divines, 
according to White in Reason and Religion, were ‘onely Historicall, not Scientificall’.187 This 
distinction echoed Hobbes’s division of (historical) knowledge of fact, and 
(demonstrative or philosophical) knowledge of consequences – a division that covered 
both the objects of knowledge and the means of establishing them.188 Historical divines, 
White argued, ‘can tell you after the manner of an history of Narrative what the most 
celebrated Doctors teach’.189 Such divines merely acted as custodians of tradition, 
transmitting doctrine down the ages. Though not a direct reference to his Church of 
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England antagonists, this remark nevertheless implicated those who, in White’s view, 
were largely interested in establishing the truth or divinity of doctrine, but refrained from 
unpacking its meaning. Chillingworth, for example, strove to demonstrate the rationality 
of believing what scripture taught, but made no attempt to show that scriptural doctrines 
were explicable by human reason.190 
   However, if ‘Divinity [also] be a Science’, there must, White argued, ‘of necessity be, or 
be possible a sort of Divines who in true speaking know Theologicall Truths’.191 This 
second group of divines was not just interested in protecting the integrity of tradition as 
it passed from generation to generation. They were also committed to understanding the 
meaning and true sense of religious doctrine. Take, for example, the phrase; “the saviour 
sat at the right hand of the father”. As a matter of faith, it is ‘certainly known those 
words are true’. However, its literal meaning – the ‘materiall sence’ grasped by the 
unlearned – fell short of the full and proper import. Only scientific divinity, which 
‘consult[ed] some other skill than that of Faith’, would disclose its ‘true sence’, that 
Christ rested by God after his time on earth, but remained the chief minister of the 
temporal realm.192 White described the practice of comprehending doctrine as ‘true 
divinity’, and said that only those engaged in this second (theological) activity ‘will 
properly and with Justice claim the title of Divines’.193  
   The notion that certain divines needed skills or learning to perform their professional 
obligations was reminiscent of Meric Casaubon’s (1599-1671) call for Anglican ministers 
to be versed in various humanistic disciplines. Casaubon stressed philology as a means to 
validate scripture. But, like White, he was committed to a rational religion, grounded in 
‘general learning’.194 According to White, proper theological understanding was largely 
reserved for an educated elite, and ‘assent to every one, nay to the greatest part of such 
deductions, is not requir’d from the generality of Christians’.195 This distinguished theology 
from religion; only a few comprehended the former, whereas it was paramount that 
everybody, not just the educated, apprehended the latter.196 But it also gestured at the 
closeness of theology and philosophy. For White, the learned were responsible for 
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establishing and clarifying the terms used in syllogisms.197 Likewise, theology was the 
preserve of experts.   
   For non- and anti-Blackloist Catholics, the question of meaning in religion or theology 
was settled by the Church, sanctioned and guided by the Holy Spirit. White’s approach – 
which incurred Roman censure – was more individualistic. Naturally, in Reason and 
Religion, he promised to disavow anything that violated ‘any authority constantly 
acknowledg’d for infallible in the Catholick Church’.198 But just as the Church spoke 
truth in religion, not because it was the Church per se, but because it was a conduit for 
tradition, so in theological matters, the Church established meaning, not by majority (i.e. 
Roman) rule, but by adherence to reason. Speaking of authority in A Letter to a Person of 
Honour (1659), White said: 
 
‘If it be pretended infallible, I ask whence are we assur’d thereof. If by any other 
authority than their own; let us beg the favour to see it produc’d; if by their own 
only, we shall then submit when they shall have extricated themselves of the 
maze, or circle, in which they dance’.199  
 
The Church could not claim biblical endorsement for its theological authority if it 
possessed exclusive exegetical rights. For White, certainty had two sources – ‘besides that 
of Faith’, there was ‘no other then such as springs from Demonstration’. This reaffirms the 
non-demonstrative character of faith-based religious argumentation. But it also shows 
that theology was not simply a matter of arbitrary institutional authority. Rather, ‘a 
Doctors authority reaches no further than the force of the reason he brings’, i.e. his 
ability in demonstration. There was, moreover, ‘no reason why any Divine should forfeit 
the right his degree and quality gives him of interpretation, because others of the same 
Profession dissent from him’. Claiming theology was governed by the rules of 
demonstration, White effectively freed himself of ecclesiastical constraint. The real 
theology of the Catholic Church, as White understood it, ‘preferr’d the substance of 
reason before the shadow of popularity’.200 It was this theology that he claimed to be 
doing, and which he promised never to contradict. 
   Theology strove to understand the truths contained in faith. This, as I will now show, 
meant it shared with philosophy an interest in logic and the ascertainment of meaning. 
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According to White, philosophy grew out of, and was reducible to, a set of Aristotelian 
metaphysical precepts. These precepts, and the doctrine deduced from them, were true 
and certain by virtue of their derivation from formal geometric logic. Truth was thus 
captured in language, and philosophy was an exercise in discovering meaning. Theology 
worked by the same principles – like philosophy, it was concerned with establishing 
definitions and formally teasing out the consequences embedded within them. 
Theological practice was split into two parts: understanding articles of faith, and 
extrapolating further doctrine from them. Philosophy was integral to both. In A Letter, 
White said it was necessary to explicate ‘the mysteries of our Faith by Principles of 
Nature, and Philosophy’, in order to overcome the ‘obscurity which overshadows them, by 
the light and conformity of Reason’.201 More specifically, in Reason and Religion, he argued 
that: ‘To find out then the true sense [of faith]…Philosophy [was] a fitting instrument’, 
because ‘by Philosophy we come thus to understand our Faith, and by understanding it, 
to be able to both defend it and propagate science out of it’.202 Philosophy governed the 
correct use of language; it therefore facilitated the comprehension of faith, and the 
extrapolation of further doctrine. In fact, theology began when modes of philosophical 
reasoning were transplanted into discussions about the meaning and elaboration of 
matters of faith. Not only did theology borrow, methodologically, from philosophy, it 
also relied on philosophy for conceptual coherence. As White explained: if ‘our Divinity 
be grafted into the stock of our naturall Speech and words, whose meanings and 
Definitions Philosophy must open up to us…[and] If Definitions be the Principles of 
Science, and Philosophy defines the words Divinity uses, it [philosophy] must needs have 
a material priority to it [theology]’.203 
   Such was theology’s reliance on philosophy that White exhorted Divines to ‘find out the 
Truths in Philosophy, and then the Mysteries of our Faith will square well enough with them’.204 This 
reflects White’s view that church authority should derive from the intellectual capacities 
of its theologians, not from church-sanctioned scriptural sources. But it also exposes 
White’s belief that, because theology drew its method and conceptual grounding from 
philosophy, philosophical proficiency must precede theological study. This widespread 
pedagogical injunction was evident in curricula priorities dating back to the early 
medieval period. Undergraduate and MA arts courses were philosophically-oriented, 
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covering topics in logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics. The purpose of this 
education, however, was not simply to verse students in philosophy. Instead, the arts 
course was a propaedeutic to the three professional postgraduate courses: medicine, law 
and theology. It was one of philosophy’s jobs to provide conceptual preparation for the 
more important business of theology.205 White experienced these educational and 
vocational imperatives first hand: his Aristotelian schooling in Douai was designed to 
produce Catholic clergy. Philosophy’s role as preparation and grounding for theology is 
also evident in the structure of White’s subsequent writings. In the Theological Appendix to 
his Peripateticall Institutions, White followed the lead of thinkers like Mersenne (although 
Protestant authors did likewise), and made a series of philosophical digressions followed 
by biblical interpretations in an attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of his 
philosophy with the story of Genesis.206 In each case, the philosophy preceded the 
exegesis (in terms of textual organisation), and the theology was shown to fit with the 
philosophy (although the former represented the culmination of the ideas present in the 
latter). 
   For White, the conceptual foundations used to establish the meaning of any form of 
natural or written speech – theological or otherwise – were philosophical. This was 
polemically significant – if the understanding relied on the arbitration of definitions by 
philosophy, it was hard to sustain the Protestant argument that the Bible, alone and 
without prior learning, could be a source of edification. But it also adds texture to 
Jordan’s somewhat simplistic claim that theology was merely the philosophical glossing 
of religious truths. 
   In White’s view, philosophy and theology were, in large part, coterminous. He 
therefore accepted a characterisation of his writings in which ‘Philosophy and Divinity 
are so perfectly squar’d, that if I had not made a Division of the Books it had been impossible to know 
where one ended and the other began’.207 This has a double significance, historical and 
historiographical. First, it positioned White within an Aristotelian tradition that, 
following Thomas Aquinas, thought ‘Sacred doctrine can borrow from philosophical 
disciplines…in order to make itself clearer’.208 Consequently, however, it put him at odds 
with his non- or anti-Aristotelian countrymen. For example, Thomas Sprat – ostensibly 
speaking on behalf of the Royal Society – wrote that philosophy’s conscription into 
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‘speculative Warrs’ of theology/religion had caused ‘the knowledge of Nature…[to be] 
very much retarded’.209 Bacon had set the tone for this line of argument, claiming that, 
despite theology’s sometime reliance on the concepts and vocabulary of natural 
philosophy, the subject matter and methods of each discipline were radically 
differentiated.210 The disciplinary boundary was even more stringent for Hobbes, who 
held that religion and theology were laws to be obeyed, not propositions amenable to 
philosophical inquiry.211 Engaging with White directly, Hobbes argued that the admixture 
of philosophy and theology was a categorical confusion, for once ‘a demonstration 
persuades us of the truth of any proposition, that is no longer faith, but is natural 
knowledge’.212 In addition, Hobbes said, philosophical inquiry would eventually reach a 
point of conceptual tension with theology. For example, it would be difficult, in 
Hobbes’s view, to assimilate the idea of an unmoved mover into a philosophical 
investigation of the nature of motion. At such a moment, the only appropriate course 
was to accept one’s incapacity to understand, and forbear judgement on truth or falsity.213 
White disagreed: not only could philosophy and theology occupy the same conceptual 
space, it was also philosophy’s function to explain and develop theology. As he put it in 
Peripateticall Institutions, it is ‘the highest pitch of Philosophy, to wait on and be subservient to the 
Traditions deriv’d from God’.214  
   However, it was not true – and here we come to the historiographical point – that 
White simply conflated philosophy and theology. Southgate repeatedly asserts as much, 
saying that White made science and religion indistinguishable.215 Somewhat confusingly, 
he also claims that, for White, science and Christianity were two parts of an undifferentiated 
whole.216 White certainly conceived of philosophy and theology as compatible and 
enmeshed. But his entire disciplinary framework was, in a sense, characterised by 
discontinuity. Thus, in Controversy-logicke, he said: 
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‘there are divers sortes of learning: And that it doth not follow, that he who is 
eminent in one sort, must therefore (of necessity) excel in another. Geometry, 
Physicke, Law, Philosophy, Metaphysikes, and Divinity; are all of them different sorts 
of learning; all, so independent of one another, that he who is excellent in one of 
them, may have but a small share in any of the rest’.217 
 
Proficiency in one discipline did not guarantee comprehension of another. The 
implication of this argument is best inferred by reviewing the sort of counter-assertion 
(Glanvill’s) that White was likely engaging with. Although the above remark was made 
before The Vanity of Dogmatising was published, it reflects a line of thought present in 
White’s later responses to Glanvill.218 Glanvill held that everything in existence was part 
of an uninterrupted chain of causes. To have true knowledge of a particular cause in a 
particular field therefore required prior knowledge of all the other causes or fields of 
learning with which it intersected. In other words, it was ‘necessary’, first, ‘to know the 
whole Syntax of Causes’. And because ‘every Science borrows from all the rest…we 
cannot attain any single one, without the Encyclopaedy’.219 
   Although White did not intend to radically disunite learning, he rejected Glanvill’s 
argument because it undercut the idea that some knowledge could and had been 
established, despite the absence of total knowledge. This sheds new light on White’s view 
that philosophy was instrumental in explicating faith and elaborating theology. 
Philosophical skill did not guarantee theological acumen; philosophy was a necessary, but 
not a sufficient condition. White therefore denied that ‘the strength of Divinity comes 
from Philosophy’. Theology was derived from tradition, and drew its strength from the 
truth of faith. Instead, ‘Philosophy is the wax into which the seal of Divinity is printed’ – 
theology needed philosophy, but did not automatically grow out of it.220   
   Philosophy was subservient to theology. That alone testifies to their disciplinary 
separation. However, in Reason and Religion, White also drew attention to their dissimilar 
source materials and epistemic foundations. The mysteries of religion, he said, ‘could not 
be known without Revelation; though, after they are revealed, they may by nature be 
explicated, and new truths be propagated out of them’.221 The core and basis of theology 
was revelation, not philosophy. Philosophy gave rise to theology insofar as it established 
the concepts and definitions used in theological reasoning. But philosophy could not 
“do” theology by itself, independent of revelation, because ultimately theology derived 
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from tradition, not philosophy. The roots of each discipline were different, even 
oppositional. Thus, White said, ‘revealed propositions’ were ‘explicated by Philosophical 
ones known without Revelation’. The source of theology or the articles of faith was 
revelation, while the source of philosophy – here, simply ‘without Revelation’ – was 
reason. As White went on to say – not a little exasperatedly – there was a ‘difference 
between inventing Divinity-truths and finding out the Meanings of the Words in which 
they are deliver’d’.222 Divinity-truths were revelatory, “invented” by God. They were 
known to be true by virtue of their protection and dissemination by the Catholic 
apostolic tradition. Discovering the meaning of divinity was procedurally different. It was 
the job of theology, a task it performed with the resources of philosophy. These 
relationships entailed great overlap – philosophy and theology shared a method and a 
preoccupation with meaning – but they also implied difference – philosophy was based 
on natural principles, while theology derived from faith. 
   A further point of difference between philosophy and theology – one which, to my 
knowledge, is largely overlooked in the literature – concerns their respective intelligibility. 
Philosophical truths were certain because they were intelligible – i.e. because they were the 
products of logical reasoning. Theological truths, on the other hand, were certain 
because of their presence within the Catholic tradition, which had no bearing on their 
intelligibility. White accepted that ‘Reason [alone, or without revelation] could never have 
reach’t these mysteries’ of faith. In addition, he claimed that ‘even assisted by Revelation we 
cannot penetrate into the Deity nor any Mystery, thorowly’. He added, as a concession, 
that ‘some Predicates and truths concerning them’ may be discovered.223 But, it seems, 
there remained a kernel of mystery to theological truths, untouchable by human inquiry.  
   The reason for this residual unintelligibility was never made entirely clear. There was 
possibly some polemical purpose; challenging White’s detractors who claimed he 
‘evacuate[d] faith by Demonstration, evidence, knowledge’.224 Moreover, in Controversy-
logicke, White disparaged English intellectual culture and education, claiming the 
reasonableness of divine mysteries was lost because ‘neither the propounder, nor the 
auditory, have (usually) Philosophy enough to understand the solution’.225 This implies a 
more epistemologically-minded justification for why theology lacked absolute 
intelligibility. According to White, a ‘Mystery is difficult, not for it selfe, but because wee 
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understand not nature’. Mysteries were not intrinsically unknowable, but adequate natural 
(philosophical) knowledge was needed to properly comprehend them. Thus, he said: ‘As 
he who perfectly understandeth Logick, will have no difficulty to believe in Trynity: who 
knoweth the composition of body and soule in Man, will easily admitt the Incarnation. 
And who comprehendeth how living Creatures do nourish themselves, will not sticke at 
the Mystery of the Eucharist’.226 Theology’s reliance on philosophy therefore ran deeper 
than their shared methodological interest in meaning and deduction. They were 
conceptually entwined also; the mysteries of faith unlocked and explicated by a correct 
and proper understanding of nature. Elsewhere, White showed an appetite for such an 
investigation, and gave a partial example of how philosophy could conceptually 
illuminate theology. In ‘Of Transubstantiation’, he said the explanatory power of 
corpuscularian theories of body was so great that the Eucharist ought to ‘breed no 
difficulty, much less be deem’d an Impossibility’. This was because ‘it was not Gods 
Intention to make the Mysteries of Faith Ridiculous, & absurd to common sense, but as 
congruous as the nature of ye mystery would bear’.227  
   Nevertheless, the idea that the quality of philosophical knowledge determined the 
scope of theological knowledge raised two problems. First, imperfections in our 
philosophical knowledge would result, necessarily, in imperfections in our theological 
knowledge. This was particularly concerning because ‘not every Catholike, nor yet every 
Catholike disputant, is necessarily a great Philosopher’.228 The second, connected 
problem was that only total knowledge in a particular philosophical field (‘he who 
perfectly understandeth’) would enable one to comprehensively understand divine 
mysteries. White endeavoured to show that some natural truths could be known with 
certainty, but he recognised his limits; ‘I pretend not to set downe all: For…there is no 
All’.229 Without this total knowledge, divine mysteries would never be totally explicable. 
   In the fourth of Rushworth’s Dialogues, White pointed to another potential impediment 
to our comprehension of particular theological topics; the inadequacy of language. White 
argued that it was impossible for man to please God, because that implied man was also 
able to displease him; and God was never the subject of displeasure. Echoing Hobbes, 
White held that: 
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‘when ’tis said we please and displease him [God], those expressions must be 
taken in such a signification as both may be proportionably apply’d to him; that 
is, neither must be understood in the ordinary signification, in which we use 
them, when we talk of our selvs’.230  
 
Problems associated with language were fairly limited – they would not affect the areas 
of theology that dealt with ethics and human nature, for example. Moreover, as 
discussed, language was adequate for philosophy – accurately capturing human thought 
and the natural world. But linguistic confusion or imprecision would, to some extent, 
disable the philosophical mechanisms employed to understand and expand upon articles 
of faith to do with the nature of God. White again followed Aquinas, who argued that, 
because we only know God through his creation, the words we use to describe him are 
lifted from our understanding of temporal, material things. Thus, ‘no word used of God 
is appropriate to him in its way of signifying’.231 
   White did not pursue these issues – the incompleteness of philosophy and the 
inadequacies of language – in great depth. But they both worked to make individual 
theological conclusions less secure and more contingent than individual philosophical 
ones. Or, at the very least, theology was only as certain as the philosophy (and linguistic 
faculties) upon which it relied. Consequently, in Controversy-logicke, White accepted that 
‘As for the arguments from reason, to prove Catholike Truths: They may have as much 
strength, as the disputant is capable of. For, no argument is so strong, but that if it be 
shott from a weake hand, it may prove wholly blunt and impenetrant’.232 Theology could 
be undone by philosophical misapprehension or linguistic imprecision. A Catholic 
polemicist must therefore be careful not to discredit Catholicism, and ‘not engage 
himselfe in it [a dispute], unlesse he be assured, both that his dart is a good one, and that 
he hath the dexterity to ayme it right, and the strength to throw it home’.233 
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
According to White, it was essential that before engaging in theology one either 
understood the historical reasons why tradition guaranteed truth, or one knew the 
doctrines delivered by tradition were true because one believed one’s father or priest. 
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(Given that theology was an intellectual activity, and theologians were learned people, it 
was likely to be the former, but the point was that all people could, and must, have 
certitude in religion). After these habits of mind had certified the truth of religious 
doctrines (but abstained from querying their actual meaning), theology came into play. It 
was the job of theology to uncover the proper meaning of matters of faith – which could 
be quite different from their literal, commonsensical meaning – and to deduce further 
doctrine from these first religious principles. Both these functions required theology to in 
some sense coalesce with philosophy.  
   For White, philosophy was a linguistic practice concerned with meaning and the truths 
of nature. It was governed by formal logic, and reducible to Aristotelian metaphysics. 
Theology drew upon philosophy in two ways. First, it harnessed philosophy’s method. 
This allowed scientific divines to establish the correct meaning of the terms used within 
articles of faith, and to logically deduce further doctrine from them. And second, 
theology turned to philosophical doctrine – corpuscularianism, for example – to unlock 
and explicate theological mysteries, like the Eucharist. As such, theology relied on 
philosophical doctrine for conceptual coherence, and was only as certain as the language 
and logic used in demonstration. ‘Philosophy’, as White put it, ‘is the wax into which the 
seal of Divinity is printed’.234 However, notwithstanding these methodological and 
conceptual overlaps, philosophy and theology were separate disciplines, distinguished by 
their source materials and epistemic potential. Theology sprang from faith, or the 
Catholic oral tradition. Philosophy, on the other hand, was reducible to Aristotle, and 
based entirely on reason and logic. Thus, while language and logic were sufficient for 
philosophical purposes, some theological topics (God) transcended human definitional 
capabilities and were beyond the scope of philosophical reasoning. 
   White, in sum, cleaved to traditional Thomistic assumptions about disciplinary remits 
and hierarchy. Philosophy (of an Aristotelian bent) had non-theological applications – 
the study of nature, for example. But it was principally a propaedeutic to theology. 
Theology, on the other hand, was developed by philosophical methods and explicable by 
philosophical doctrine; but it was a discrete discipline, based, fundamentally, on faith. 
Ultimately, White argued, all knowledge was born of logical deductions from Aristotelian 
metaphysics. 
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   These logico-metaphysical principles were picked up by White’s disciple Sergeant, and 
used to counter John Locke’s scepticism about natural knowledge of substances.235 
Hence, they endured, in some form, into the eighteenth century. White and the 
Blackloists therefore demonstrate the flexibility, and to some degree, compatibility, of 
various intellectual or philosophical systems philosophy in early modern England – 
combining Aristotelian logic with corpuscular matter theory and the mechanical 
philosophy. They also show that, amid the seventeenth century’s manifold intellectual 
upheavals, it was still argued that philosophy had a foundational role in, and was 
important insofar as it facilitated, theology. It is also apparent, however, that much of 
England’s post-Reformation inter-faith polemic did not rely on theology, or 
philosophical reasoning. These debates revolved around establishing the truth of 
religious tenets, rather than unpacking their meaning. As such, they often refrained from 
philosophical discussion, focusing instead on historical or exegetical argumentation. 
   Many of these themes are also present in the following chapter. Arguing from a very 
different religious standpoint, Henry More said the truth of faith (in this case, faith in the 
sanctity of the Bible) was historically verifiable. More also demonstrates the continued 
vitality in the seventeenth century of other ancient philosophical traditions (in this case, 
Platonism). However, More’s belief in prisca theologia, and the pervasive influence of his 
Origenist theology, meant the Cambridge divine argued for an even more comprehensive 
intermingling of natural philosophy and theology.
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Henry More 
 
 
 
Henry More was a Platonist theologian and philosopher, based, for most of his life, in 
Cambridge. He entered Christ’s College in 1631, was ordained and made a fellow in 
1641, and stayed until his death.1 At Cambridge, he developed an anti-Calvinist theology, 
based on the notions that God’s actions were constrained by the idea of goodness, and 
that man’s reason was improvable. Consequently, he argued, God’s laws and creation 
were potentially intelligible to man. However, More was un-persuaded by the most 
stringently mechanistic iterations of the new philosophy. He therefore balanced 
mechanical or corpuscular natural philosophy with a Platonic metaphysics based on 
immateriality. In sum, More established a relationship between natural philosophy and 
theology in keeping with his theological Platonism: both disciplines were rational, and 
thus compatible; but the former was also incoherent without the latter, as More regarded 
material accounts of nature as necessarily partial. 
   From the 1630s, when he studied under Robert Gell (1595-1665), More’s theological 
views stayed relatively unchanged. His early platonic poetry – Psychozoia (1640) and 
Psychodia Platonica (1642/7) – refuted atheism by differentiating matter and spirit, and 
argued for the possibility of spiritual perfectionism against Calvinist predestination. The 
same themes governed More’s substantial theological works, An Explanation of the Grand 
Mystery of Godliness (1660), and Divine Dialogues (1668).2 Importantly, all More’s writings 
subscribe to the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul.3 In the main, More was also 
consistent philosophically. He was exposed to Cartesianism in the 1640s, and, in 1646, 
published Democritus Platonissans, arguing that Cartesian mechanism and experimental 
philosophy was compatible with Platonic mysticism.4 Although More became 
increasingly vocal about the atheistical implications of Descartes’s philosophy, he had 
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longstanding reservations about mechanics, raised in their correspondence in the late 
1640s, and given full vent in Divine Dialogues.5 
   The changes in More’s output were mainly changes in genre, and were directed by 
shifts in English religious sentiment. His poetry – which was a reaction to the Calvinism 
in Cambridge in the 1640s – evolved, in the tolerant climate of the Interregnum, into 
thoroughgoing philosophical and natural theological treatises: An Antidote against Atheism 
(1653) and The Immortality of the Soul (1659). However, after the Restoration, high 
churchmen accused More of political disloyalty and excessive rationalism – i.e. of trying 
to show that religious and theological doctrine could be understood by reason. 
Therefore, in the 1660s, he gave more weight to revelatory theology,6 and, in general, his 
work become less philosophical, and more apologetic and theological.7 He defended the 
rationality, though not the truth, of his theology in The Apology of Dr. Henry More (1664). 
And in A Brief Discourse of the true Grounds of the Certainty of Faith in Point of Religion (1668), 
he set out a scriptural account of faith. Thereafter, he translated works into Latin – in 
order to reach a wider, European audience – and began, but did not finish, a synoptic 
metaphysical text, Enchiridium Metaphysicum (1671). 
   Due to his range and depth of thought, More is considered ‘the most vital and 
interesting of all the Cambridge School’ of divines.8 Jasper Reid even calls him ‘the most 
eminent’ English philosophical authority of his day.9 Nevertheless, More has evaded 
extensive scholarly study, in part, ironically, because of his close association with other 
seventeenth-century figures.10 He was a member of the so-called “Cambridge Platonists” 
– a label that obscures as much as it reveals.11 Benjamin Whichcote, Ralph Cudworth, 
More and others were, from mid-century, colleagues at Cambridge who shared an 
                                                
5 Alan Gabbey provides the best accounts of More’s association with Cartesian mechanics. He argues that, 
although More’s initially enthusiastic response to Cartesianism, morphed, over time, into disapprobation, 
his particular criticisms of Cartesian physics remained fairly constant following the pair’s correspondence 
in the late 1640s. What More increasingly feared, according to Gabbey, was that “Cartesianism” was 
vulnerable to atheistical appropriation and exploitation. See Gabbey, ‘Henry More and the Limits of 
Mechanism’. For other accounts, see Marjorie Nicolson, ‘The Early Stage of Cartesianism in England’, 
Studies in Philology, 26 (1929), 356-74; Charles Webster, ‘Henry More and Descartes: Some New Sources’, 
The British Journal for the History of Science, 4 (1969), 359-77; Leonora D. Cohen, ‘Descartes and Henry More 
on the Beast-Machine – A Translation of their Correspondence pertaining to Animal Automatism’, Annals 
of Science, 1 (1936), 48-61. 
6 A. Rupert Hall, Henry More and the Scientific Revolution, (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 121-2.  
7 John Gascoigne, Cambridge in the Age of Enlightenment: Science, Religion and Politics from the Restoration to the 
French Revolution, (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 41-4. 
8 John Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century, vol. II, 
(Edinburgh, 1872), p. 303. 
9 Jasper Reid, The Metaphysics of Henry More, (Dordrecht, 2012), p. 1. 
10 Crocker provides one of the few monographical accounts of his life and thought. See Henry More. 
11 The label has nevertheless gained much currency. See Henry Robert McAdoo, The Spirit of Anglicanism: a 
survey of Anglican Theological Method in the Seventeenth Century, (Black, 1965); C.A. Patrides (ed.), The Cambridge 
Platonists, (Cambridge, 1969); Hutton, ‘The Cambridge Platonists’. 
 132 
interest in Platonic philosophy. However, their differences were manifold, and More was 
singular. Not only was he was the only “professional” philosopher, he was also the only 
student of the Church Father, Origen of Alexandria (184/5-253/4).12  
   Recent scholarship has stressed More’s engagement with more august seventeenth-
century thinkers.13 For example, he challenged Descartes’s mechanism,14 and repudiated 
Robert Boyle’s voluntarism.15 His engagement with Thomas Hobbes remains 
understudied – something I address below.16 More’s place in the history of the English 
Church is also recognised: as an embodiment of so-called latitudinarian theology, and an 
example of the Church’s diversity.17  
   Though useful, these comparative studies do not tell the whole story, and More 
deserves to be studied in his own right. He was a preeminent Platonist and metaphysician 
– a leading Cambridge authority and member of the Royal Society. He also articulated 
perhaps the most radical unity between natural philosophy and theology in seventeenth-
century England. Their unity, he argued, owed to both disciplines’ origin in a Mosaic 
cabbala – a single, united textual tradition. As such, More is proof that much 
seventeenth-century thought relied on ancient wisdom, combined or retooled with newer 
doctrine. Specifically, he offers an example of how ancient theological doctrine shaped 
formulations of the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy and theology. 
                                                
12 Levitin, Ancient Wisdom, p. 16. More also wrote and published across a greater number of disciplines than 
the other Platonists. For example, Whichcote focused on sermonising, and Cudworth was preoccupied 
with ancient learning. For Whichcote, see Robert A. Greene, ‘Whichcote, the Candle of the Lord, and 
Synderesis’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 52 (1991), 617-44. 
13 See Sarah Hutton (ed.), Henry More (1614-1687): Tercentenary Studies, (Dordrecht, 1989).  
14 See Webster, ‘Henry More and Descartes: Some New Sources’; Nicolson, ‘The Early Stage of 
Cartesianism in England’; Cohen, ‘Descartes and Henry More on the Beast-Machine’; Alan Gabbey, 
Philosophia Cartesiana Triumphata: Henry More (1646-1671), in Thomas M. Lennon, John M. Nicholas, John 
W. Davis (eds.), Problems with Cartesianism, (Kingston, 1982), 171-249; Robert Pasnau, ‘Mind and Extension 
(Descartes, Hobbes, and More), in Henrik Lagerlund (ed.), Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and 
the Mind/Body problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment, (Dordrecht, 2007), 283-310; M.J. Osler, 
‘Triangulating Divine Will: Henry More, Robert Boyle, and René Descartes on God’s Relationship to the 
Creation’, in M. Baldi (ed.), Stoicismo e Origenismo nella filosofia del seicento inglese, (Milan, 1996), 75-87. 
15 See Henry, ‘Henry More versus Robert Boyle’; Mandelbrote, ‘The Uses of Natural Theology’. For Boyle 
and More’s differing uses of experimental philosophy, see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and 
the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life, (Princeton, 2011), pp. 207-24. 
16 For the classic treatment of their intellectual relationship, see Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan, pp. 81-95. 
Parkin gives a more recent account, but he is far more interested in Hobbes’s relationship with Cudworth. 
Taming the Leviathan, pp. 322-34. 
17 See McAdoo, The Spirit of Anglicanism, pp. 81-155; D.W., Dockrill and J.M. Lee, ‘Reflections of an 
Episode in Cambridge Latitudinarianism: Henry More’s Epistle Dedicatory to Gilbert Sheldon of his 
Enchiridion Metaphysicum’, in D.W. Dockrill and R.G. Tanner (eds.), Tradition and Traditions, (Auckland, 
1994), 207-23; G.A.J. Rogers, ‘The Other-Worldly Philosophers and the Real World: The Cambridge 
Platonists, Theology and Politics’, in G.A.J. Rogers, J.M. Vienne, and Y.C. Zarka (eds.), The Cambridge 
Platonists in Philosophical Context: Politics, Metaphysics and Religion, (Dordrecht, 1997), 3-15; David Pailin, 
‘Reconciling Theory and Fact: the problem of ‘Other Faiths’ in Lord Herbert and the Cambridge 
Platonists’, in Douglas Hedley and Sarah Hutton (eds.), Platonism at the Origins of Modernity, (Dordrecht, 
2008), 93-111. 
 133 
More subscribed to two Platonically-inspired theological views: that God was 
constrained by goodness, and that the human soul went through various stages of pre- 
and post-terrestrial development. Respectively, these beliefs guaranteed the rationality or 
knowableness of natural philosophy and theology, and meant reason could be enhanced 
by piety, granting the mind access to higher knowledge (philosophical and theological). 
Nevertheless, illuminated reason could not establish the degree of certainty that More 
reserved for religious belief. One could therefore assert the reasonableness of both 
disciplines, but not – with absolutely certainty – attest to their truth. The (potential) 
fragility of theology meant it was philosophy’s job to protect it from counter arguments 
or rebuttal.18   
   This chapter is divided into four sections. The first argues that More’s philosophy was 
fundamentally a means to protect theology from rational rebuttal. A major plank of this 
agenda was More’s notion that natural philosophy begot natural theology – the study of 
the former inevitably giving way to an appreciation of the latter. The remaining three 
sections develop and link the themes drawn out in the first. The second isolates More’s 
views on faith, and looks at his argument that, due to the prophetic accuracy of the Bible, 
it was rational to be a believing Christian. The third turns to More’s theological concerns, 
and examines how he used the works of Origen to repudiate Calvinism. And the fourth 
returns us to the issue of disciplines, outlining the way More’s two principal theological 
doctrines – necessitarianism and (Origenist) pre-existence and perfectibility – informed 
the character and scope of his natural philosophy and theology. 
 
 
I .  Theology ’s  phi losophical  f ence   
 
In 1646, More summarised his anti-Calvinist theology thus: ‘divine goodnesse’ was the 
‘measure of his [God’s] providence’, and ‘limits the Essence of the world as well as its 
duration’.19 Divine actions, including creation, were performed according to discernable 
principles. Consequently, natural philosophy and theology were rational disciplines – i.e. 
they were capable of being understood and explained by intelligent creatures. However, 
                                                
18 See More, Apology, p. 482. 
19 Henry More, Democritus Platonissans, or an Essay upon the Infinity of Worlds out of Platonick Principles. Annexed to 
this second part of the Song of the Soul, as an Appendix thereunto, in Philosophical Poems, (Cambridge, 1647), To the 
Reader, unpaginated.  
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rational doctrines were not necessarily true doctrines. Unable to assert theology’s 
absolute truth, philosophy was required to champion and defend it.  
   Several of these rhetorical and epistemic issues were sketched out in More’s Conjectura 
Cabbalistica (1653). Here, More sought to repudiate atheism by demonstrating the 
coherence of reason, faith, and ancient learning; and specifically, the harmony between 
philosophy and scripture. In the Cabbalistica, More said: 
  
‘For though in such things as are necessary and essential to the happinesse of a 
man, as the belief that there is a God, and the like; it is not sufficient for a man 
only to bring undeniable reasons for what he would prove, but also to professe 
plainly and dogmatically, that himself gives full assent to the conclusion he hath 
demonstrated: So that those that do not so well understand the power of reason, 
may notwithstanding thereby be encouraged to be of the same faith with them 
that do, it being of so great consequence to them to believe the thing 
propounded: Yet I conceive that Speculative and Dispensable Truths a man not 
onely may, but ought rather to propound them Sceptically to the world, there 
being more prudence and modesty in offering the strongest arguments he can 
without dogmatizing at all, or seeming to dote upon the conclusion, or more 
earnestly to affect the winning of Proselytes to his own opinion. For where the 
force of the arguments is perceived, assent will naturally follow according to the 
proportion of the discovery of the force of the arguments. And an assent to 
opinions meerly speculative, without the reasons of them, is neither any pleasure 
nor accomplishment of a rational creature’.20 
 
This dense passage contains several important points. First, notwithstanding the 
‘undeniable reasons’ proving God’s existence, the faithful must simply profess their 
belief, with or without demonstration. Thus, ‘belief that there is a God, and the like’ 
could be asserted dogmatically. This seems straightforward. Unfortunately, it does not 
entirely correspond with More’s remarks in An Antidote (also published in 1653). The 
purpose of An Antidote was to rationally argue for God’s existence, and not merely assert 
it. More nevertheless offered this disclaimer: 
 
‘when I say that I will demonstrate that there is a God, I do not promise that I 
will alwayes produce such arguments, that the Reader shall acknowledge so 
strong as he shall be forced to confesse that it is utterly unpossible that it should 
be otherwise. But they shall be such as shall deserve full assent and win full 
assent from any unprejudic’d mind’.21  
 
                                                
20 Henry More, Conjectura Cabbalistica. Or, a Conjectural Essay of Interpreting the minde of Moses, according to a 
Threefold Cabbala: viz. Literal, Philosophical, Mystical, or, Divinely Moral, (London, 1653), ‘The Preface to the 
Reader’, unpaginated.  
21 Henry More, An Antidote Against Atheisme, or An Appeal to the Natural Faculties of the Minde of Man, whether 
there be not a GOD, (London, 1653), p. 3. 
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In contrast to his advice in the Conjectura, More’s whole manner was decidedly un-
dogmatic. He said a rational person should be persuaded that God exists. But he did not 
proffer ‘undeniable reasons’ for this, nor did he encourage blind assertion. More 
therefore had much in common with the latitude-men, whose moderate scepticism 
meant they championed ecumenicalism and toleration. Taking their cue from William 
Chillingworth’s Religion of Protestants (1638), the latitudinarians emerged during the Civil 
War as an alternative to theological dogmatism. Many were partial to natural theology, of 
which An Antidote was a pioneering example.22 However, historians often apply the label 
un-reflexively and too rigidly.23 Latitudinarians were not the only clerics to devise rational 
theologies, nor, following the Restoration, did they consistently advocate latitude or 
religious tolerance.24 Nevertheless, there were similarities between More and clerics like 
Chillingworth and John Tillotson, who both rejected the possibility of infallible certainty, 
but thought matters of faith were morally certain, or very highly probable.25 More’s 
interests were perhaps more metaphysical than, say, Chillingworth’s. But, like the latter, 
he refrained from claiming the absolute truth of religious or theological doctrine, and 
instead settled for probable belief.  
   Returning to the passage in Conjectura: when More said ‘the belief that there is a God, 
and the like’ was a matter of dogma – ‘and the like’ being a pointed inclusion – he may 
have been referring, not simply to the existence of God, but more generally, to belief in 
the truth of the Bible.26 This makes sense of two things. First, it fits with More’s account 
of the spectrum of certainty. As we will see, More said biblical truth was indubitably 
certified by the “felt” guidance of what he called divine sagacity. It could therefore be 
asserted dogmatically. Second, it explains his view that, by declaring it (the truth of the 
Bible) confidently, others would be ‘encouraged to be of the same faith’. A simple belief 
in a deity would not fulfil this function. 
                                                
22 The classic work on latitudinarianism and the Cambridge Platonists is Tulloch, Rational Theology, esp. p. 6. 
For more nuanced appraisals, see Sarah Hutton, ‘Edward Stillingfleet, Henry More, and the decline of 
Moses Atticus: a note on seventeenth-century Anglican Apologetics’, in Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, 
and Perez Zagorin (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England 1640-1700, (Cambridge, 1992), 68-84, p. 
68, who identifies More as an influence on latitudinarianism’s early platonic adherents. Or see Alan 
Gabbey, ‘Cudworth, More and the Mechanical Analogy’, in Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez 
Zagorin (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England 1640-1700, (Cambridge, 1992), 109-27, pp. 109-10, 
who claims More was part of the movement’s first generation.  
23 See Kroll, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-3. 
24 See Richard Ashcraft, ‘Latitudinarianism and Toleration: Historical Myth versus Political History’, in 
Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Perez Zagorin (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Religion in England 1640-
1700, (Cambridge, 1992), 151-77, pp. 156-61. 
25 See van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty, p. 41, esp. ft. 74. 
26 As well as belief in the afterlife or the immortality of the soul.  
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   However, the clearest injunction in the above passage was that speculative doctrines – 
the sort found in natural philosophy and theology, and spun out of the rational 
intellective faculty – were to be propounded tentatively and with humility. This included 
doctrines that were fundamental to More’s understanding of the world, like the Spirit of 
Nature and the pre-existence of the soul. These theories were confirmed by reason, he 
said, and ought to be assented by rational observers. Their truth, however, was harder to 
determine. More fleshed out the doctrine of pre-existence in The Immortality, his second 
work of natural theology. In the preface, he said his arguments were ‘as clear a Proof as 
Natural Reason will afford us’. But, he continued, ‘I doe acknowledge a further and more palpable 
evidence comprehended in Christian Religion’.27 Reason adduced powerful arguments, capable 
of accessing the truth. But the most secure and comprehensive certification of truth was 
faith.  
   Following the Restoration, many divines were evicted from Cambridge by returning 
high churchmen. More was forced to account for his doctrinal idiosyncrasies, and 
profess loyalty to the re-established English Church. Defending himself in The Apology, 
he erred even more cautiously, claiming to ‘avow and admit these Theorems no farther 
then as Rational; but for their absolute reality and truth, to be more wary and reserved in 
the Assertion thereof’.28 A rational notion might also be a true notion, but the former did 
not necessarily imply the latter.  
   For More, then, theology was a set of rational propositions – graspable by the human 
mind, and consonant with rational principles – not a set of self-evidently true ones. 
These included arguments about the lifespan of the soul – which should be postulated 
speculatively – but also arguments for God’s existence, which could be asserted fairly 
certainly/dogmatically. This cognitive deficit lies at the heart of More’s understanding of 
the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy and theology. Theology was 
based on rational argument, but its truth was uncertain, making it vulnerable to attack. 
These epistemic conditions meant theology must rely on philosophy to argue its cause. 
As such, in the ‘General Preface’ to A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings (1662) – a 
compendium of his key philosophical works to date – More said that his ‘Design…is not to 
Theologize in Philosophy, but to draw an Exoterick Fence or exteriour Fortification about Theologie’.29 
                                                
27 More, The Immortality of the Soul, ‘The Preface’, unpaginated.  
28 More, Apology, p. 488. In this instance, More said the decision to accept or reject the truth of a doctrine 
should be motivated by practical considerations. For example, whether or not that decision destabilised the 
belief of the unlearned, or undermined the authority of the church.    
29 More, Collection, ‘The Preface General’, p. vi. 
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   This remark reveals three things about More’s understanding of the natural 
philosophy-theology dynamic. First, their disciplinary relationship was established by the 
needs, or vulnerability, of theology; natural philosophy was entirely subordinate. 
Theology needed protecting, or as More put it, fortification. The main threat to theology 
was ‘the confident Atheist, and his Gigantick batteries raised against the belief of the existence of a 
God, and of a Reward in the World to come’.30 But other threats existed also. On the one 
hand, More was anxious to protect his theology from rival Christian accounts of sin, 
grace and providence. His lengthy and repeated discussions of the pre-existence and 
perfectionism of the soul were designed to show the philosophical superiority of his 
theology over Calvinism. On the other hand, More saw greater coherence among the 
text-based, Protestant denominations, than between Protestantism and paganism or 
Catholicism.31 Turning the fence metaphor on its head, then, it could also symbolise the 
encompassing, and, ideally, the alignment of, Protestantism against the Catholic tradition. 
Whatever the threat, the fact that theological doctrines, like the life of the soul, were the 
products of rational intellection meant they could, in theory, be argued against. 
Philosophy – the fence – was therefore used to resist whichever rebuttals emerged, and 
strengthen theological convictions.  
   Second, and consequently, More’s philosophy was decidedly apologetic. In the 
‘General Preface’, he said ‘The great Cement that holds these several Discourses together is one 
main Design…The knowledge of God’.32 And, in The Apology, he tried ‘To manage the truth of 
our Religion in such a way as would be most gaining upon men of a more Rational and Philosophical 
Genius’.33 In More’s view, the geniuses of the age had been instrumental in Christianity’s 
decline.34 The most culpable were Hobbes, whose monism disallowed the existence of 
immateriality, and Descartes, who posited a universe effected only minimally by spirit. 
Both produced works which, though not necessarily reflections of authorial impiety – 
More never accused Descartes personally of irreligion, for example – had atheistical 
implications, or were vulnerable to atheistical interpretation. More’s dualist philosophy – 
which uniquely ascribed extension to spirit – was designed to countermand these 
positions.   
                                                
30 Ibid., p. vi. 
31 More, Apology, p. 541. 
32 More, Collection, ‘The Preface General’, p. iv. 
33 More, Apology, p. 482. 
34 John Henry, ‘A Cambridge Platonist’s Materialism: Henry More and the Concept of the Soul’, Journal of 
the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 49 (1986), 172-95, pp. 175-7. 
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   Finally, and perhaps most importantly, More claimed he was ‘not [trying] to Theologize in 
Philosophy’, anticipating and countering the suggestion he was unduly mixing disciplines. 
This undercuts modern interpretations of More’s work – see Robert Crocker, for 
example – as either theological philosophy or ‘philosophical theology’.35 These labels fail 
to capture the precision of More’s disciplinary arrangements. More regarded natural 
philosophy and theology – particularly natural theology – as intimately connected. 
Neither discipline claimed absolute certainty, but they were both rational and intelligible. 
In fact, in the ‘General Preface’ More said Christianity was the only religion that ‘dares 
appeal unto Reason’.36 Moreover, their subject matters were largely complementary, and, 
in some cases, interchangeable – spirit featured in both disciplines. As such, philosophy 
was apologetic, pointing towards and preparing the ground for theology. Nevertheless, 
the relationship was subtler than simple coextension. More placed both disciplines on a 
continuum, natural philosophy coming first, giving way to natural theology. Studying 
matter produced partial explanations of nature. But, More said, this incompleteness 
pointed towards the existence of something else, something spiritual.  
   The main point of the philosophy-as-fence metaphor was that theology needed to be 
protected and supported by philosophy. An additional interpretation – which can be held 
alongside the former – is that before arriving at theology (something delimited), one 
must go through or scale the fence (philosophy). This notion – of going through 
philosophy to get to theology – is compatible with More’s account of the limits and 
purposes of natural philosophy. On the one hand, he said in Immortality, natural 
philosophy explored how far mechanical causes could account for natural phenomena. 
On the other, it exposed the explanatory insufficiency of mechanism and materialism, 
and, by paving the way for spiritual explanations (like the Spirit of Nature), provided ‘the 
first step to the abstrusest mysteries in Natural Theologie’.37 This somewhat complicates the 
disciplinary relationship between (natural) philosophy and (natural) theology. As 
discussed, the terms of the relationship were set by theology; theological propositions 
lacked certainty, so philosophy was used to protect and defend them. Clearly, however, 
the epistemic weakness cut both ways. For it was the failure of mechanism to account for 
                                                
35 Crocker, Henry More, p. 203. Hutton has challenged this view. She says that More used philosophy to 
defend theology. But, she argues, there was less disciplinary conflation than Crocker implies. See Sarah 
Hutton, ‘The Cambridge Platonists’, in Steven Nadler (ed.), A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, 
(Oxford, 2002), 308-19, p. 313. 
36 More, Collection, ‘The Preface General’, p. vi. 
37 More, The Immortality of the Soul, ‘The Preface’, unpaginated.  
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natural phenomena that, in More’s view, necessitated the existence of spiritual substances 
and thus initiated theological contemplation  
   More reiterated this idea in his metaphysical work, Enchiridion Metaphysicum, when he 
said: ‘from the more accurate knowledge of nature or the world we emerge into a 
sufficiently clear knowledge of God and of the other incorporeal substances’.38 However, 
here More framed the disciplinary shift between the study of matter and the study of 
spirit in terms of physics and metaphysics. The latter, he argued, was ‘taught after 
physics’, and was ‘the most noble fruit of natural philosophy’, all of which was in keeping 
with the conventions of university curricula.39 Less conventionally – but necessary to 
make Enchiridion Metaphysicum consistent with Immortality – More defined metaphysics as 
‘the art of correctly contemplating incorporeal substances insofar as they are revealed in 
our faculties by the light of nature. Thus, metaphysics is, as it were, natural theology’.40 
More cleaved to the common conception of natural theology as any argument for, 
inducement to believe in, or confirmation of, God’s existence based on logic, reason or 
experience. It therefore encompassed metaphysics, without being entirely synonymous 
with it. The latter was exclusively interested in incorporeal substances, including God; the 
former – natural theology – dealt with the same topics, but also engaged with ontological 
arguments for God’s existence that made no reference to incorporeality. Still, More 
envisaged an obvious (and extensive) crossover between natural theology and 
metaphysics. This was different from, say, Francis Bacon who (in a different intellectual 
context) argued that, although natural theology grew out of the trunk of first philosophy, 
they did not strictly speaking overlap. 
   However, the salient issue for More – which Bacon accepted, albeit implicitly – was 
that natural theology/metaphysics was the inevitable outgrowth of natural philosophy; 
that the study of matter necessarily gave way to an appreciation of immateriality. As 
More said: ‘natural philosophy leads, indeed…it directs us as by a path to knowledge of 
that sort of principles which are both elevated and divine, as is plainly apprehended to be 
posited above all corporeal nature, and to exceed its powers’.41 The closeness of, but also 
the differences between, these disciplines is evident. Natural philosophy and natural 
theology originated in the same practices; studying matter or physical nature. They both 
also worked by the same epistemic principles; reasoned judgements about investigable 
                                                
38 Henry More, Henry More’s Manual of Metaphysics: a translation of the Enchiridion Metaphysicum, with 
introduction and notes by Alexander Jacob, (Hildesheim, 1995), p. 1. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., p. 2. 
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substances. However, eventually their subject matters diverged. Natural philosophy stuck 
to physical inquiries, and natural theology posited immateriality where material 
explanations were unsatisfactory. 
   It was on this basis, More argued, that ‘metaphysics is restricted to the light of nature, as it is 
distinguished from supernatural theology’.42 Metaphysics/natural theology was elaborated by 
reason, and therefore addressed subjects – the existence of spirit – that reason was 
capable of investigating. Supernatural theology, on the other hand, was not sourced from 
reason, but presumably was found in scripture. This, concomitantly, established a simple 
difference between natural philosophy, which, like natural theology, was based on reason; 
and supernatural theology, which was not. Nevertheless, this was a difference in origins 
(the reasoning faculty or scripture), not a difference in kind (compatible with rational 
argument or not). As this chapter will show, More defined faith as rational belief in the 
truth of the Bible. He also regarded the contents of theology – natural or supernatural – 
as rational insofar as they conformed to the notion of God’s goodness. The fact that 
Christianity or supernatural theology derived from scripture, not reason, did not 
therefore mean Christianity and reason were incompatible. On the contrary, More 
accepted what was a commonplace among English Protestants – see Tillotson on the 
doctrine of the Trinity, for example – that although some scriptural tenets were above 
reason, none contravened it.43 
   According to More, scripture and reason were so compatible that any supposed 
discrepancies were actually evidence of misinterpretation. In The Apology, he said that 
‘such Reason as is really repugnant to them [the oracles of holy writ] is not true Reason, 
if sifted to the bottom; nor those Interpretations of Scripture true that are thus 
repugnant to true Reason’.44 If reason and scripture were compatible, it was not a huge 
leap to assert that philosophy (which was rational) and scripture were compatible also. 
Indeed, More said, ‘Principles or Conclusions of Philosophy’ should have ‘no real 
repugnancy with Scripture’, they should also be ‘unexceptionably tenable and 
demonstrable, and they must be ‘easily accordable with the Attributes of God and the 
Phænomena of Providence’.45 Thus, as well as a connection between natural philosophy 
and natural theology, it is also possible to speak of an affinity between philosophy and 
Christianity in general. Along with other so-called latitudinarian clergymen, More viewed 
                                                
42 Ibid., p. 3. 
43 Reedy, The Bible and Reason, p. 10. 
44 More, Apology, p. 483. 
45 Ibid., p. 486. 
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natural philosophy/theology and theology as discrete yet compatible ways of rationally 
reflecting on God and creation.46 ‘There is no real clashing at all betwixt any genuine Point of 
Christianity and what true Philosophy and right Reason does determine or allow…[for] there is a 
perpetual peace and agreement betwixt Truth and Truth’. Of his own philosophy, More 
even claimed that, ‘were it true, (as most certainly it is exceeding rational) it is so far from 
clashing with Christian Truth, that it were to me, next to the Bible and those 
wonderfully-faithfull and clear Prophetical Predictions therein, the greatest corroboration 
of my Faith’.47 It was the Bible, and specifically the true or realised prophesies it 
contained, that guaranteed the truth of faith. But true philosophy (i.e. More’s philosophy) 
was so pious, and conformed so perfectly to Christianity, that, after the Bible, it was the 
best grounds for belief. The hierarchy of disciplines was clear: natural theology was born 
out of, and a remedy for, natural philosophy; and philosophy, in general, was primarily 
tasked with supporting and fortifying theology. But the compatibility and shared 
rationality of philosophy and Christian religion and theology was mutually beneficial. It 
meant, firstly, that one could ‘assert Religion and vindicate her from that vile Imputation 
of Ignorance in Philosophy’. But it also ‘justifie[d] those more noble results of free 
Reason and Philosophy from that vulgar suspicion of Impiety and Irreligion’.48 Reason 
and faith, philosophy and theology, were in total harmony. 
   Underpinning this disciplinary compatibility was More’s belief in an ancient Gentile 
theological tradition, or cabbala.49 The authority of ancient wisdom in the seventeenth 
century is a contested issue.50 Bacon held to a version of prisca theologia – the idea of an 
original theology known by the ancients. But the ancients weighed particularly heavily on 
More, who presented the history of philosophy as an outgrowth – or an elaboration – of 
a longer history of religious and theological thought. This explains More’s admiration for 
‘the wisest and the most virtuous’ heathen writers who, he claimed in Conjectura, ‘had their 
Philosophy from Moses and the Prophets, as Pythagoras and Plato, or else the Disciples or Friends 
of these Philosophers’. Pagan philosophy was not perfect, for despite ‘having receiv’d the 
Cabbala from the ancient Prophets…they have [still] mingled their own fooleries with it, either out of 
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the wantonnesse of their Fancy, or mistake of Judgement’.51 But by dint of their exposure to early 
theological wisdom, ancient philosophers had a unique relationship to divine truth.52 
More sketched this genealogy in the ‘General Preface’ to his Collection. It began with 
Pythagoras whose ‘Philosophy was the ancient Wisdome of the Jews’, and therefore ‘had relation 
to the Text of Moses’.53 This philosophical tradition bifurcated into physical and 
metaphysical schools, represented initially by Democritus and Plato. Latterly, however, 
‘the ancient Pythagorick or Judaick Cabbala did consist of what we now call Platonisme and 
Cartesianisme, the latter being as it were the Body, the other the Soul of that Philosophy; the 
unhappy disjunction of which has been a great evil to both’.54 More’s ambition was to reunite these 
now disparate (and thus misguided) strands.55 In short, he intended to reintegrate 
immaterial entities into mechanical accounts of nature.  
   The pay-off of this history or cabbala – what made it ‘an indispensable duty of that 
Faithfulness I owe to the Christian Church’ – was the provenance it ascribed to philosophical 
learning.56 In their earliest iterations, philosophy and theology had the same textual 
foundations and authorship. This was critical, for if philosophical truths (Cartesian and 
Platonic) were present in ‘the Text of Moses’, then ‘no Philosopher has any the least pretence to 
magnifie himself against Religion and the Church of God, wherein such rich Theories have been ever 
treasured up’.57 Philosophical truth – which was subsequently scattered across the historical 
canon – had first been set down, allegorically, in scripture.58 The compatibility of natural 
philosophy and scripture therefore owed to the former’s derivation from ancient Mosaic 
texts. Consequently, as More said in Divine Dialogues – a survey of his most important 
natural philosophical and theological positions – it made sense to ‘look upon the 
Christian Religion rightly understood to be the deepest and the choicest piece of 
Philosophy that is’.59 
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   Natural philosophy and theology had many points of overlap – textual origin, subject 
matter, epistemic status, and governance by reason. In large part, this closeness was 
designed to establish or reflect theology’s seniority. Not only was natural philosophy 
perfected by natural theology: it also protected and corroborated theology. The rest of 
this chapter will demonstrate how this disciplinary arrangement was motivated by, and 
reflected, several of More’s basic theological presuppositions. To explain the rational 
coherence of natural philosophy and theology I will turn to More’s necessitarianism, and 
to account for the reason-truth distinction I will show how More’s theories of the soul 
conditioned his understanding of reason. However, as a useful introduction to issues of 
rationality and truth, and to demonstrate More’s engagement with scriptural Christianity, 
I will first discuss More’s concept of faith. 
 
 
II .  Bibl i ca l  grounds for  fai th  
 
Like Bacon and Thomas White, More distinguished his arguments for belief from his 
elaboration of theology. He did not discuss the former with the same intensity as, say, 
White, who was more involved in polemical religious pamphleteering. But More’s 
digressions on religious belief informed his notions of rationality and truth. They also 
betray flashes of his pressing theological concerns: overturning Calvinist notions of God, 
sin, and human potential. More’s understanding of faith is therefore a useful reference 
point for thinking about how he structured disciplines like natural philosophy and 
theology.  
   A Brief Discourse of the true Grounds of the Certainty of Faith in Point of Religion (1668) was a 
short addendum – less than thirty pages – to More’s (lengthy) two volume Divine 
Dialogues. It was a response to the accusation – levelled at many Cambridge divines in the 
1660s – that More paid too much attention to natural theology, and not enough to 
scripture. In his analysis of biblical faith, More described belief as a state in which one 
was persuaded, on particular grounds, of a particular truth. One could be mistakenly 
persuaded of something, or persuaded on false grounds. But ‘the true Grounds of the 
Certainty of Faith are such as do not onely beget a certain and firm Faith, but a true one, 
and this is in virtue of their own Truth and Solidity, as being such as will appear true and 
solid to all impartial and unprejudiced Examiners’.60 More acknowledged that education, 
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interest or appetite might make people unsympathetic to belief, and it was therefore the 
first criterion of faith to avoid or resist these impediments. This was called ‘Moral 
Prudence’.61 
   But, assuming this basic level of impartiality, faith rested on naturalistic foundations, 
(the upshot of which was that everybody, even the wicked, was capable of having faith).62 
‘It is plain’, More argued,  
 
‘that Certainty of Faith presupposeth Certainty of both Reason, and Sense rightly 
circumstantiated. For, forasmuch as Faith properly so called is nothing but an 
unwavering Assent to some Doctrine proposed upon the ground of infallible 
Testimonie, there must be some Reason to persuade us that that Testimony is 
infallible…Certainty of Sense is also required. For if the Sense be not certain, there 
could be no infallible Testimony of matter of Fact’.63  
 
Like White, More said faith rested on testimony. For More, however, testimony was 
strictly scriptural. Reason must persuade us that biblical testimony was genuine, and thus 
infallible. And the senses must be supposed reliable; to guarantee that the authors of 
(biblical) testimony correctly witnessed and understood the events they subsequently 
documented in scripture. In his Principia (1644), Descartes attacked the veridicality of 
man’s sensory information and rational apparatus.64 More knew this, but nevertheless 
claimed reason and sense were essential to faith. However, he argued, various conditions 
had to be met for the faculties to operate properly and for cognition to be successful. 
For example, More accepted the Aristotelian notion that sense organs must be physically 
sound in order to reliably convey information to the mind.65 He also said reason could 
only operate effectively in salutary physical conditions. In keeping with early modern 
views on melancholy – famously expressed in Robert Burton’s (1577-1640) The Anatomy 
of Melancholy (1621) – More traced various psychological disturbances to somatic states.66 
‘The Body’, he summarised, ‘doth engage the mind in Thoughts or Imaginations’.67 More 
was particularly interested in the causes and treatment of the ‘false perswasion’ that an 
individual has direct and privileged access to God’s mind, which he discussed in 
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Enthusiasmus Triumphatus (1656).68 Departing from neo-Platonic tradition, he claimed 
reason and imagination – i.e. both parts of the human soul – were immaterial.69 Reason 
ought to tame the imagination and govern the body via material animal spirits. However, 
the reverse was also possible; the imagination could overrun reason, spurred by physical 
stimulation.70 When this happened, the mind became deluded. Thus, More argued, ‘the 
Causes of Enthusiasme’, (which he elsewhere likened to the causes of atheism71), could be 
‘resolved into Complexion or the present Temper of Distemper of the body, arising from 
natural causes’.72 The most potent cause was ‘Melancholy’, which, ‘when it reaches to a 
disease…sets on some one particular absurd imagination upon the mind so fast, that all 
the evidence of reason to the contrary cannot remove it’.73 So, to relieve the mind, the 
body required treatment.  
   Whatever remedial action was taken to aid or facilitate the faculties, certain limits were 
insuperable. For instance, proofs for God’s existence lacked absolute certainty. In 
addition, the essences of substances were inaccessible to the human mind. Substances 
were identifiable by their immediate properties – impenetrability in the case of matter, 
penetrability in the case of spirit – but the link between a substance and its properties 
was indemonstrable.74 (The salient issue for More was that the immediate properties of 
spirit were as knowable and as intelligible as the immediate properties of matter).75 
Despite these qualifications, More worked from the ‘Postulate or Hypothesis, that Our 
Faculties are true’.76 Though imperfect, the faculties were capable of apprehending 
‘Common Notions [intuitive truths], Externall Sense, and evident and undeniable 
Deductions of Reason [logical links between arguments]’.77 ‘Whatever is clear to any one 
of these Three Faculties’, he said, ‘is to be held undoubtedly true, the other having 
nothing to evidence to the contrary’.78 Crucially, in Grounds of the Certainty of Faith, More 
said that if reason and sense were correctly calibrated, ‘there are some Truths so clear, 
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that Immorality it self…puts no bar to the assenting to them, that is, puts no bar to their 
appearing to be true’.79 These included logical and physical dicta. But they also included 
the truth of Christianity, which, returning us to the focus of this section, was grounded in 
the truth of the Bible.  
   More addressed the subject of the biblical grounds for religious truth in his poem 
Psychozoia (written in 1620), when he said religious belief or doctrine should be sourced 
from ‘that infallible Rule of Faith, the holy Word’.80 Charting the life of the human soul, 
the poem was a critique of, and alternative to, the doctrine of predestination, composed 
when Puritanism was rife in Cambridge, and in Christ’s and Emmanuel Colleges in 
particular.81 English Arminians like Richard Montagu (1577-1641) had stressed the moral 
and political dangers of Calvinist theories of grace since the 1620s.82 More, however, 
rejected predestination because it undercut the idea of God’s goodness, and disallowed 
the possibility that all souls were perfectible. In large part, he argued, biblical doctrine 
could be grasped by reason, or shown to be compatible with rational principles.83 
Further, every human soul possessed reason and was capable of refining its rational 
faculty. Reason was the route to salvation, and therefore, salvation was universally 
achievable. 
   More returned to the question of the Bible’s role in faith in An Explanation of the grand 
Mystery of Godliness. However, he wrote Mystery of Godliness just before the Restoration, 
when the religious temper in England was very different. Anticipating a period of 
ecclesiological tolerance and moderation, More felt free to argue that, although 
episcopacy was rational, it was not jure divino.84 However, the restored Church was far less 
conciliatory than More expected. Returning high churchmen regarded their priesthood as 
divinely commissioned, and treated their opponents punitively. As well as purging the 
Church of Puritan influence, they also took aim at Cambridge latitudinarians. The latter, 
it was argued, were politically disloyal and prioritised natural philosophy/theology over 
scripture.85 More was obviously vulnerable to these charges – he had written extensively 
on natural theology, and, in Mystery of Godliness, argued that reflection was required to 
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uncover the intelligibility, or reasonableness, of divine mysteries. Nevertheless, he also 
said ‘the Spirit of God in the plain Records of Scripture will afterward so ratifie and 
confirm’ divine mysteries.86 So, again, More posited the Bible as the basis for religious 
truth. 
   More said the truth or falsity of Christianity hinged on whether God’s providence was 
an actual historical phenomenon. If he could ‘prove That this Messias is already come, 
and that Iesus whom we worship is that Christ’, then he would have ‘prove[n] That 
Christianity…is not a mere Idea, but a real Truth’.87 More therefore set out to show the 
historical fulfilment of various biblical prophesies, including – most importantly – that 
Jesus had come and that he was the Messiah. This distinguished More from English 
controversialists (and fellow latitudinarians) like Chillingworth and Tillotson. All three 
posited the Bible as the grounds for faith. But the latter two were largely interested in the 
legitimacy of the Bible as a document (as they did battle with the Catholic oral tradition). 
Their concern was the canonical authenticity of the texts; that they were authored by 
who they claimed they were; at particular times, and in particular places.88 More, on the 
other hand, simply pointed to the historical truth of biblical prophecy. In this regard, he 
had more in common with Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699), who adduced the superior 
accuracy of sacred history over various heathen histories as evidence of biblical truth.89 
   Eight years later, in Grounds of the Certainty of Faith, More expanded the criteria for 
Christian truth, while remaining essentially committed to a scriptural foundation. 
Certainty of faith, he argued, was ‘grounded upon the Certainty of Vniversal Tradition, 
Prophecy, History, and the Nature of the things delivered, Reason and Sense assisting the Minde 
in her Disquisitions touching these matters’.90 Tradition, prophecy and history (at least 
the biblical parts) were criteria based on the historicity of scripture (as outlined in Mystery 
of Godliness). The addition of ‘The Nature of things delivered’ was shorthand for the 
reasonableness of Christian doctrine. This seems confused, for in Mystery of Godliness 
More suggested the reasonableness and the truth of Christianity were two different 
things. The former – which was More’s major theological preoccupation – was 
demonstrated by showing the compatibility of doctrine with the idea of God’s 
providential goodness. The latter was established by prophetic fulfilment. But Grounds of 
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the Certainty of Faith was not a radical overhaul of More’s views. It remained the case that 
‘the Bible is the truest Ground of the Certainty of Faith’ – a state of affairs vouchsafed 
by reason.91 But More now sought to demonstrate that a variety of evidence – largely 
scriptural, but also the reasonableness of Christian doctrine – coalesced into one proof of 
the truth of Christianity. More’s abiding scripturalism was evident in his attitude to other 
faiths. He esteemed Judaism over Paganism because only the former derived from 
Mosaic texts. Moreover, though he rejected Calvinist teachings, More called on ‘all 
Protestant Churches, whose Religion is the Bible…to use so well a limited Indulgence’ – 
i.e. to refrain from bellicosity.92 Tellingly, however, he stopped short of advocating 
freedom of conscience for Catholics, who built their religion on fallible men instead of 
infallible scripture.93 
   More’s view of rational faith helps pinpoint the distinctiveness of his theology, which 
strove to demonstrate the rationality of Christian doctrine. He alluded to the distinction 
– between religion and theology – in Grounds of the Certainty of Faith. His main thesis was 
that, because scriptural prophecy was evidently true, it was rational to have faith in the 
Bible – i.e. be persuaded that it was authentic and divine. However, More also said the 
rationality of Christian belief implied the rationality of Christian doctrine. This suggests that 
faith and theology were tightly linked. Given the right conditions, More said the human 
faculties were reliable and capable of certainty. The truth of faith was therefore certified 
by reason and sense. However, reason also assented to various ‘Natural Truths, whether 
Logicall, Physicall, or Mathematicall, that are so palpably true, that they constantly and 
perpetually appear so as well to the Wicked as the Good, if they be Compotes mentis’.94 In 
short, the rational faculty that determined the truth of the Bible was also used to assent 
to natural truths.  
   From this truism, More inferred that the content of revelation must be compatible with 
natural truths. This had some logical cogency – it is impossible for two truths (natural or 
scriptural) to be incompatible. But More was making a subtler point. If a natural truth 
contradicted scripture, the former was false. This implied that the basis for the 
(discredited) natural truth – i.e. reason – was invalid, and capable of producing falsehood. 
However, the invalidation of reason would also undermine the biblical ground for 
certainty in faith, which was certified by reason. In conclusion, then, revelation had to be 
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reasonable, or compatible with natural truths, otherwise there would be no certain basis 
for belief in the first place. As More put it; ‘if Reason where it is clearest [i.e. in 
establishing natural truths] is false, we have no assurance it is ever true, and therefore no 
Certainty of Faith, which presupposes Reason’.95 
   Thus, More jumped from the notion that it was rational to believe in scripture to the 
notion that Christian doctrine was rationally knowable. This served as a neat logical 
presentation of his views. However, More did not think Christianity was reasonable 
because it was compatible with natural truths, and because those natural truths were 
established by the same reasoning faculty responsible for validating the Bible. These were 
symptoms or effects of Christianity’s reasonableness, not an explanation of it. Thus, in 
this instance, More reasoned from an effect (Christianity’s compatibility with natural 
truths) to a cause (Christianity’s reasonableness). But the order of causation, and, in many 
instances, the order of More’s reasoning, was different. He hinted at this when he said 
that ‘no Revelation…is repugnant to the Divine Attributes’, alluding to the supposed 
accordance of biblical doctrine with the idea of God’s goodness.96 As discussed in the 
following section, in More’s view, Christian doctrine was reasonable because it derived 
from, or conformed to, the notion that God was good. The rationality of belief was a 
related but separate issue – More’s theological assumptions about the nature and actions 
of God preceded and conditioned the remainder of his thought, including his conviction 
that faith could be shown to be true. As we will presently discuss, these presuppositions 
formed the core of More’s longstanding anti-Calvinism.  
 
 
III .  Providence and theor ies  o f  the soul  
 
More was concerned by the materialistic, and thus atheistical, pretensions of his rational 
age. As such, Immortality contained a detailed refutation of Hobbes’s materialist natural 
philosophy.97 More also had an uneasy relationship with Cartesian dualism, which he 
regarded as liable to materialist exploitation.98 Consequently, More developed (in his 
view) a more robust dualism, based on theological premises (different from Descartes’s). 
At the same time, he was anxious to preserve the fundamentally rational character of 
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Christianity. In part, this involved proving the reliability and authenticity of scripture. But 
it was essentially a theological agenda, pitting More against the Reformism he 
encountered during his childhood and early education.99 In this section I will flesh out 
More’s peculiar Origenian rejection of Calvinism, and, in the next section, explore the 
manner in which it governed his conceptions of natural philosophy and theology.  
   The history of the early to mid-seventeenth-century conflicts within the English 
Church is important for understanding More’s theology. Not only did these conflicts 
motivate More to develop a more inclusive, latitudinarian-esque theology, they also 
informed his doctrinal commitments regarding providence and grace. The Elizabethan 
and Jacobean churches were theologically Calvinist, adhering to the doctrine of double 
and absolute predestination – election and reprobation determined by God’s unchanging 
will.100 An Arminian presence existed in the Church from around 1610, but it remained 
quiet until the ascendency of Charles I in 1625, and the appointment of William Laud 
(1573-1645) as the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1626. From then, and into the 1630s, 
the Church rejected Calvinism in what one commentator described as a ‘Counter-
Reformation without the Jesuits’.101 English Arminians, like their Dutch counterparts, 
rejected predestination, arguing that God willed the salvation of all believers.102 (Still, the 
English developed a distinct sacramental view of grace, with a particular emphasis on 
baptism). In a significant polemical move, Montagu and other Arminian clerics began 
associating Calvinism and predestination with Puritanism, including all three under an 
expanded conception of non-conformism.103  
   Scholars disagree about whether the Laudian settlement was motivated by theological 
concerns – for, say, human freedom104 – or simply vague anti-Puritanism.105 From the 
mid-1620s, the label “Puritanism” was bandied around in different contexts to satisfy a 
variety of polemical needs. Among other things, it referred to Reformism, 
Presbyterianism, Calvinism, non-conformism, and clerical tyranny. Inevitably, “Anti-
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Puritanism” was also constructed to capture a variable selection of arguments, claims and 
qualities.106 
   Whatever the exact character of the Laudian Church, or the exact meaning of 
Puritanism, the attacks on predestination and Presbyterianism during Charles I’s personal 
rule (1629-1640) undoubtedly produced a militant “Puritan” backlash in the 1640s – just 
as More’s own theological views were crystallising.107 Episcopacy was abolished during 
the Civil War, and many Church of England ministers were ejected from their posts 
during the Interregnum.108 Various sects, not only Puritanism, gained strength at this 
time.109 However, the situation reversed abruptly following the Restoration. Charles II 
promised a conciliatory Church, but it failed to materialise.110 Instead, the Acts of 
Uniformity (1662) and the Conventicle Acts (1664 and 1670) set boundaries for dissent 
and forbade non-establishment congregations, penalising the array of sects that 
flourished during the 1650s.111 
   These institutional and doctrinal vicissitudes were mirrored, microcosmically, in 
Cambridge, where More studied then taught. During the Civil War and Interregnum, the 
university was under parliamentary control, and therefore largely Puritan.112 This was 
formative for More, who began developing his anti-Calvinism in the 1640s. However, 
Cambridge also played host to latitudinarian clergymen – a group associated with More – 
who conformed to both the parliamentary and restored Church settlements, stressing the 
importance and inclusivity of natural theology.113 After the Restoration, More wrote to 
Anne Conway (1631-1679) complaining that the returning high churchmen, bent on re-
imposing episcopacy, and doctrinal and ritual uniformity, ‘push hard at the Latitude men 
as they call them, some in their pulpitts call them sons of Belial, others make the Devill a 
latitudinarian’.114 Many clergymen were forced from their posts and decamped to 
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London, and – although More and Cudworth remained in Cambridge115 – after the 
1660s, More’s work was generally more apologetic and less philosophical.116 
   Nevertheless, More was consistently hostile to Calvinism. Its principal defect, he 
argued, was that it gave ontological priority to God’s power over his goodness or justice, 
and thus left man and creation in moral confusion. For instance, in his Institutes of the 
Christian Religion (1536), John Calvin said: ‘By God’s name is indicated his power, which 
comprises all his excellences: as, his might, wisdom, righteousness, mercy, truth’.117 
Condemning theological voluntarism in Divine Dialogues, More said: 
 
‘if the measure of his [God’s] Providence be his mere Power, Will or Sovereignty, no 
man living can tell what to expect in conclusion. All true Believers may be 
turned into Hell, and the wicked onely and the Blasphemer ascend into the 
Regions of Bliss. For what can give any stop to this but God’s Iustice, which is a 
branch or mode of his Goodness?’.118  
 
Reformist voluntarism – according to More – held that creation and providence issued 
from God’s will directly, untutored by a rational or discernable design. Calvin’s God was 
therefore arbitrary because his choices were capricious and not constrained by external 
considerations.119 
   Challenging this view, More said God’s first and preponderant attribute was goodness, 
a theological position known as necessitarianism or intellectualism. In An Appendix to the 
late Antidote against Atheism (appended to the second edition in 1655), More described 
God as ‘that absolute and immutable Good, and full and pure Perfection’. As such, ‘he 
[God] cannot but include in his Idea that precious Attribute of Benignity, and therefore 
acting according to his entire Nature, he is onely good himself’.120 The other divine 
attributes were tailored according to God’s goodness. Nothing, More said in The Apology, 
‘can… be rightly termed an act of his Severity, Mercy, Policy, Veracity, or the like, unless 
it participate in his Goodness’.121 This conditioned the character of all God’s acts and 
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commands. God’s wisdom and power, More wrote in Divine Dialogues, were ‘adjoyned to 
this infinite Goodness, to contrive and execute his holy, just and benign designs’.122 And 
‘from these three, his infinite Goodness, Wisedome and Power, issue out all the Orders of the 
Creation in the whole Universe’. 123 ‘Goodness’, in short, was ‘the Measure of his [God’s] 
Providence’.124 
   This sort of argument was not unusual. By placing God’s goodness before his will and 
power, anti-Calvinists could describe and reject predestination as impossibly unjust. For 
More, however, necessitarianism went hand-in-hand with two controversial assumptions 
about the pre-existence and perfectibility of the soul. These doctrines corrected what, in 
More’s view, were additional deficiencies in Reformist theology – the notions that man’s 
divinity had been totally, irreversibly, extinguished, and consequently, that salvation was 
arbitrary.  
   More’s theories of the soul are also important because, in conjunction with his 
necessitarianism, they shaped his analysis of knowledge – what man was capable of 
knowing, and why his efforts at knowledge might be frustrated. More said the journey 
and circumstances of the soul, from heaven to earth and back again, conditioned the 
effectiveness of the reasoning faculty. Terrestrial souls were embroiled in materiality, 
which placed limitations on reason. Elevated souls, on the other hand, suffered minimal 
material intrusion, freeing reason from disturbances or distractions. The breadth and 
certainty of philosophical and theological knowledge, as well as their potential for 
development, was determined by the health and status of the soul. These doctrines of the 
soul therefore informed More’s general account of disciplines and knowledge, and his 
assessment of natural philosophy and theology, in particular.  
   According to More, the life of the soul predated its temporal experience. He shared 
this view with his friend and collaborator, Joseph Glanvill, and both men drew 
inspiration from the Church Father, Origen. Origen’s antiquity made him a credible 
source for Reformers interested in early, uncorrupted Christian thought.125 All human 
souls, he argued, were created perfectly and simultaneously, and not in conjunction with 
individual copulations; they pre-existed earthly life. Nevertheless, they eventually fell 
from heaven due to their pursuit of sensuality, which, he argued, placed the responsibility 
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of the Fall on individual souls.126 Origenism was therefore a potentially useful buffer 
against Augustinian anthropology, and, for early modern thinkers like More, an 
alternative to Calvinist predestination.127 However, although More described him as a 
‘Miracle of the Christian World’, others were sceptical.128 Origen’s Platonism, and 
particularly his doctrine of pre-existence, meant Restoration churchmen like Samuel 
Parker (1640-1688) and Seth Ward (1617-1689) considered him heterodox.129 Pre-
existence was even rejected by fellow Platonists like Cudworth.130 
   Psychogenesis was hotly debated in 1640s Cambridge. In sermons delivered between 
1646-1647, and later published, Nathaniel Culverwell (1619-1651) discussed three 
possible theories. In the first, known as traduction, souls were perpetuated from parent 
to child. The second theory was pre-existence. The third theory, called creationism, 
involved God breathing a soul into a newly conceived body. According to Culverwell, 
the first theory was untenable; the remaining two, he said, were equally viable. On the 
other hand, in his Ad Philosophiam Teutonicam Manuductio (1647), Charles Hotham (1615-
1672), a fellow at Peterhouse, claimed traduction was the only intelligible possibility.131 
More entered the discussion with his poem, The Præexistency of the Soul (1647), in which he 
described the soul’s heavenly life and its subsequent fall to earth. ‘The Souls of men’, he 
said, ‘thorough [sic] their own revolting from God before they came into the body, have 
thus in severall measures engaged themselves in the sad, dangerous, and almost fatall 
entanglements of this Corporeall World’.132  
   More held to this argument his entire life. Yet his discussions of pre-existence were 
always cautious, attesting to the doctrine’s biblical soundness and elaboration by reason, 
not its truth. In Immortality, for example, he surveyed the three theories aired in the 
Cambridge debates, concluding that ‘these two [other] opinions being so incongruous 
what is there left that can seem probable, but the Præexistency of the Soul?’.133 Discussing 
pre-existence in The Apology, he said it was ‘within the bounds of Modesty [to] averre it to 
be a very Rational and Useful opinion…But all that I averre is the Rationalness of this 
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Position, not the Truth thereof’.134 Most scholars interpret this circumspection as More’s 
way of avoiding Church persecution.135 More made his deference to the Church apparent 
in The Apology, written after the 1662 Act of Uniformity.136 And speaking on the issue 
earlier (in 1662), he admitted; ‘I do not find my self bound in conscience to profess my opinion therein 
any further then is with the good liking of permission of my Superiours’.137 More was equally 
circumspect in The Præexistency of the Soul: although, then, he was subject to different 
ecclesiastical pressures – the strong Calvinist presence in Cambridge. Thus, he wrote, ‘I 
do not contend (in thus arguing) that this opinion of the Præexistency of the Soul, is 
true, but that it is not such a self-condemned Falsity’.138 
   However, for all his caution, pre-existence had a sort of analytical certainty for More, 
insofar as it preserved, or followed from, the idea of God’s goodness. As he remarked in 
Immortality, because ‘the Wisdome and Goodness of God will doe that which is the best; and 
therefore if they [souls] can enjoy themselves before they come into these terrestrial 
Bodies (it being better for them to enjoy themselves then not) they must be before they 
come into these Bodies…Wherefore the Præexistence of Souls is a necessary result of the 
Wisdome and Goodness of God’.139 Pre-existence was also good theodicy, absolving 
God of responsibility for the Fall and the existence of evil. As Origen remarked in On 
First Principles (c. 219-225),140 ‘rational creatures…were endowed with the power of free 
will, [and] it was this freedom which induced each one by his own voluntary choice either 
to make progress through the imitation of God or to deteriorate through negligence’.141 
Following Origen, More said ‘Soules did once subsist in some other state; where, in severall manners 
and degrees, they forfeited the favour of their Creatour’. As such, they, not God, were responsible 
for the ‘several calamities and asperities of fortune, and sad drudgeries of Fate, as a punishment 
inflicted, or a disease contracted from the severall Obliquities of their Apostasie’.142 Of particular 
importance to More was the punishment imposed on man’s reasoning capacity, and the 
limits this set for knowledge.  
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   Both Origen and More conceived of the soul’s fall from heaven (and its incremental re-
ascension) in terms of its conveyance by different bodily vehicles. According to Origen, 
it was ‘impossible’ for a soul to ‘live apart from a body…this [material] substance seems 
to have been produced for them or after them, yet never have they lived or do they live 
without it’.143 The type of bodily vehicle occupied by a soul was determined by the nature 
and severity of the soul’s estrangement from God. ‘Each vessel’, he argued, ‘received, 
according to the measure of its purity or impurity, its place or region or condition in 
which to be born or to fulfill some duty in this world’.144 For example, when ‘material 
substance…is drawn down to lower beings it is formed into the grosser and more solid 
condition of body and serves to distinguish the visible species of this world with variety. 
But when it ministers to more perfect and blessed things, it shines in the splendour of 
‘celestial bodies’’.145 More also claimed souls were coextensive with, and functionally 
bound to, body..146 Further, he concurred that the type of vehicle reflected the identity or 
purity of a particular soul. In Conjectura, he explained how, ‘by forsaking the divine Light’, 
Adam ‘so changed the nature of his Vehicle…[and] sunk more and more towards a moral 
and terrestrial estate’.147 Therefore, while Angels enjoyed aerial bodies, Adam’s 
descendants had to make do with coarser terrestrial hosts. Moreover, bodily encasement 
did not cease with terrestrial death. ‘The nature of the Soule’, More argued in Immortality, 
‘is such that she cannot act but in dependence on Matter, and that her Operations are 
some way or other alwaies modified thereby. And therefore if the Soule act at all after 
death…it is evident that she is not released from all vitall union with all kind of Matter 
whatsoever’.148 
   Body and soul were inseparable. But they were, for More, different entities. It was on 
this subject – the ontological status of immaterial substance – that More and Hobbes 
clashed most violently. In Leviathan, Hobbes said: ‘For the Universe, being the Aggregate 
of all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a 
Body, that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe’.149 Body and 
substance were two names for the same thing. Body was characterised by dimensionality 
– ‘every part of Body…hath the like dimensions’ – while substance was the subject of 
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material variation.150 To be conceptually different from body, spirit – in Hobbes’s view – 
must lack dimensionality. Therefore it occupied no place; was no part of the universe; 
and did not exist. Names like incorporeal substance, he famously said, were ‘but 
insignificant sounds’.151 
   More confronted these arguments directly in Immortality. Of Hobbes’s claim that the 
universe was entirely material, he said that, ‘this is not to prove, but to suppose what is to 
be proved’.152 He then agreed with Hobbes that ‘All Substance has Dimensions’, but 
countered that ‘all has not Impenetrability’.153 This meant that spirit had dimensions, or was 
extended, and thus, it was ‘not Trinall Dimension, but Impenetrability, that constitutes a 
Body’.154 Consequently, although two bodies could not occupy the same space, spirit 
could penetrate other substances. According to More, spirit occupied an additional 
fourth dimension, and so ‘Spirits and Bodyes may be in the same imaginary Space’, 
without either losing extension.155 These arguments were supposed to refute and counter 
Hobbes’s materialist view of the world. Ironically, by conceptualising spirit as extended 
substance, More was himself accused of materialism.156 Still, by claiming spirit and body 
were capable of interpenetration, he conferred legitimacy on the controversial doctrine of 
pre-existence. 
   According to More, after exiting heaven for an earthly existence, the only direction a 
human soul could take after death was upwards, back towards God. This distinguished 
More from Origen, who thought human souls could transmigrate into even lower, 
animalistic vehicles.157 However, both men claimed man could win back the original, 
rarefied purity lost during the Fall – a doctrine known as perfectionism. Both therefore 
inverted the Calvinist tenets that ‘it is not in our power or ability to discharge what we 
owe the [divine] law’, and thus we ‘must seek and await help from another quarter’.158 
According to Calvin, ‘when Adam slipped into sin, this image and likeness of God was 
cancelled and effaced, that is, he lost all the benefits of divine grace’. As such, ‘all of us 
born of Adam are ignorant and bereft of God, perverse, corrupt, and lacking every 
good’.159 More, on the other hand, said man’s soul retained a divine seed, or ‘indelible 
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Image or Idea of God’.160 Further, to purify his soul, man had to nurture this vestigial 
divinity and eschew sensuality. Man would never become divine – the view of alchemists 
like Paracelsus and Jan Baptista van Helmont (1580-1644) – because the soul was 
necessarily bound to body.161 But re-purifying the soul had two major pay-offs. First, as 
discussed in the next section, it freed reason from self-interest and material distraction, 
enabling the apprehension of more sophisticated knowledge – philosophical and 
theological. And second, it paved the way to salvation, preparing the soul for more 
refined bodily vehicles. Again, this distanced More from Calvin, who said ‘God’s 
mysteries pertaining to our salvation are of the sort that we cannot in themselves and by 
their own nature (as is said) be discerned’, and that ‘eternal election…had destined them 
[the elect] to this end before they were born’.162 
   Earthly life, More observed in Immortality, was based on the obvious ‘Terrestial Congruity’ 
of body and soul. However, after death, the soul could make good on its ‘vital aptitude at 
least to unite with Aire’. Finally, as the ‘Aire is a common Receptacle of bad and good 
Spirits…[and] the Soule of Man is capable of very high refinements…the Souls of men 
arrived to such a due pitch of purification must at last obtain celestial Vehicles’, akin to 
those enjoyed immediately after their creation.163 To set this salvific process in motion, 
man had to reverse the patterns of behaviour that precipitated the Fall. So, More said in 
Mystery of Godliness, he had to live a ‘Divine life…an Obediential Faith and Affiance in the true 
God’, for it was ‘From this Faith Apostate Angels and lapsed Mankind are fallen’.164 The 
divine life was founded on ‘Charity, Humility, and Purity; which, where-ever they are found, 
are the sure and infallible marks or signes of either an unfallen Angel or a Regenerate Soul’.165 
Three dispositions followed from these virtues: a love of God and creation; recognition 
of God as the cause of everything; and moderation vis-à-vis sensual pleasures.166 
Together, they prescribed a form of self-abnegation; surrendering the individual, sensual 
will to the divine. 
   Calvin complained that all people, even those who ‘love God deeply and with sincere 
affection’, were ‘occupied with fleshy desires’, which ‘prevented [them] from hastening at 
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full speed to God’.167 More did not think sensuality was entirely, intrinsically, or 
insuperably bad.168 But its overindulgence caused the soul’s descent into terrestrial 
corporeality, and was an impediment to spiritual re-purification.169 The terrestrial soul 
vacillated between its higher (spiritual) and lower (material) capacities. Thus, in Divine 
Dialogues, More described man as having ‘such a mixt nature, and of so invincible a 
Freeness, that he may either associate himself with Angels, or sort himself with Apes and 
Baboons or Satyrs of the Wood’.170 Phrasing it slightly differently in Mystery of Godliness, 
he said there were ‘two distinct Kingdoms, the one of Darkness, (whose Laws reach no 
further then to the Interest of the Animal life,) the other of Light, which is the true 
Kingdom of God’. These ‘two Kingdoms must alwaies be at odds, and that there must 
be a perpetual conflict till victory’. Importantly, though, ‘the Kingdom of Light reaches from 
Heaven to Earth’, and, as such, souls were not totally lost to sin.171 Man spurned God for 
material pleasure, involving his soul in a tug-of-war between its spiritual and material 
inclinations. But man had not lost the capacity to reacquire, or re-energise his trace of 
divinity. Following the divine life guaranteed him a post-mortal existence in an aerial 
vehicle, and, perhaps, ‘that great Reward of an Heavenly, Aethereal or Immortal body, 
which shall be given at the last day’, which ‘is of very high concernment for the 
compleating of the happiness of the Souls of the faithfull’.172 Faith in God and sensual 
moderation were tickets back to the divine. 
 
 
IV. Knowledge ,  reason and disc ip l ines 
 
More’s two overarching theological commitments had a considerable impact on his 
conception of knowledge, informing the character and epistemic scope of his natural 
philosophy and theology. First, in light of his necessitarian assumptions, More conceived 
natural philosophy and theology as rational, knowable disciplines. And second, having 
recourse to Origenian theories of the soul, he could explain both disciplines’ failures, as 
well as their scope for improvement. I have discussed the possibility that More’s 
reluctance to assert the truth of doctrines like pre-existence (but also Copernicanism, and 
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others) was politically motivated. But, as will become clear, More’s caution was also 
consistent with his assessment of man’s cognitive abilities. (This is somewhat circular: 
More’s adherence to pre-existence and perfectionism affected his analysis of man’s 
cognitive faculties; in turn, this analysis precluded him from being absolutely certain of 
the truth of pre-existence and perfectionism. More did not acknowledge the circularity. 
But it is not hugely problematic – as discussed, reticence allowed him to claim deference 
to Church authority). 
   Necessitarianism is the fulcrum in More’s thought. He can therefore be situated within 
a well-known interpretive heuristic. M.B. Foster famously, but simplistically, argued that 
the emergence of empirical science was informed and motivated by the theological 
notion that the world was (voluntaristically) created.173 Since then, scholarship has 
investigated the idea that, in medieval and early modern Europe, the type of natural or 
moral knowledge available to human beings, and the manner by which it could be 
known, was determined by one’s beliefs about God and his providential relationship with 
creation. By and large, thinkers are placed into one of two groups. The first group, which 
includes More, were necessitarians or intellectualists. Necessitarians believed God created 
the world in keeping with an independent standard of reason. Creation was therefore 
constituted by necessary relationships, and, as such, natural philosophy and theology 
were rational, and partly knowable a priori. The second group were voluntarists. They 
prized God’s freedom above all else, and rejected the idea that his creative acts were 
fettered, either by external standards, or self-imposed divine conditions. Voluntarists like 
Boyle said creation was arbitrary and contingent, not a set of rational necessities. The 
world could only be known by empirical investigation, and, consequently, natural 
philosophy was hypothetical.174 
   Of course, binary typologies can rarely, if ever, satisfactorily account for all instances. 
Descartes, for example, resists simple pigeonholing. God, he argued, created eternal, 
necessary truths, like mathematical proofs, which he might nevertheless have created 
differently – i.e. he could have created a world governed by different mathematical 
principles, or a world in which particular mathematical principles did not apply. 
Respectively, these positions look intellectualist and voluntaristic. Bridging these 
viewpoints, Descartes distinguished God’s absolute power (his unactualised hypothetical 
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ability to do anything), which was free, from his ordained power (the source of his 
creative acts), which, because God was immutable, produced eternal truths.175 It is also 
problematic to assume typological uniformity. As Peter Harrison has argued, voluntarism 
was not a clear-cut designation. It held that creation was entirely a product of divine will, 
and was therefore contingent. But contingency was taken to mean either not necessary, or 
dependent on God. Neither did voluntarism necessarily produce particular epistemic 
commitments; according to Harrison, not all voluntarists were empiricists, for 
example.176 
   The grand historical narrative about the relationship between providence and 
philosophy or science therefore has flaws. It was not the case that a set of undisputed 
and unchanging theological positions inevitably gave rise to a set of undisputed and 
unchanging natural philosophical positions. In places, however, it is possible to see a 
causal connection between an individual’s particular view of providence and several of 
their particular natural philosophical doctrines. Thus, in many cases, a natural 
philosopher’s providential commitments help explain the extent to which they thought 
the world was knowable, and the type of certainty they expected from natural knowledge. 
This is certainly true of More. 
   For More, God was good, not as a function of his omnipotence (as Calvin would say), 
but because he ascribed to, and absorbed into his very essence, the notion of goodness. 
‘Goodness’, More said, was ‘certainly the most sovereign Attribute in God’, and 
therefore, it was ‘the measure of all what we may by way of Analogy call moral Attributes 
in him’.177 Morality, then, was derived from a principle of goodness co-eternal with God. 
It was therefore neither arbitrary, nor command-based, but knowable a priori. In keeping 
with his essential goodness and morality, God created the world rationally – i.e. 
according to established and discoverable principles. This had a knock-on effect for 
More’s conceptualisation of natural philosophy. If the world was ordered such that it was 
amenable to rational inquiry, natural philosophy was a rational, knowable discipline.178 In 
fact, ‘the wit of Man’, More asserted in An Antidote, was made by God ‘to contemplate 
the Phaenomena of Nature’.179 
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   As creation was a rational act, it persisted according to regular, detectable laws (of 
motion, for example). Appropriating mechanical vocabulary, More claimed ‘God has 
made the World as a complete Automaton, a Machina that is to move upon its own Springs 
and Wheels, without frequent recourse of the Artificer’.180 More was not an out-and-out 
mechanist.181 But mechanistic tropes neatly fitted his theological view that God created a 
well-functioning world that did not need constant amendment. Not only was it beneath 
God’s divinity to embroil himself in every temporal occurrence, many of which were 
sordid, corrupt or misdirected. But occasionalism – the idea that God was the proximate 
cause of all phenomena – subverted the notion that nature (largely) worked by laws that 
could be investigated by man. In Divine Dialogues, More said God had ‘given us the 
admirable works of Nature and the holy Oracles to exercise our Faith and Reason. But 
so frequent and palpable Interpellations in humane affairs would take away the 
Usefulness of both’.182 By constantly tampering with creation, God would obscure 
nature’s observable regularities. It was because God created the world with observable 
and conceivable regularities, and refrained from subsequent interference, that natural 
philosophy could speak about the order and structure of the world, and transcend natural 
history. The study of nature therefore presupposed, and in turn corroborated, beliefs 
concerning the rationality of God.  
   More’s apologetic intentions were widely appreciated, and probably aided his election 
to the Royal Society.183 The Society did not have a uniform, corporate philosophical 
methodology, but its members all thought natural philosophy supported basic religious 
or theological truths.184 According to Thomas Sprat, ‘the Power and Wisdom and Goodness 
of the Creator…display’d in the admirable order, and workman-ship of the 
Creatures…lies in the Natural Philosophers hands’.185 Nevertheless, the structure of More’s 
natural philosophy – conditioned by his particular views on providence – jarred with the 
type of natural philosophy favoured by prominent Society men, like Boyle.186 In The 
Christian Virtuoso (1690-1), Boyle, a voluntarist, said:  
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‘in the Divine Nature, Power, Wisdom, and other Attributes, there is a 
Fæcundity that had produc’d a World of Contrivances, Laws, and other things, 
that exceedingly surpass both the Number and Variety, that the dim and limited 
Intellect of Man could reach to’.187 
 
Therefore, ‘the Notions and Opinions, Men take up, of the Works and Mind of God, 
upon the mere Suggestions of the Abstracted Reason’ were ‘almost always very deficient, 
but will be oftentimes very erroneous’. Creation was contingent, and therefore natural 
causation could not be deduced a priori. At best, Boyle argued, natural philosophy could 
observe and experiment on nature, and learn something of its superficial behaviour. For 
‘by the favour of Experience and Revelation, [we] stand in a much clearer Light’.188 More 
differed on both fronts. The world, he argued, was largely open to rational inquiry 
(although More accepted the essences of substances may elude human faculties); and 
philosophical knowledge was often certain and demonstrative.189 On account of his 
different theological presuppositions, More’s natural philosophy was therefore both 
greater in scope than Boyle’s, and less circumspect in its findings. 
   Overlaying this foundational disagreement, More and Boyle became entangled in 
controversy about the correct use and interpretation of experimental knowledge.190 In 
1660, Boyle published New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, touching the Spring of the Air, 
prolixly describing the air-pump experiments he conducted for the Royal Society. The 
reports were intended as visual testimony, and steered clear of metaphysical speculation. 
Nonetheless, Boyle argued, the springiness of the air was experimentally verifiable. 
Further, as a matter of fact, this empirical doctrine required no further causal 
explanation. In his Collection, published two years later, More drew upon and elaborated 
Boyle’s experimental work. In one experiment, the air-pump receiver was evacuated, 
causing the valve on the receiver to close tighter. For Boyle, this was evidence against 
natural teleology. Nature, it seemed, was senseless and stupid – the air trying to re-enter 
the evacuated receiver (via the valve), sealed the valve tighter, which thwarted its own 
efforts. More agreed up to a point – for him, the experiment demonstrated the inertness 
of matter. However, he went further – too far in Boyle’s view – using the episode as 
evidence, not only of the passivity of matter, but also of a spiritual entity responsible for 
directing matter and affecting order. He called this immaterial entity the Spirit of Nature, 
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or the ‘Universal Soule of the World’.191 Its functions were not entirely coherent; More 
suggested it was responsible for both the maintenance of nature’s regularities, and 
instances where natural laws were broken, violated or repressed.192 Importantly, though, 
the existence of a governing immaterial principle was demonstrated, according to More, 
by the supposed inability of mechanism to fully explain most (or indeed any) natural 
phenomena.193 Thus, he said in Immortality, natural inquiries must see ‘how far in every thing 
the concatenation of Mechanical causes will reach’, after which, ‘from a distinct deprehension where they 
must needs break off, as not being able alone to reach the Effect, which necessarily leads them to a more 
confirmed discovery of the Principle…the Spirit of Nature’.194 Such an inquiry moved from the 
study of matter (natural philosophy) to the study of spirit (natural theology). It was also 
underpinned by the assumption that, because God was good, nature was governed by 
principles that reason could identify. Boyle, nevertheless, was unsatisfied with More’s 
method of demonstration. He admitted the existence or function of the Spirit of Nature 
could not be definitively ruled out – he even wished More ‘much success of proving the 
existence of an incorporeal substance’.195 But, for Boyle, the Spirit of Nature lacked 
positive empirical or experimental evidence. Nor was it necessary to account for the 
phenomena – everything More attributed to the Spirit of Nature could be explained by 
the air’s springiness. Thus, in A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature 
(1686), he said the idea of ‘nature being God’s vicegerent…is one of the main businesses 
of this discourse to call in question’.196 Positing nature as ‘a semi-deity or other strange 
kind of being’ had no place in natural philosophic discourse.197 
   As discussed, More’s necessitarianism established the type of knowledge attainable 
within natural philosophy – rational theories concerning the structure of creation. It had 
a similar effect on the remainder of his theological and religious thought. Calvin argued 
that man ‘cannot comprehend God’s incomprehensible wisdom, nor is it in our power to 
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investigate’.198 Conversely, More said the ‘Christian Religion [was] rational [i.e. 
comprehensible] throughout’.199 However, although necessitarian theology meant 
Christianity was reasonable, its reasonableness came in varying degrees of obviousness or 
clarity. Parts of the Bible were manifestly clear. Following the Restoration, high 
churchmen argued that, in order to stabilise the English Church, scriptural study and 
ecclesiastical history should be prioritised over natural philosophy/theology.200 Keen to 
appear moderate and conciliatory, More emphasised the importance of exegesis, arguing 
that ‘the Summe or Substance of whatever was considerable in any Religion’ was 
‘comprehended in the Gospel of Christ’.201 Pursuing this notion in Grounds of the Certainty 
of Faith, he said the Bible was ‘sufficiently plain to an unprejudiced Capacity in all Points 
necessary to Salvation’.202 Thus, ‘The Comprehension of these Points of Faith [was] 
always and every-where held by all Christian Churches from the Apostles time till now, and 
so plain by Testimony of Scripture, is most rightfully termed the Common or Catholick and 
Apostolick Faith’.203 
   However, More acknowledged that other parts of Holy Writ did not lend themselves 
so immediately or so obviously to human understanding. He addressed this issue in 
Mystery of Godliness, published just prior to the Restoration. The text incurred censure 
from Joseph Beaumont (1616-1699) – a leading conservative theologian in Cambridge – 
for applying natural philosophical and metaphysical learning to Christian doctrine.204 To 
show the general rationality of Christianity, More rehearsed several natural theological 
proofs for the existence of God (and other immaterial entities, like the soul and spirits), 
also found in earlier works, like An Antidote and Immortality. These proof were 
demonstrable – they followed logical pattern and procedure – but they were unlikely to 
be apprehended by everyone, especially without aid or inducement. More paid particular 
attention to versions of the ontological and teleological arguments. The former – which 
he approvingly attributed to Descartes – held that the idea of existence was implicit in 
the idea of an absolutely perfect being. Existence was clearly a more perfect state than 
non-existence, and thus it was contradictory for God – the most perfect being – to lack 
existence.205 The latter claimed that the order and purpose manifest in nature – from the 
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working of the eye, to the provision of animals and natural resources for man’s 
convenience – was indicative of a supervising rational principle.206 Such a principle could 
not derive from matter, which More said was inert and stupid. Purpose, reason or design 
therefore implied spiritual presence. More believed, quite conventionally, that God 
created matter, and was the cause of the variegated laws of motion.207 However, from 
Immortality onwards, he attributed many terrestrial phenomena to the Spirit of Nature, 
which he called ‘the great Quarter master-General of divine Providence’, and ‘the vicarious 
power of God upon…Matter’.208 
   Notwithstanding these demonstrations, there remained, More said in Mystery of 
Godliness, ‘considerable Obscurity and Abstrusenesse in Christian Religion’.209 Still, two factors 
mitigated this abstruseness. First, the obscurity of faith was functional. Mystery made 
Christianity venerable; it also prevented the impious from apprehending religious 
doctrine as fully as the pious. Further, those who overcame the challenge of religious 
mysteries would feel justly rewarded and gratified.210 Second, mystery did not render 
Christianity unintelligible. A doctrine might be difficult or obscure, but, with careful 
exegesis, its reasonableness became apparent. In this regard, More cited the Trinity, the 
divinity of Christ, and the non-sleep of the post-mortal soul.211 Though complex and 
difficult, these doctrines were scripturally verifiable (and not borrowed from pagan 
traditions), and compatible with reason. Thus, More ‘conceive[d] Christian Religion rational 
throughout’.212   
   Of course, these excursuses were an attempt to show how, or in what way, Christianity 
was rational. To explain why Christianity was rational, or from whence its rationality 
derived, More took a different approach. This question returns us to the implications of 
More’s necessitarianism. More confirmed the intelligibility or reasonableness of 
Christianity, arguing that it was ‘suited unto the nature and condition of things and the 
state of men upon earth’. Importantly, though, when talking about the ‘more Intelligible 
part of Christianity’, he associated ‘Reasonableness’ with being ‘worthy of the Divine 
Wisdome and Goodness’.213 In other words, Christian doctrine was reasonable insofar as 
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it was compatible with the idea that God was good. With this in mind, we can revisit 
More’s comments about the rationality of Christianity in Grounds of the Certainty of Faith. 
More said that because reason was responsible for validating the grounds for faith and for 
assenting to natural truths, Christianity itself must be reasonable and consonant with 
natural truths. However, it is clear, now, that the compatibility of natural truths and 
rational Christian doctrine – as well as our ability to know either of them – were 
consequences of God’s ‘Congruous and Rational’ providence, and ultimately, his 
goodness.214 In sum, the logical case for Christianity’s reasonableness, made in Grounds of 
the Certainty of Faith, reflected a state of affairs dictated by necessitarian assumptions. 
   As suggested above, the effect of necessitarianism on More’s natural philosophy and 
theology was profound, though fairly predictable. More’s other great theological 
assumption – his heterodox theories of the soul – exerted a subtler, but no less 
significant, influence. The two beliefs nevertheless worked in conjunction. Generally 
speaking, necessitarian principles guaranteed the knowableness and rationality of natural 
philosophy and theology. However, More’s account of the soul’s journeys between 
heaven and earth, and its attendant oscillations between animality and divinity, meant the 
power and efficacy of reason varied. These changes in the capacities of reason affected 
the potential and limitations of both natural philosophy and theology.  
   The role of reason, More argued in Mystery of Godliness, was to unravel,  
 
‘further clew[s] of Knowledge, enlarging her sphere of Intellectual light, by laying open to her self 
the close connexion and cohesion of the Conceptions she has of things, whereby inferring one 
thing from another she is able to deduce multifarious Conclusions as well for the pleasure of 
Speculation as the necessity of Practice’.215  
 
However, these capacities were contingent on the condition of the soul. The soul had a 
dual character. On the one hand, it fell from heaven due to excessive sensuality. On the 
other, it retained a trace of ineradicable divinity (which prevented it from descending 
further into more animalistic vehicles). Reason was hitched to these movements; it was 
the ‘Middle life or Facultie of the Soul’, situated ‘betwixt the Divine and Animal’ parts. When 
reason stuck to the ‘Middle life which is neither Animal nor Divine’, it was responsible for 
the development of natural philosophy, mathematics or rhetoric. However, it could also 
‘be swallowed down into the Animal life…her operations…tinctured with that life into 
which she is immers’d’, becoming an instrument to gain wealth and power, and satisfy 
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ambition.216 In this state of distraction, reason was liable to err in matters of knowledge 
and learning – ‘the voice of Reason & Nature’, More said in Immortality, is ‘subject to corruption’, 
and ‘may very well be defectuous or erroneous in some things’.217 
   Linked to this flexibility of purpose, reason was capable of generating different degrees 
of certainty. Provided reason and the senses were rightly circumstantiated, ordinary 
intellection furnished moral certainty. However, if reason was hitched to a divine or 
purified soul it transcended the confines of normal ratiocination, achieving higher, divine 
certainty. In large part, scholars have overlooked or underappreciated the implications of 
this double use of reason.218 However, as I will show, for More, the epistemic potential 
of both natural philosophy and theology hinged on the possibility of spirit enhancing 
reason. 
   The differences between ordinary and enhanced or illuminated reason were usefully 
fleshed out in Grounds of the certainty of Faith. Here, More’s comments are limited to the 
ways in which different grades of reason established different degrees of certitude in faith. 
Nevertheless, the principles affecting reason were not context-specific; the enhanced 
reason that conditioned faith was the same enhanced reason that conditioned natural 
philosophy and theology. According to More, ordinary reason, or intellection, assented 
to ‘Natural Truths, whether Common Notions or Scientificall Conclusions that are so 
palpably true that they perpetually appear so as well to the evil as the good’.219 This had 
two consequences. First, natural truths were ‘competible even to a carnal man or a man 
unregenerate’; and second, ordinary reason was universal. Ordinary reason was also 
responsible for validating the truth of scripture, a prerequisite for Christian belief. As 
such, everybody was capable of faith. The drawback of this common faculty, however, 
was that it was only capable of yielding ‘Moral and Human Certainty’.220 
   Nevertheless, this native faculty could be improved, and thus one’s certainty in faith 
could be increased. ‘There is a Divine Certainty of Faith’, More said: 
 
‘which besides the Grounds that the Moral or Humane Certainty hath, is supported 
and corroborated by the Spirit of Life in the new Birth, and by illuminated Reason. 
This is not to be argued, but to be felt…[and] this Divine Certainty has an higher 
Degree of Firmness and Assurance of the truth of the Holy Scriptures, as having 
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partaken of the same Spirit with our Saviour and the Apostles, but does not vary 
in the Truths held in the common Faith’.221  
 
Illuminated reason, or what More elsewhere called divine sagacity, made the grounds 
of faith more certain, without increasing the range of truths available through 
‘common Faith’. This spiritual faculty, unlike ordinary ratiocination, ‘was not to be 
argued, but to be felt’. 
   Activating this faculty involved purifying the soul. This, for More, meant reversing 
the effects of the Fall (conceived in Origenian terms), and prioritising the soul’s 
divine part over its sensual part. ‘Sensuality is alwayes an enemy to subtilty of reason’, 
he wrote in his collection of Philosophical Poems (1647), and ‘men of the most tam’d 
and castigate spirits are of the best and most profound judgement, because they can 
so easily withdraw themselves from the life and impulse of the lower spirits of this 
body’.222 Withdrawing from materiality cultivated habits of mind and action like 
humility, charity and purity, which gave rise to virtues like justice, temperance and 
fortitude. These traits, More claimed in Mystery of Godliness, were ‘in a supereminent 
manner comprehended in the Divine life’, and which, by ‘taking possession of the 
Middle life or Rational powers, must needs beget also in the Soul the truest ground of 
Prudence that may be’. Thus, he said, the ‘Divine life’ was ‘the Light and the Purification 
of the Eye of the Mind whereby Reason becomes truly illuminated in all Divine and 
Moral concernments’.223 In sum: eschewing sensuality and living virtuously – i.e. 
pursuing the divine life – unyoked reason from animality and tied it to the divine.  
    More’s notion of illuminated reason bore a great resemblance to the idea of right 
reason, regularly invoked by Christian Fathers and Renaissance humanists. Right 
reason was a form of philosophical consciousness that connected man to God. It 
was the faculty that sought after absolute truths, and its functionality required the 
fulfilment of ethical conditions; one must be good before one could know.224 
Illuminated reason, likewise, furnished greater certainty than ordinary intellection, but 
was only available to practitioners of the divine life. In keeping with latitudinarian 
views on human faculties prevalent during the Interregnum, (and in direct opposition 
to Calvinism), More, in Conjectura, explained that reasoning ‘is really a participation of 
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that divine reason in God, and is a true and faithful principle in man, when it is 
perfected and polished by the holy Spirit’.225 
   For More, then, reason and faith were complexly interrelated.226 In outline, the 
relationship went as follows: faith – which was based on scripture – was validated by 
reason; at the same time, reason was enhanced by faith and the divine life, which in turn, 
increased the certainty of faith. The import of this dynamic has been variously 
interpreted. David Pailin claims More used revelation to plug the gaps in religious 
knowledge, left open by reason. Although More set out myriad rational arguments for 
the existence of God and the soul, Pailin says he regarded reason as fundamentally 
inadequate in religious discourse.227 This holds inasmuch as More did not think religion 
sprang directly or entirely from reason. But Pailin is reductionist, suggesting that faith 
was an accumulation of knowledge, first rational, then scriptural. In fact, faith and reason 
interacted dialectically, both enhanced by their connection to the other. Sarah Hutton 
picked up on the subtlety (or circularity) of More’s insistence that faith was rational 
belief, and that faith enhanced reason. However, Hutton identifies the first step in this 
chain of reasoning – establishing the rationality of belief – with More’s natural theology, 
or rational proofs of God’s existence.228 Again, there is some truth in this; the rationality 
of faith is implied by the existence of natural theology. But, in Grounds of the certainty of 
Faith, More said that at the most basic level faith was propagated, not by natural 
theology, but by rational assent to the truth of scripture. Following this basic 
apprehension, reason and faith interacted in a sequence of developmental stages. Everybody, 
even the impious, had reason enough to be morally certain of the (biblical) grounds for 
faith. However, the faithful, by refraining from sensuality and living the divine life, 
surrendered their wills to God’s. As such, their reasoning faculties became illuminated, 
and, consequently, their certainty in the grounds of faith increased. 
   So much for the impact of illuminated reason on faith. More also argued that spiritual 
purification, and the attendant transformation of reason, affected the quality of 
theological and philosophical knowledge. In Mystery of Godliness, he said ‘Unrighteousness 
is encumbred with many distempers and impediments whereby even Natural knowledge, as 
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well as Divine Wisdome, is much hindred in a man’.229 The animal life cultivated epistemic 
fetters, affecting both natural philosophy and theology. Nevertheless, More contended, 
these fetters – anger, pride, ostentation, sensuality etc. – were eroded by what he called, 
‘soundness of the Soul’ – the result of the divine life.230 Put another way; ‘Righteousness 
and Holiness [the divine life] is the only true way to Divine Wisdome [theology] and a 
sound judgement in things [natural philosophy]’.231 
   In some ways, this process recalls Bacon’s endeavour to free the mind from the idols 
caused by the mind’s distempers. Just as, for Bacon, religion instilled charitableness that 
disposed people to natural inquiries; the divine life, according to More, ‘remove[s] Pride, 
Self-interest and Intemperance that clog the Body and cloud the Soul, [and] it is plain from 
hence, of what great advantage the Divine life is for the rectifying and ruling our 
Judgements and Understandings in all things’.232 Like Bacon, More’s remarks expose 
several shortcomings in Sorana Corneanu’s account of the regimens of the mind. 
Corneanu says that within the English experimental scene, the study of nature not only 
yielded truth, but also cultivated personal moral excellence.233 More was hardly a doyen 
of the experimental milieu. Nevertheless, like Bacon – the so-called father of 
experimentalism – his association of virtue and philosophy does not accord with 
Corneanu’s analysis. The regimen thesis says natural inquiry cultivates virtue. For More, 
however, virtue was a condition for good natural philosophy. By living well, or pursuing 
the divine life, the mind was freed from epistemic impediments and reason was 
illuminated. It was in these conditions, More argued, that philosophy prospered.  
   To understand exactly how the divine life affected philosophical and theological 
knowledge, we must look deeper into the ways that faith impacted on reason. Discussing 
biblical hermeneutics in Divine Dialogues, More (via his spokesperson, Philotheus) 
repudiated the use of ‘dry Reason unassisted by the Spirit’.234 Pressed for details, Philotheus 
described spirit in a manner that recalled More’s account of illuminated reason in Grounds 
of the certainty of Faith. Philotheus called it,  
 
‘the Spirit of Life in the new Birth, which is a discerning Spirit, and makes a man of 
a quick understanding in the fear of the Lord…[and] In the guidance of this Spirit a 
man shall either immediately feel and smell out by an holy Sagacity what is right 
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and true, and what false and perverse, or at least he shall use his Reason aright to 
discover it’.235  
 
This passage draws out a crucial distinction; the purification of spirit effected reason on 
two fronts. First, it forged an ineffable but felt connection with God – enabling one to 
‘immediately feel and smell out’ the truth – and second, it enhanced normal, discursive 
reason – allowing one to ‘Reason aright’. 
   The difference is fundamental. More only invoked the “felt” or intuitive variety of 
illuminated reason in relation to the truth of the Bible. Its effect was to intensify one’s 
certainty in a known truth (that the Bible was the real word of God). The enhancement 
of discursive reason, however, had a different function, and wider application. Man’s 
ordinary rational facilities were capable of assenting to natural truths and common 
notions. Enhancing these facilities (which was not the same as introducing a new type of 
intuition) enabled the mind to go beyond common notions, and apprehend what, in the 
‘General Preface’ to Collection, he called ‘Theories of the greatest importance’. These were 
doctrines like the Spirit of Nature, or pre-existence. In short, an enhanced intellective 
faculty opened the mind to new truths and greater comprehension (philosophical and 
theological). This state was ‘antecedaneous’ to reason, insofar as it set the foundation for 
good reasoning, and was a condition for ‘intellectual success’.236 Note, however, that this 
second type of illuminated reason could not generate the same certainty as “felt” reason. 
After all, doctrines like pre-existence and the Spirit of Nature were clear and intelligible 
rather than doubtlessly true. 
   The intellectual successes wrought by enhanced intellection were both philosophical 
and theological. Of the former, More said: 
 
‘I should commend to them that would successfully philosophize…a certain Principle more 
noble and inward then Reason it self, and without which Reason will faulter, or at least reach 
but to mean and frivolous things…I should adventure to term it Divine Sagacity, which is 
the first Rise of successful Reason, especially in matters of great comprehension and moment, 
and without which a man is as it were in a thick wood’.237 
 
This passage sums up More’s attitude to enhanced intellection, albeit obliquely. When 
un-illuminated and tied to animality, ‘Reason will faulter’ – concerned only with enrichment 
and ostentation. Conversely, reason enhanced by faith produces ‘Divine Sagacity’, and 
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this ‘first Rise of successful Reason’ granted access to greater philosophical truths. The main 
point of difference between enhanced reason (as it pertained to philosophy), and “felt” 
intuition (that effected faith) was that the former did not simply intensify one’s 
conviction in old truths (like faith); it enabled the mind to go beyond ‘mean and frivolous 
things’, and discover new truths. 
   Theology was similarly affected by illuminated reason. In Mystery of Godliness, More said 
‘the Soul of man in its unrighteous and polluted condition, does very unadvisedly with so 
much curiosity and anxious labour to endeavour the discoveries of divine Truths’. 
Instead, ‘she [the soul] ought to commit her self first to the skill of a faithfull Physitian, 
to Christ, who is the healer of the Souls of men as well as he was of their Bodies, and so 
to be re-estated again into that state of health and soundness’. Only a healthy or purified 
soul would apprehend divine truths. For ‘if the Soul receive no impresse from God, it 
discovers nothing of God’, and ‘unless the Image of God be in us, which is Righteousness and 
true Holiness, we know nothing of the Nature of God, and so consequently can conclude 
nothing concerning him to any purpose’.238 Divine truths were only accessible to 
righteous souls – souls that sought out and amplified the image of God residing within 
them. Thus, enhanced reason did not simply make divine truths more certain; it 
facilitated their comprehension or discovery.  
   This returns us to More’s remarks about the simultaneous obscurity and intelligibility 
of Christianity. Although some parts of Christianity appeared unintelligible, under close 
and careful inspection their reasonableness became apparent. This distinction, we can 
now see, refers to the different states of man’s soul and reason. Christian doctrine was 
opaque to the unrighteous. However, it was much clearer and more intelligible to 
followers of the divine life.239 More made this argument explicitly regarding obscure 
biblical passages. In Grounds of the certainty of Faith, he said ‘None of the Holy Writ is of it 
self unintelligible’, but ‘as mens spirits shall be prepared, and the time sutable’, God will 
‘impart farther and farther Light to the Souls of the Faithfull, for a fuller and a more 
general understanding the obscurest Passages in the Divine Oracles’.240 Abstruse 
passages, in other words, were comprehended by illuminated reason.   
   Nevertheless, many aspects of God’s will and providence still seemed beyond human 
apprehension. This posed problems for, or at least placed limitations on, the tenability of 
More’s necessitarianism. For if God’s goodness guaranteed the rationality and 
                                                
238 More, Grand Mystery of Godliness, p. 403. 
239 See Hoopes, Right Reason, p. 181. 
240 More, Divine Dialogues, II, p. 485. 
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intelligibility of his actions and creations, why could man, who possessed reason, not 
make sense of them? In Divine Dialogues, More debated the compatibility, or otherwise, of 
God’s omniscience and man’s free will. He adduced several arguments to demonstrate 
the non-contradiction between man’s freedom and God’s power and prescience. Still, he 
concluded, ‘though it may safely be said, that he [God] does not know any thing that 
really implies a Contradiction to be known [such as, between free will and 
foreknowledge]; yet we are not assured but that may seem a Contradiction to us that is 
not so really in it self’.241 In short, man may perceive a contradiction merely because our 
understanding was incapable of seeing otherwise. It followed, therefore, that ‘a certain 
and infallible Prescience of uncertain Futurities, that seems inconsistent to us, may 
notwithstanding be deprehended abundantly consistent by the all-comprehensive 
Understanding of God’.242 What man’s finite understanding regarded as unintelligible 
might be entirely perspicacious to God’s infinite mind. More therefore conceded that his 
arguments for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom were 
‘spoken by way of Essay rather then of Dogmatizing’.243 He never doubted their 
compatibility, but our limited capacity to understand meant, to some degree, the mystery 
remained opaque. To this extent, he agreed with Boyle, who, referring to an array of 
metaphysical and theological propositions in The Christian Virtuoso, said our ‘Intellects are 
but dim and imperfect, and indeed disproportionate to the sublimest and mysterious 
Truths’, and therefore ‘they cannot perfectly comprehend them’.244 
   However, later in the Dialogues, More moved away from Boyle, hinting that the opacity 
of various Christian dogmas or mysteries could be overcome if man’s soul was rightly 
disposed. Addressing the tension between God’s providential goodness and the existence 
of evil, More said that ‘what-ever designed or permitted Evil there seems in Providence, 
it is for a far greater good, and therefore is not properly in the summary compute of the 
whole affairs of the Universe to be reputed evil the loss in particulars being so vast a gain 
to the Whole’.245 In other words, though we perceive parochial instances of evil, they fit 
into, and are a necessary part of, a broader framework of good. This was a classic 
Augustinian assumption, and not a novel solution to the problem of sin. However, More 
said, man’s general failure to acknowledge the discrepancy between human perception 
and the nature of reality revealed much about the state of man’s soul. It was ‘our 
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Ignorance…of the true Law of Goodness (who are so much immersed into the Life of 
Selfishness, which is that low Life of Plants and Animals) that makes us incompetent 
judges of what is or is not carried on according to the Law of that Love or Goodness which 
is truly Divine’.246 The animal life freighted reason with inhibitions or preoccupations, 
rendering it incapable of discerning the goodness in providence. Consequently, it would 
seem, once unshackled from ‘the life of Selfishness’ and refined by righteousness, the soul 
would be able to understand and accept the mysterious workings of God’s providence. 
More said as much in Mystery of Godliness, when he described the divine life as ‘the truest 
Key to the Mystery of Christianity’.247 The epistemic benefit wrought by faith and 
righteousness was so certain, he said, that ‘What the Rectitude of an Angle does in 
Mathematical measurings, the same will this Uprightness of Spirit doe in Theological 
Conclusions’.248 
   So, without forfeiting his belief that God and creation were rational, More 
acknowledged that parts of the world and providence were unintelligible. More’s 
necessitarianism and doctrines of the soul thus worked in conjunction to establish the 
scope and potential of both natural philosophy and theology. The former determined the 
character and nature of both disciplines, the latter qualified man’s ability to know or 
understand them. Consequently, and in sum: certainty, truth and confusion – 
philosophical or theological – were defined by the parameters for knowledge set by 
More’s theological assumptions. 
   This, finally, suggests another possible reason for More’s reluctance to assert the truth 
(and not merely the reasonableness) of particular doctrines, like the Spirit of Nature, or 
pre-existence. The Apology made clear More’s deference to Restoration Church authority. 
But reticence was to be expected, given that, despite his best efforts at holiness, More 
was still a terrestrially inhabited soul, capable of truth but also error.249 So ingrained was 
More’s circumspection, he said that proofs of God’s existence were not absolutely and 
universally reliable. Still, his scepticism ought not to be overstated. When discussing the 
pre-existence ‘Hypothesis’ in Immortality, he felt bold enough to assert that, ‘we are 
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247 More, Grand Mystery of Godliness, p. 55. 
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249 The notion that terrestrially-bound souls were liable to err, and that they should not assert the truth 
(rather than just the rationality) of doctrines like the pre-existence of the soul, was itself a position 
wrought, somewhat circularly, from More’s actual commitment the doctrine of the soul’s pre-existence.  
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according to the Light of Nature undoubtedly to conclude, that the Soules of Men doe 
præexist’.250 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In seventeenth-century England, More – a fairly unorthodox Platonic-Origenist 
clergyman – envisaged as tight a connection between natural philosophy and theology as 
anyone. Although it was the highest discipline, theology was incapable of acquiring the 
same level of certainty as faith. Philosophy was therefore drafted in to strengthen its 
credibility and certainty, protecting theology from rational rebuttal, atheistic or 
theological. In large part, More did this by demonstrating how natural theology grew 
inevitably out of the study of matter and mechanism: topoi of natural philosophy. Both 
disciplines were governed by reason, and, to a degree, they shared subject matter – the 
workings/failings of mechanism, and the role of God in nature. This disciplinary 
continuity meant that philosophy/the dictates of reason, and theology or scripture were 
entirely compatible. Moreover, their disciplinary compatibility derived from their 
apparent one-time unification in an ancient cabalistic doctrine, stretching back to Moses.  
   This reveals two important things about More and the seventeenth century. First, his 
interest in prisca theologia shows that, although he engaged in contemporary philosophical 
debate – with Descartes, Hobbes and Boyle – his own interventions were guided by 
(what he took to be) ancient wisdom. Like White, More demonstrates that early modern 
philosophy was often rooted in older systems of thought, and attempted to integrate new 
discoveries or doctrines into past systems. Second, though he recognised the ingenuity of 
natural philosophy – particularly Descartes’s – More held that, conceptually, it had never 
existed, and could never exist, independently of theology. In its original incarnation, 
philosophy shared a textual foundation with theology, and in its current mechanistic 
guise, it relied on theological or theistic principles – incorporeality or the Spirit of Nature 
– to account for natural phenomena.  
   The closeness of natural philosophy and theology was a critical part of More’s 
campaign against atheism and Calvinist theology. He regarded Calvinist theories of grace 
as unjust and immoral. Thus, he embraced a necessitarian view of providence, and 
Origenian doctrines of the soul, both of which expressed, or followed from, the notion 
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that God was good and thus acted within rational bounds. From these premises, More 
drew the remainder of his philosophical and theological ideas. His philosophy was 
therefore more than God-orientated.251 Fundamentally, it was shaped by, and in turn 
corroborated, his intricate and unorthodox theological presuppositions. Necessitarianism, 
for example, ensured natural philosophy and theology were rational and largely knowable 
disciplines. In addition, More’s theories of the soul established the role and scope of 
man’s reason, which set limits for knowledge, and suggested ways to expand those limits. 
The idea that reason could be elevated by faith and spiritual purification informed More’s 
apologetic agenda and epistemic outlook. Faith, he argued, was a rational belief in the 
truth of Christianity, based on the prophetic accuracy of the Bible. Having faith and 
living a divine life enhanced or enriched reason. This not only strengthened one’s 
(rational) faith (in the Bible), it also opened the mind to greater and more complex 
truths, philosophical and theological. More’s historical significance therefore extends 
beyond the fact that he draws attention to the presence of Platonism in seventeenth-
century English thought. He also, and more specifically, demonstrates the way (broadly) 
Platonic assumptions – ontological and epistemic – structured disciplines (specifically, 
natural philosophy and theology) and disciplinary boundaries.  
   More and the Platonists in Cambridge influenced John Locke, particularly on the 
subject of rational and inclusive religion. However, Locke was somewhat less optimistic 
about man’s cognitive potential. Natural philosophy was not a science, he said, because 
sense and reason were unable to observe and understand the inner workings of nature. 
Initially, at least, he was confident that, because theological propositions were as 
demonstrable mathematical propositions, theology was a knowable discipline. However, 
he later tempered this view, arguing that complex theological deductions were beyond 
the capacities of most people, and therefore that theology was a system of belief, not 
knowledge. Nevertheless, he said, biblical truths were more certain than claims about 
nature. Therefore, in a similar vein to More, Locke claimed theology had the right to 
govern natural philosophy.
                                                
251 As Peter Dear notes, because the philosophy-as-piety dynamic could be played out in myriad ways, 
Cunningham’s model only reveals part of the story. See Peter Dear, ‘Religion, science and natural 
philosophy: Thoughts on Cunningham’s thesis’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32 (2001), 377-86. 
Cunningham replied to Dear, in Andrew Cunningham, ‘A Reply to Peter Dear’s ‘Religion, science and 
natural philosophy: Thoughts on Cunningham’s thesis’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 32 (2001), 
387-91. 
 178 
John Locke 
 
 
 
I .  Disc ip l ines  and Genre  
 
John Locke is famously associated with two important seventeenth-century traditions – 
both linked to the scope or reach of human cognition. First, in An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding (1689), he defended experimental natural philosophy – philosophy that 
produced probable, not certain, accounts of the natural world.1 And second, following 
the work of divines in Tew – the residence of the Viscount Falkland – and Cambridge, 
he wrote A Letter concerning Toleration (1689), analysing the relationship between reason 
and faith; justifying toleration from both epistemic and socio-political perspectives.2 In 
sum, Locke thought deeply about man’s ability to understand natural and religious 
subjects. However, on top of this, and as this chapter will demonstrate, he was also 
interested in various types of theological knowledge, and how they related to 
philosophical ideas and practices. 
   The literature on Locke’s religion and theology is preoccupied with the origin and 
development of his thought, rather than the way he organised his ideas – into, say, 
disciplines. However, this scholarship rightly places theology at the heart of Locke’s 
thinking. It is (broadly) comprised of three groups. The first group is interested in the 
conceptual foundations of Locke’s thought. John Dunn, for example, says Locke’s 
philosophy – although Dunn is most interested in Locke’s political arguments in the Two 
Treatises (1689) – relies on theological premises.3 So, whenever Locke talks about 
obligation, property or toleration, he is also talking about God and providence.4 For 
Dunn, this debarred Locke from modern, secular political debates. Jeremy Waldron also 
                                                
1 Experimental, probabilistic natural philosophy was strongly associated with Royal Society virtuosi like 
Robert Boyle. See Steven Shapin, ‘Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology’, Social 
Studies of Science, 14 (1984), 481-520; Barbara J. Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: 
a study of the relationships between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature, (Princeton, 1983), ch. 2. 
2 See John Marshall, ‘John Locke and Latitudinarianism’, in Richard Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, Perez Zagorin 
(eds.), Philosophy, Science and Religion in England, 1640-1700, (Cambridge, 1992), 253-82. 
3 John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: an historical account of the argument of the ‘Two Treatises of 
Government’, (Cambridge, 1969), pp. xi-xii.  
4 John Dunn, ‘What’s Living and What’s Dead in the Political Thought of John Locke’, in Interpreting 
Political Responsibility: essays 1981-1989, (Oxford, 1990), 9-25, pp. 14-20. 
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claims Locke’s philosophy is unsustainable without a theological basis. However, he 
rejects Dunn’s corollary that Locke is irrelevant to contemporary philosophy. On the 
contrary, Waldron argues, the case for equality – now and in the seventeenth century – is 
only coherent if based on theological assumptions.5 
   It is now widely accepted that Locke’s philosophy had theological underpinnings. 
Without challenging this idea, a second group of scholars has focused their attention on 
the apparently rational character of Locke’s religion and theology. Much has been written 
on Locke’s natural theology, or arguments for God’s existence derived from reason and 
experience.6 It is also noted that, in Locke’s view, reason was responsible for confirming 
the divinity of scripture. Michael Ayers construes this as reason subordinating revelation,7 
while Nicholas Jolley claims it was Locke’s way of defending reason against religious 
enthusiasts.8 
   A third group of scholars has sought to ascertain Locke’s denominational loyalties. 
This is a tricky task given the political landscape in seventeenth-century England. In 
1662, the Act of Uniformity prescribed the Book of Common Prayer and established 
sanctions for dissenters. The Toleration Act (1689) subsequently withdrew these 
penalties, but only for Trinitarian Protestants.9 These pressures encouraged cautious 
authors to dissimulate or remain silent.10 Consequently, scholars looking for evidence of 
Locke’s anti-Trinitarianism turn to his unpublished copybooks and notebooks, as well as 
his friendships and book collections. According to John Marshall, Locke’s childhood 
Calvinism gave way to Unitarianism – quite possibly Socinianism – following his exile in 
Holland (from 1683).11 However, Marshall also links Locke to so-called latitudinarian 
divines like Benjamin Whichcote, John Tillotson, and Isaac Barrow (1630-1677).12 Using 
largely the same sources, Victor Nuovo argues that Locke’s views on the Fall and the 
soul suggest he was actually an Arminian or an Arian.13  
                                                
5 Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke’s Political Thought, (Cambridge, 
2002), pp. 13-14.  
6 G.A.J. Rogers, ‘John Locke: Conservative Radical’, in Roger D. Lund (ed.), The Margins of Orthodoxy: 
Heterodox Writing and Cultural Responses, 1660-1750, (Cambridge, 1995), 97-116, pp. 100-2. 
7 Michael Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, (2 vols. London, 1991), I, pp. 121-2. 
8 Nicholas Jolley, ‘Reason’s Dim Candle: Locke’s Critique of Enthusiasm’, in Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The 
Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives, (London, 2003), 179-91.  
9 John Colley, Persecution and Toleration in Protestant England 1558-1689, (Harlow, 2000), p. 199. 
10 See John Marshall, ‘Locke, Socinianism, “Socinianism”, and Unitarianism’, in M.A. Stewart (ed.), English 
Philosophy in the Age of Locke, (Oxford, 2000), 111-82, pp. 179-80. 
11 Ibid. See also John Marshall, John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility, (Cambridge, 1994).  
12 Marshall, ‘John Locke and Latitudinarianism’.  
13 Victor Nuovo, ‘Locke’s Theology. 1694-1704’, in M.A. Stewart (ed.), English Philosophy in the Age of Locke, 
(Oxford, 2000), 183-215; Victor Nuovo, ‘Locke’s Christology as a Key to Understanding his Philosophy’, 
Peter R. Anstey (ed.), The Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives, (London, 2003), 129-53.  
 180 
   These debates are all fairly familiar, and I will draw upon elements of this scholarship 
in what follows. In particular, I accept and will elaborate the idea that theology informed 
other areas of Locke’s thought, and was in, in some sense, rational.14 Nevertheless, this 
scholarship has limitations: it only really addresses the relationship between Locke’s 
politics and his theology, and regards the latter as important only insofar as it explains, or 
is explained by, the former.15 Other disciplines – natural philosophy, for example – rarely 
enter the picture. Reversing this trend, this chapter will look at Locke’s theology in its 
own right, and explore its relationship with natural philosophy. Crucially, where past 
scholarship has focused on the formation of Locke’s argumentation, I will concentrate 
on its structure. Consequently, this chapter is less about the influences affecting Locke’s 
thought, and more about his attempts to manage and order his ideas and arguments. As 
such, it focuses on the mechanisms by which Locke intended to legitimise and connect 
disparate bodies of natural and divine knowledge; in short, it is about disciplines.  
   Disciplines were important to Locke, and he thought deeply about the ways they 
structured knowledge. Their utility was apparent in Thoughts concerning Education (1693), 
where Locke associated education with the acquisition of virtue.16  For the most part, 
Thoughts recommends different texts for instruction in different areas of learning. This 
highlights the pedagogical function of disciplines – turning knowledge into learnable 
parcels – but also demonstrates their composite nature, associating each discipline with 
different texts, doctrines, authors and practices. Disciplinary hierarchy was also 
significant for Locke. Thus, in Of the Conduct of the Understanding – written as an additional 
final chapter for the Essay in 1697, but published posthumously in 1706 – Locke gave 
theology top billing.17 Nevertheless, he pointedly upended traditional scholastic 
disciplinary conventions. For example, in keeping with many of his contemporaries, he 
eschewed commentary and logical textbook genres when writing about the 
understanding.18 Moreover, he identified natural philosophy, ethics and semiotics as the 
                                                
14 Here, the historiographical issue of least importance is Locke’s preferred religious denomination. This 
remains a live and interesting debate, but whether or not Locke can be tied to a particular sect on account 
of allusive theological remarks has little bearing on how he established and ordered certain disciplines. 
15 The paradigmatic case is Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke. Ian Harris, ‘The Politics of Christianity’, 
in G.A.J. Rogers (ed.), Locke’s Philosophy: Content and Context, (Oxford, 1994), 197-215, gives an ingenious, 
but not entirely convincing account of how Locke’s politics informed his theology. And Nuovo suggests 
that Locke’s philosophy can only be understood in light of his peculiar Christology. See ‘Locke’s 
Christology as a Key to Understanding his Philosophy’. 
16 John W. and Jean S. Yolton, ‘Introduction’, in John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, edited with 
introduction, notes and critical apparatus by John W. and Jean S. Yolton, (Oxford, 1989), 1-75, p. 28. 
17 Locke, Conduct, pp. 66-7. 
18 Richard Serjeantson, ‘“Human Understanding” and the Genre of Locke’s Essay’, Intellectual History Review, 
18 (2008), 157-71, pp. 162-8. 
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‘three great Provinces of the intellectual World’, echoing the neo-Stoic tradition, which 
divided philosophy into logic, physics and ethics.19 
   The disciplinary focus of this chapter puts me in close connection with another, fourth 
strand of historiography – scholars interested in textual identity, and the genre of the 
Essay in particular. The Essay is commonly regarded as a work of epistemology; it is, after 
all, a book about knowledge, certainty, belief and probability.20 Less anachronistically, 
Nuovo says the Essay is an example of natural theology, noting the prominent 
discussions of God’s existence, our duties to God, moral law, and divine promises.21 A 
third interpretation, put forward by Richard Serjeantson, posits the Essay as a treatise on 
semiotics.22 In keeping with his medical training, Locke was interested in the elaboration 
of signs – the third part of his tripartite division of the sciences. The Essay, Serjeantson 
argues, is a book about ideas and words: the signs of the understanding. These re-
evaluations of the Essay’s genre have important scholarly consequences; encouraging us, 
for example, to rethink the history of epistemology (in which Locke is usually a key 
figure). 
   Taking heed of this literature, I too will analyse Locke’s arguments, methods and 
concepts by locating them within disciplinary distinctions. However, I part company with 
these scholars on two fronts. First, although it can be useful to establish the disciplinary 
register of individual texts (as conceived by Locke), in some ways it risks concealing as 
much as it reveals. By its fourth edition, the Essay was over 700 pages long, and, as Locke 
confessed, was ‘written by incoherent parcels; and, after long intervals of neglect, resum’d again’. Such 
a ‘discontinued way of writing’ was likely to produce work that spanned various topics and 
engaged with different disciplines.23 The Essay, then, contains bits of natural theology (as 
noted by Nuovo), is overwhelmingly concerned with ideas and language (as argued by 
Serjeantson), and, despite Locke’s intentions to the contrary, flirts with natural 
                                                
19 Locke, Essay, p. 721; Serjeantson, ‘“Human Understanding” and the Genre of Locke’s Essay’, p. 170; 
Jeremiah Hackett, ‘Roger Bacon on the Classification of the Sciences’, in Jeremiah Hackett (ed.), Roger 
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20 See Ayers, Locke, I. 
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Understanding his Philosophy’, pp. 130, 140-2; Victor Nuovo, ‘Introduction’, in Victor Nuovo (ed.) John 
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of epistemology. See Lisa Downing, ‘The Status of Mechanism in Locke’s Essay’, The Philosophical Review, 
107 (1998), 381-414, pp. 382, 414. 
23 Locke, Essay, ‘The Epistle to the Reader’, p. 7. 
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philosophy.24 So, rather than trying to assign the Essay a disciplinary identity, I will use 
the text to discuss Locke’s views on a number of disciplines. Second, and following from 
this, I am interested in how Locke conceptualised disciplines across his works. 
Therefore, I will canvass Locke’s entire corpus, and not just focus on the disciplinary 
genre of a single text. 
   This chapter unpacks Locke’s formulations of natural philosophy and theology, and 
analyses how they interacted in light of their respective (and various) origins, subject 
matter and methods. Importantly, it will chart the changes in this relationship, brought 
about by Locke’s re-evaluation of the viability of natural theological knowledge. Some 
scholars only study Locke’s theology as a way to explicate his politics.25 Locke’s nuanced 
theological sub-categorisations are therefore overlooked, and his variegated account of 
theology’s relationship with natural philosophy is missed or oversimplified. In different 
texts, Locke encapsulated two popular seventeenth-century approaches to the 
disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy and theology. First, he argued in the 
Essay that the methods and subject of natural philosophy was an ideal conduit to 
theological knowledge. And second, in the Reasonableness of Christianity (1695), he said 
theology was based on faith (not knowledge), and that reason rarely approached divine 
understanding. Nevertheless, theology remained a more certain and reliable discipline 
than natural philosophy. Locke therefore provides evidence that, into the eighteenth 
century, and even among philosophical reformers, theology was still considered the 
highest, most authoritative, discipline.  
   The remainder of this chapter is split into five sections. First, I set out the basic 
content and structure of both disciplines. Most importantly, I argue, Locke’s theology 
was constituted by three sub-disciplines: natural theology, biblical theology, and (less 
importantly for this chapter) speculative doctrine. Second, I explore Locke’s natural 
theology, set out in the Essay. Natural theology was a type of knowledge; produced by 
the association of clear and real ideas. To clarify Locke’s arguments, I rehearse his 
ideational theory of cognition, showing how natural philosophical knowledge led to 
theological understanding. The third section demonstrates how, in the 1690s, Locke 
revised his view of theology and its relationship with natural philosophy. His theory of 
cognition did not change, but Locke began doubting man’s ability to reliably formulate 
and combine ideas that demonstrated the existence of God or the content of morality. 
                                                
24 Although, as Peter Anstey notes, the overarching aims of the Essay were not natural philosophical in 
character. See Peter R. Anstey, John Locke and Natural Philosophy, (Oxford, 2011), pp. 20-2. 
25 Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke; Harris, ‘The Politics of Christianity’. 
 183 
Consequently, in the Reasonableness, he de-emphasised natural theology and began 
stressing the importance of biblical theology. This scriptural sub-discipline was 
conceptually and epistemologically distinct from natural philosophy, a distinction that 
was partly attributable to the difference between reason and faith. However, as I argue in 
the fourth section, reason had a dual definition, and, for Locke, belief was merely a type 
of rational assent or persuasion. Moreover, he claimed, this persuasion was so secure that 
scriptural faith took precedence over probable knowledge. Finally, I tease out the 
consequences of this dynamic, arguing that, although Locke’s updated version of 
theology-as-scriptural-faith was uprooted from (probabilistic) natural philosophy, it still 
had the authority to govern it. 
 
 
II .  Natural  phi losophy and tr ipart i t e  theo logy  
 
In this section, I will sketch Locke’s conceptualisation of natural philosophy, and its 
limitations. Afterwards, I will turn to Locke’s tripartite theology. Each theological 
substratum operated independently of the others, but over time Locke changed their 
order of priority.26 
   The final chapter of the Essay contains Locke’s first printed definition of natural 
philosophy – the study of substances. It was, he said, ‘The Knowledge of Things, as they 
are in their own proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations’. This 
included, ‘not only Matter, and Body, but Spirits also, which have their proper Natures, 
Constitutions, and Operations as well as Bodies’. By this catholic definition – or 
‘enlarged Sense of the Word’ – natural philosophy dealt in ‘bare speculative 
Truth…whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or any of their 
Affectations’.27 Locke reiterated this set-up in Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Again, 
he claimed that ‘Natural Philosophy being the Knowledge of the Principles, Properties, and 
Operations of Things, as they are in themselves, I imagine there are Two Parts of it, one 
comprehending Spirits with their Nature and Qualities; and the other Bodies’. The former, 
which Locke called metaphysics, ‘ought to go before the study of Matter, and Body, not 
as a Science that can be methodized into a System, and treated of upon Principles of 
                                                
26 In some ways, this image of theological layers and foundations resembles Locke’s imagery of an ‘Under-
Labourer…clearing Ground a little’, see Essay, ‘Epistle to the Reader’, p. 10. Both features of Locke’s work 
advertise his position as someone capable of disinterring fundamental aspects of knowledge.  
27 Ibid., p. 720. 
 184 
Knowledge; but as an enlargement of our Minds towards a truer and fuller 
comprehension of the intellectual World, to which we are led both by Reason and 
Revelation’. However, he continued: 
 
‘since the clearest and largest Discoveries we have of other Spirits, besides God, 
and our own Souls, is imparted to us from Heaven, by Revelation; I think the 
Information, that at least young people should have of them, should be taken 
from that Revelation…by reading of it constantly, there would be instilled into 
the Minds of Children, a notion and belief of Spirits…which will be a good 
Preparation to the study of Bodies. For without the notion and allowance of 
Spirits, our Philosophy will be lame and defective in one main Part of it’.28 
 
Substances were apprehended (in natural philosophy) via their observable qualities and 
operations. This included spiritual as well as physical substances, and, as such, 
metaphysics was assimilated into natural philosophy. However, Locke worried that a 
child’s constant and inevitable exposure to the properties and behaviour of matter would 
undermine their ability to reflect clearly and fairly on the nature of spirit. So, to avoid a 
materialist bias, natural philosophical education must begin with scriptural studies of 
spirit. That is not to say that natural philosophy had a textual foundation: the 
understanding relied on ideas garnered by sensory experience, subsequently combined 
and compared by reason. But, for Locke, prior understanding of spirit facilitated this 
cognitive process.   
   Still, he continued, no matter how well disposed the mind was to natural philosophy, 
‘we never shall be able to make a Science of it. The Works of Nature are contrived by a 
Wisdom, and operate by ways too far surpassing our Faculties to discover, or Capacities 
to conceive’.29 In compressed form, this passage signals a departure from scholastic 
disciplinary convention. Many schoolmen treated natural philosophy as demonstrative, 
and man’s faculties as capable of dissecting nature.30 Locke doubted the latter point, and 
consequently repudiated the former. His alternative account of cognition went as 
follows: knowledge is based on ideas; ideas derive from sensory experience; the inner 
recesses of nature are beyond the reach of man’s perceptive faculties; as such, the mind 
either lacks ideas, or has unclear and incomplete ones. This precludes the possibility of 
knowledge; and, in particular, limits man to a partial understanding of substance. 
                                                
28 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, edited with introduction, notes and critical apparatus by 
John W. and Jean S. Yolton, (Oxford, 1989), p. 245. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Eckhard Kessler, ‘Metaphysics or Empirical Science? The Two Faces of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy 
in the Sixteenth Century’, in Marianne Pade (ed.), Renaissance Readings of the Corpus Aristotelicum, 
(Copenhagen, 2001), 79-101, pp. 79-81; Lohr, ‘Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy’, pp. 280-3.  
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   Locke expressed this partiality by distinguishing a substance’s real essence from its 
nominal essence. The former, he explained in the Essay, was ‘the unknown Constitution 
of Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend’; the latter was the set of 
‘abstract Ideas, to which we have annexed those Names’ of substances.31 Real essences, in 
other words, were the physical, causal basis for a substance’s perceptible qualities, 
(distinguishable from substance or substratum, which acted as the logical foundation for 
bodily and spiritual substances and their qualities).32 Nominal essences, on the other 
hand, were the complex ideas formed by the cluster of recurring secondary qualities 
observed in bodies. In the case of, say, gold, this would be some combination of yellow, 
hardness, ductility etc. 
   When Locke said nature ‘operate[s] by ways too far surpassing our Faculties to 
discover, or Capacities to conceive’, he meant that man lacked the sensory equipment 
needed to grasp real essences. The mind perceived various substantial properties, which 
formed part of a substance’s nominal essence. But ‘being ignorant of the real Essence it 
self, it is impossible to know all those Properties, that flow from it’.33 Moreover, ‘whilst 
we are destitute of Sense acute enough, to discover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to 
give us Ideas of their mechanical Affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their 
properties and ways of Operation’.34 ‘All we can do’, Locke said, ‘is to collect such a 
number of simple Ideas, as by Examination, we find to be united together in Things 
existing, and thereof to make one complex Idea’.35  
   In short, the number and nature of a substance’s properties remained a mystery. Our 
ignorance of real essences meant the human understanding was incapable of deducing 
which, and how many qualities were associated with different substances: a substance’s 
nominal essence was therefore only knowable by contingent empirical observation.36 
                                                
31 Locke, Essay, p. 417. 
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33 Locke, Essay, p. 449. 
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   Thus, according to some commentators, Lockean nominal essences were arbitrary.37 
Locke conceded that, regarding nominal essences, ‘Experience must teach me, what Reason 
cannot’.38 Consequently, the ideas constituting a nominal essence varied, depending on 
the experience, knowledge and capacities of the perceiver. However, the properties 
responsible for the cluster of ideas constituting a nominal essence flowed from the 
substance’s unknown, but ontologically constant, real essence. Nominal essences 
therefore corresponded with a substance’s properties, which, though only perceived 
selectively, were rooted and united in nature.39 As Locke said: ‘Causes work steadily, and 
Effects constantly flow from them’.40 Nominal essences were effects caused by real 
essences: though conventional or contingent, they were not arbitrary.  
   Nevertheless, this level of substance scepticism placed limitations on natural 
philosophy.41 Medieval Aristotelian natural philosophy and metaphysics were structured 
bodies of knowledge, which, via logical demonstration, yielded true and certain 
conclusions.42 Rejecting this model, Locke said the ‘want of a discoverable Connection 
between those Ideas [of, say, real and nominal essences]…[meant] we are utterly 
uncapable of universal or certain Knowledge’.43 The relationship between a substance’s 
inner constitution and visible properties owed ‘to nothing else, but the arbitrary 
Determination of that All-wise Agent’.44 Consequently, the only ‘way of getting, and 
improving our Knowledge in Substances’, is by ‘Experience and History’.45 Observation and 
experimentation would bolster natural histories, and enhance our understanding of 
nature.46 Yet although ‘rational and regular Experiments’ will enable us ‘to see farther in 
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46 See G.A.J. Rogers, ‘John Locke and the Limits of Scientia’, in Tom Sorell, G.A.J. Rogers, Jill Kraye (eds.), 
Scientia in Early Modern Philosophy: Seventeenth-Century Thinkers on Demonstrative Knowledge from First Principles, 
(Dordrecht, 2010), 129-36, pp. 133-4. 
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to the Nature of Bodies, and guess righter at their yet unknown Properties…this is but 
Judgment and Opinion, not Knowledge and Certainty’.47 Ultimately, natural philosophy 
was a category of human inquiry in which, due to a ‘defect of our Knowledge’, the 
propositions under discussion ‘have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive 
them for true’.48 Unlike knowledge, which was born of clear, intuitive perceptions of the 
agreement or disagreement of ideas, probability was ‘but the appearance of such an 
Agreement, or Disagreement, by the intervention of Proofs, whose connexion is not 
constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so’.49 Natural inquiries dealt in 
probabilities, and natural philosophy was probabilistic. 
   Let us now turn to Locke’s divinity. Locke entered Christ Church, Oxford in 1652. He 
qualified BA in 1656 and MA in 1658, and occupied lectureships in Greek and Rhetoric 
in the early 1660s. However, he famously refused to take holy orders – the conventional 
route to College employment – claiming he was ill-suited to divinity, and reluctant to give 
up his other studies, principally medicine.50 Several scholars claim Locke only became 
interested in theology following his exile in Holland from 1683, under the influence of 
Remonstrant divines like Philipp van Limborch (1633-1712).51 However, the extremity of 
this transformation is somewhat overplayed. Locke declined to write a comprehensive or 
systematic theology, either before or after his exile.52 Moreover, he was obviously 
reluctant to become a Church of England minister. But his commonplace books, dating 
from his studentship at Christ Church, show obvious theological concerns, described by 
Nuovo as ‘indispensible aids to a proper understanding of Locke’s mature thought’.53 
Further, manuscript works like ‘Infallibility’, the Two Tracts on Government, and Essays on the 
Law of Nature, written in Oxford between 1661-1664, all address theological issues.54  
   Locke outlined theology’s disciplinary status in Of the Conduct of the Understanding. Quite 
conventionally, he depicted theology as the pinnacle of knowledge, a 
                                                
47 Locke, Essay, p. 645. 
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‘Science…incomparably above all the rest’. It encompassed ‘the Knowledge of God and 
his Creatures, our Duty to him and our fellow Creatures, and a view of our present and 
future State’. The range and significance of its objects of study/reflection meant theology 
was ‘the Comprehension of all other Knowledge directed to its true end: i.e. the Honour 
and Veneration of the Creator, and the Happiness of Mankind’.55 In the Essay, Locke 
described ‘The knowledge and veneration of Him [God]’ as the ‘chief end of all our 
Thoughts, and the proper business of all Understandings’.56 Theology, therefore, was the 
highest science because its functions – to know and honour God, and to understand our 
duties to him and each other – were furthered by every type of human inquiry, including 
natural philosophy.  
   On the face of it, this established a straightforward disciplinary relationship: theology 
was the highest discipline, encompassing and subordinating natural philosophy. 
However, the situation was more complex, as Locke subdivided theology into natural 
theology, biblical theology, and speculative doctrine – each subdivision interacting with 
natural philosophy in a different way. In the Conduct, Locke said foundational theological 
truths were apprehended through ‘The Works of Nature, and the Words of Revelation’. 
These theological mediums were ‘so large and visible, that those who are not quite blind 
may in them read, and see the first Principles and most necessary Parts of it’. There were, 
in addition, ‘more abstruse parts’ that required ‘Time and Industry’ to access, and were 
therefore known by fewer people.57 In sum, and respectively, Locke was referring to 
natural theology, biblical theology and speculative doctrine. 
   Each substratum counted as theology. However, their differences were manifold. They 
had discrete foundations (nature and scripture); ranged from easily apprehensible (natural 
theology and biblical theology) to abstruse (speculative doctrine); and were governed by 
different epistemic principles – knowledge (natural theology) and belief (biblical theology 
and speculative doctrine). Locke shifted his attention between substrata as his theological 
interests and priorities changed. Most significantly, as he grew sceptical of man’s ability 
to generate theological knowledge, he began prioritising biblical theology over natural 
theology.58 The relationship between Locke’s natural philosophy and theology was 
therefore in flux: contingent on the subdivision of theology being referred to. 
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   Historians tend to ignore or downplay these differences. As such, they oversimplify 
Locke’s theology and its disciplinary relationship with natural philosophy. Nuovo is 
perhaps the most reductionist, claiming Locke simply conflated religion and theology, 
conceived by John Wilkins as, respectively, reverence to God and the doctrines that 
inform and explain religious practice.59 G.A.J. Rogers attempts greater subtlety, rightly 
identifying the commonplace difference between exoteric theology, like natural theology 
and basic biblical teachings; and esoteric theology or speculative doctrine.60 However, 
neither scholar properly distinguishes Locke’s theological substrata by subject matter and 
method. Consequently, they discount the fact that, at different times, he had different 
theological preferences. Or they imply he gave them equal weight at all times. These 
assumptions are false.   
   Between the Essay (1689) and the Reasonableness (1695), Locke’s priorities moved from 
natural theology to biblical theology. In the Essay, he was fairly confident that by 
reasoning from the knowledge of oneself as a finite, imperfect being, or from the 
coherence and intelligibility evident in the natural world, man would arrive at knowledge 
of a perfect, immaterial, omnipotent creator. He even asserted that natural theology 
provided more legible divine testimony than scripture – probably as a consequence of his 
general thesis that words were imperfect and inconstant, which meant biblical passages 
were liable to be misunderstood or confused.61  
   However, in the Reasonableness, Locke reversed this view, arguing that reason usually 
failed in natural theology. Still, he said, faith overcame unrighteousness, and salvation 
was contingent on belief in Jesus’ divinity.62 These ideas had occupied Locke since before 
the publication of the Essay. While exiled in Holland (1683-1688), he discussed biblical 
error and doctrinal clarity with Arminians like van Limborch and Jean le Clerc (1657-
1736).63 He subsequently corresponded with both men, each stressing the salvific 
importance of the doctrine that Jesus was the Christ.64 However, Locke only seriously 
and publicly committed to the notion of biblical faith – culminating in the publication of 
the Reasonableness – following events that took place in England in the 1690s. After the 
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re-publication of sermons by the Puritan divine Tobias Crisp (1600-1643), Presbyterians 
and Independents debated antinomianism, arguing that faith was unimportant because 
salvation was predestined.65 In response, deists like Charles Blount (1654-1693) claimed 
natural theology had superseded revealed religion.66 In the Reasonableness, Locke rejected 
both positions. On the one hand, he emphasised the importance of faith in Jesus, and on 
the other, he questioned reason’s ability to discern theological truths. 
   Following this shift in priorities, the connection between natural philosophy and 
theology was necessarily weakened. In the Essay, Locke said natural philosophy was 
bookended by theology: it began with biblical accounts of spirit, and, via self-reflection, 
or natural observations, led to knowledge of God.67 Moreover, natural inquiries disclosed 
more about God than about nature itself. God ‘fitted our Senses, Faculties, and Organs, 
to the conveniences of Life, and the Business we have to do here’. Locke said that when 
we perceive natural phenomena, ‘We have insight enough into their admirable 
Contrivances, and wonderful Effects, to admire, and magnify the Wisdom, Power, and 
Goodness of their Author…But it appears not, that God intended, we should have a 
perfect, clear, and adequate Knowledge of them’.68 Add this to Locke’s claim that natural 
or philosophical knowledge of God was clearer than text-based biblical accounts, and 
theology is left looking like a distinctly philosophical enterprise. Locke inverted each of 
these suggestions in the Reasonableness. Most people, he argued, were cognitively incapable 
of rationally demonstrating God’s existence or his relation to creation. Salvation 
therefore hinged on one’s assent to basic biblical propositions. As such, theology was 
faith-based, and no longer arose from philosophical inquiry. 
   Locke’s third theological stratum factored less prominently in his thought.69 Speculative 
theology was a species of belief, not knowledge – regarding, for example, fallen angels or 
human resurrections.70 These beliefs could be held alongside commitments to natural 
theology or biblical theology. But assenting or not assenting to them did not affect one’s 
chances at salvation.71 Locke had these and other types of theological or religious belief 
in mind when he discussed the right (or ability) of magistrates to enforce beliefs, or 
articles of faith. In the aftermath of the Civil War, and uncertain of the episcopal 
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character of the re-established Church of England, Locke regarded toleration as 
dangerous.72 In the First Tract on Government (1660), he therefore claimed ‘the magistrate 
may lawfully determine the use of indifferent things relating to religion’.73 Locke’s 
position softened in his unpublished Essay Concerning Toleration (1667).74 But his views 
radically altered when, following Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the 
accession of James II in England (both in 1685), he feared Catholicism was threatening 
European Protestantism.75 Living in exile, he wrote A Letter concerning Toleration (1685, 
published in 1689), arguing that civil power was instituted to secure peace, not enforce 
opinion, but also that civil laws were incapable of effecting the formation of beliefs.76 
 
 
III .  Knowledge and natural  theo logy 
 
In the ‘Epistle to the Reader’, Locke said the germ of the Essay emerged from a meeting, 
at least twenty years before, between ‘five or six Friends…at my Chamber’. The subject of 
discussion, which Locke described as ‘very remote’ from the Essay’s eventual composition, 
was, according to one of Locke’s friends, the principles of morality and revealed 
religion.77 Locke was subsequently encouraged to demonstrate, in writing, how man 
should govern his opinions and conduct. Many years later, this undertaking ended as a 
treatise on the understanding.78 However, the Essay retained a strong interest in both 
morality and religion. In particular, Locke argued that all or most people were capable of 
knowing – not just believing – that God existed, and that man had duties to both his 
creator and to one another. 
   This chapter is not primarily interested in the influences on, or motivations for, 
Locke’s thought. Rather, it seeks to explain how Locke organised ideas through 
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disciplines and disciplinary distinctions. To do this, I will reconstruct the order and 
connections between Locke’s arguments about God and contentions about nature, and 
situate them in their disciplinary contexts. In this section, I examine the Essay’s claims 
about divine knowledge or natural theology, and the ways in which natural philosophy 
buttressed theology. First, however, I must review Locke’s views on the foundations of 
knowledge. 
   Locke’s criterion for knowledge was simple: ‘the perception of the connexion and agreement, or 
disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas’.79 Knowledge was divisible into three types. 
First, intuitive knowledge was generated by the immediate perception of the agreement 
or disagreement of two ideas, without the intermediation of any others.80 The second 
type was demonstrative, created by the association of two otherwise unconnected ideas, 
via other ideas called proofs.81 Intuition and demonstration both pertained to general 
ideas or truths. But, thirdly, ‘There is, indeed, another Perception of the Mind, employ’d 
about the particular existence of finite Beings without us; which…passes under the name of 
Knowledge’. Though less certain than intuitive or demonstrative apprehensions, sensory 
knowledge established ‘the existence of particular external Objects, by that perception 
and Consciousness we have of the actual entrance of Ideas from them’.82 
   Ideas were experiential. That is, they either derive from ‘Our Senses’, which, by being 
‘conversant about particular sensible Objects, do convey into the Mind, several distinct 
Perceptions of things’. Thus, we have ideas of external material things and qualities. Or, 
they come from ‘the Perception of the Operations of our own Minds’, furnishing ideas of 
thought, belief, doubt and will.83 The mind receives bundles of ideas – qualities like 
colour, sound, motion etc. – that appear united in particular things. However, ‘the Ideas 
they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senses simple and unmixed’. These are called 
‘simple Ideas’, and ‘are suggested and furnished to the Mind, only by those two ways 
above mentioned, viz. Sensation and Reflection’.84  
   Simple ideas were entirely passive, entering the mind involuntarily. But the mind also 
‘exerts several acts of its own, whereby out of its simple Ideas, as the Materials and 
Foundations of the rest, the other [ideas] are framed’. According to Locke, the mind 
operates on ideas in three ways: first, it compounds simple ideas into complex ones; 
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second, it sets ideas next to each other, creating relations; and third, it separates ideas 
from their circumstantial conditions, producing abstract ideas. Of complex ideas, the 
most significant were ideas of substances – collections of ideas of qualities presumed to 
be united in one thing; and modes – ideas that depended on, or were affections of, 
substances. Modes were either simple, combining the same idea, like a number. Or they 
were mixed, compounding ‘simple Ideas of several kinds, put together to make one 
complex one’, like beauty or theft, right or wrong.85 
   Locke’s meditations on ideas, particularly their sources and how they impressed upon 
the mind, brings up questions of textual genre. To describe the mechanics of human 
cognition, Locke relied on natural philosophy. As we will see, he then cashed out these 
principles to establish theological knowledge. Evidently, then, the Essay traversed 
multiple disciplines, and was not confined to a particular genre. Thus, as several 
historians have argued, the Essay was not simply an example or defence of natural 
philosophy – conceived as a version or combination of corpuscularian matter theory and 
mechanistic principles of change. Peter Anstey, for example, says that, although Locke 
was evidently interested in various natural philosophical hypotheses, the function of the 
Essay was to defend experimental practices in natural philosophy against speculative 
systematisers like Aristotle and René Descartes.86 Serjeantson paints a similar picture. He 
says Lockean natural philosophy was experimental, and therefore only dealt in matters of 
fact. The Essay, however, was a book about the understanding, a subject not amenable to 
empirical observation: consequently, it was not natural philosophy.87 Both interpretations 
chime with Locke’s disclaimer at the beginning of the Essay that, ‘I shall not at present 
meddle with the Physical Consideration of the Mind…[for example] by what Motions of 
our Spirits or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, 
or any Ideas in our Understandings’.88 Despite these intentions, Locke was unable to 
entirely steer clear of natural philosophy. This was because, to explicate the differences 
between bodily qualities and the ideas they produced in the mind, ‘Physical Enquiries’ 
were ‘necessary’.89 So, as well as discussing ideas as objects of the understanding, Locke 
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inquired ‘into the nature of their causes’.90 However, this was a minor exception, and he 
hoped to be ‘pardoned this little Excursion into Natural Philosophy’.91 
   The excursion was set in broadly corpuscularian terms, and centred on the distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities in bodies, and the ideas they engendered.92 
Locke said ‘the Power to produce any Idea in our mind, I call Quality of the Subject 
wherein that power is’.93 Some qualities, moreover, are ‘utterly inseparable from the 
Body’.94 Experience teaches that all bodies have (seemingly corpuscular) primary qualities 
like solidity, extension, figure and motion. In addition, Locke assumed all bodily 
substances were fabrications of the same underlying matter.95 Thus, observing primary 
qualities in macro-bodies, he inferred their existence in micro-bodies or corpuscles.96 
Contrarily, some qualities ‘are nothing in the Objects themselves, but Powers to produce 
various Sensations in us by their primary Qualities’. These secondary qualities – effects in 
the mind produced by insensible parts of bodies – included colours, sounds and tastes.97 
A body’s primary qualities were therefore the cause or source of its secondary qualities, 
which did not actually exist in bodies, but were the effects wrought by particular bodily 
constitutions. 
   On this basis, it is hard to tell the difference between primary qualities and real 
essences. Both terms helped explain observable qualities, and, according to Lisa 
Downing, they were basically synonymous.98 However, although Locke clearly regarded 
them as connected, they were not the same thing. Real essences were the insensible 
particle structure of a substance, while primary qualities were the size, shape, motion etc. 
of those particles. Discussing ‘insensible Corpuscles’ in the Essay, Locke said they were 
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‘the active parts of Matter, and the great Instruments of Nature, on which depend not 
only all their secondary Qualities, but also most of their natural Operations’. 
Unfortunately, ‘our want of precise distinct Ideas of their primary Qualities, keeps us in 
an incurable Ignorance of what we desire to know about them’.99 Clearly distinguishing 
primary qualities and real essences, he added that knowledge would be greatly enhanced 
‘if we could discover the Figure, Size, Texture, and Motion [i.e. the primary qualities] of 
the minute Constituent parts [i.e. the real essence]’.100 
   The ideas of primary and secondary qualities were produced in the mind ‘by impulse’. 
Regarding primary qualities, Locke said ‘singly imperceptible Bodies must come from 
them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain some motion’.101 This undercuts 
Michael Jacovides’s contention that, because primary qualities were attached to 
imperceptible entities like corpuscles, they must themselves be imperceptible, and 
incapable of producing ideas in the mind.102 In fact, imperceptible bodies conveyed 
primary qualities to the sense organs via motion, which produced ideas in the brain. 
Thus, as Downing argues, primary qualities were intrinsic, irreducible qualities existing at 
the micro-body level; but also powers existing at a macro-body level, capable of 
producing accurate ideas of those irreducible qualities in the mind.103 Equally, ‘the Ideas of 
secondary Qualities are also produced, viz. by the operation of insensible particles on our Senses’. 
Specifically, ‘different Motions and Figures, Bulk, and Number of Particles, [i.e. primary 
qualities] affecting the several Organs of our Senses, produce in us those different 
Sensations’ – colour, smell etc.104 The upshot was that ideas of primary qualities 
paralleled physical patterns in natural things. Namely, ideas of figure and bulk derived 
from the figure and bulk inherent in objects. Contrarily, ideas of secondary qualities did 
not resemble anything in the things themselves; the ideas did not encompass the physical 
basis of those qualities.105 Heat, for example, was merely a type of motion conveyed to 
sense organs and relayed through the body. In no way did the idea (of heat) resemble its 
cause (the motion of insensible particles). Consequently, without a subject to experience 
heat, all that is left is the motion of particles; the sensation is gone.106  
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   Although all ideas had their origin in motion, not all ideas were real. ‘Real Ideas’, 
according to Locke, ‘have a Foundation in Nature; such as have a Conformity with the 
real Being, and Existence of Things, or with their Archetypes’.107 These included all 
simple ideas, which were effects produced by powers in external things – the causal 
mechanism was constant, whether or not the idea resembled its cause.108 Mixed modes 
were also real. Ideas like “courage” or “justice” were compounds made by the 
understanding; they had no reality outside the mind (from which they might deviate), and 
were therefore archetypical. On the other hand, ideas of imaginary substances were 
fantastical, not real. A centaur, for example, was a complex idea whose component ideas 
were not united in reality.109 This distinction produced two categories of knowledge. For 
‘Where-ever we perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of any of our Ideas there is 
certain knowledge: and where-ever we are sure those Ideas agree with the reality of 
Things, there is certain real Knowledge’.110  
   Such were Locke’s connections between knowledge, ideas and qualities. We can now 
turn to his application of these principles in theology, also found in the Essay. Not only 
did his arguments for God’s existence rely on natural philosophical expositions of 
cognition, they also, in part, drew upon studies and perceptions of nature – forging a 
degree of disciplinary overlap between natural philosophy and theology. Note, however, 
that Locke was not claiming to have knowledge of God’s nature. The nature of any 
substance was obscure and unknown because human faculties were too weak to detect 
real essences. Our knowledge of substances derived from their sensible qualities, and 
their corresponding simple ideas.111 Consequently, the ‘Idea we have of the 
incomprehensible supreme Being’ came about by combining simple ideas of ourselves 
(garnered by reflection) with ‘our Idea of Infinity’.112 Knowledge of divine existence was 
different, however. According to Locke, God’s existence was so clear that, like self-
evident mathematical proofs, ‘There was never any rational Creature, that set himself 
sincerely to examine the truth of these Propositions, that could fail to assent to them’. 
Locke acknowledged that ‘there are many Men, who having not applied their Thoughts 
that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other’.113 But this simply meant that not 
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everybody was approaching the task properly, for every human was natively capable of 
knowing God. 
   This raises an obvious point of difference between natural philosophy and theology. 
The former was unable to produce certain knowledge because man’s senses had no 
access to real essences and could not discern their connection with nominal essences. 
The latter, on the other hand, yielded knowledge. In order to prove this, Locke had to 
rationally connect the idea of God’s existence to ideas that man knew were true and real. 
Unlike self-knowledge, which was intuitive, or knowledge of external bodies, which was 
sensitive, knowledge of God was demonstrative.114 Still, determining the type of 
arguments used by Locke has been a subject of scholarly dispute. For Rogers, it was a 
priori demonstrations from knowledge of oneself.115 For Richard Ashcraft it was a 
posteriori demonstrations from nature.116 In fact, it is clear that Locke used both.  
   Towards the end of the Essay, Locke described how certainty in one’s existence could 
lead to knowledge of the existence of an all-powerful intelligent being. According to 
Locke, self-knowledge was intuitive, and based on real ideas. Anyone who claimed not to 
perceive the agreement between the idea of self and the idea of existence was invited to 
enjoy their non-existence until ‘Hunger, or some other Pain convince him of the 
contrary’. This truth was connected to various others. First, Locke said, it was also 
known intuitively that being or existence was not uncaused: it did not emerge from 
nothing. Therefore, ‘it is an evident demonstration, that from Eternity there has been 
something; Since what was not from Eternity [e.g. man], had a Beginning; and what had 
a Beginning, must be produced by something else’.117 In addition, effects received their 
nature from their causes, and never exceeded them in power. Consequently, the cause of 
the intelligence in the world must itself be supremely intelligent. Finally, as ‘it is 
impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative Matter should produce a thinking 
intelligent Being’, it follows that ‘the first eternal Being cannot be Matter’.118 In sum, 
‘from the Consideration of our selves, and what we infallibly find in our own 
Constitutions, our Reason leads us to the Knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, 
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That there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being’.119 The name for this being, 
Locke said, was God. 
   God’s existence was also proven by arguments from design. Here, Locke drew upon a 
long natural theological tradition, given particular contemporary prominence by divines 
like Henry More. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the 1650s and 1660s, More 
published several works of natural theology – An Antidote, the Immortality, and Mystery of 
Godliness – which all claimed the purposefulness of nature was indicative of a guiding, 
organising principle, assumed to be God, or God’s instrument. Locke read More, and 
knew More’s mentor Whichcote.120 Unsurprisingly, then, his Essays on the Law of Nature 
(1663-1664) contains natural theological arguments similar to More’s. Knowledge of 
God, like knowledge of anything, had a sensory origin.121 The senses, Locke said, 
perceived ‘solid bodies and their conditions’. Further, these ‘perceptible objects’ and the 
‘qualities presented to the senses…can all in some way be traced back to motion’. This 
awareness resulted in an appreciation ‘that this visible world is constructed with 
wonderful art and regularity’. From these observations, the mind ‘proceeds to an inquiry 
into their origin, to find out what was the cause, and who the maker, of such an excellent 
work’. Locke assumed the world ‘could not have come together casually and by chance 
into so regular and in every respect so perfect and ingeniously prepared a structure’. 
Hence, ‘it is undoubtedly inferred that there must be a powerful and wise creator of all 
these things’.122 Locke recycled this argument in the Essay, claiming that, ‘by a due 
Contemplation of Causes and Effects…it is necessary to admit some Eternal Being’.123 
He also held that ‘the visible marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power, appear so 
plainly in all the Works of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but seriously 
reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity’.124 Locke went so far as to say that 
studying nature revealed more about God than about nature itself.125 
   Locke alternated between the a priori and design arguments to produce a rational 
foundation for God’s existence. Both arguments produced knowledge by connecting 
disparate ideas via intermediary ones. However, the a posteriori argument is of greater 
interest for our purposes because it highlights the close connection between natural 
philosophy and theology. The design argument began by reflecting on perceptible, i.e. 
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material, objects of nature, and ended by inferring divine workmanship. It thus 
comprised natural philosophical premises – studying natural objects through sensory 
observation – and a theistic conclusion – that God existed. This brand of natural 
theology drew upon the subject matter and methods of natural philosophy, and, from 
this shared disciplinary foundation, made existential claims about God. Turning this 
arrangement on its head, one could say that natural philosophy gave rise to, or formed 
the basis of, theological principles. 
   In the Essay, Locke placed great emphasis on the efficacy and necessity of these natural 
theological arguments. In fact, their value to religious belief and theological 
contemplation exceeded the value of scripture. For: 
 
‘Though every thing said in the Text [scripture] be infallibly true, yet the Reader 
may be, nay cannot chuse but be very fallible in the understanding of it. Nor is it 
to be wondered, that the Will of GOD, when cloathed in Words, should be 
liable to that doubt and uncertainty, which unavoidably attends that sort of 
Conveyance…And we ought to magnify his Goodness, that he hath spread 
before all the World, such legible Characters of his Works and Providence, and 
given all Mankind so sufficient a light of Reason, that they to whom this written 
Word never came, could not (when-ever they set themselves to search) either 
doubt of the Being of a GOD, or of the Obedience due to Him. Since then the 
Precepts of Natural Religion are plain, and very intelligible to all Mankind, and 
seldom come to be controverted; and other revealed Truths, which are conveyed 
to us by Books and Languages, are liable to the common and natural obscurities 
and difficulties incident to Words, methinks it would become us to be more 
careful and diligent in observing the former, and less magisterial, positive, and 
imperious, in imposing our own sense and interpretations of the latter’.126 
 
These remarks end with a polemical swipe at religious dogmatists, unjustly imposing their 
scriptural interpretations on others. But beneath, or within, the polemic, Locke was 
making a point about religious knowledge, consistent with his broader epistemological 
principles. The Bible only contained truth. Nevertheless, knowledge of scripture was 
hampered by the inevitable obscurities of language. As Hannah Dawson has 
demonstrated, the uncertainty and inconstancy of language was a major concern for 
Locke.127 Words denote ideas, which means ideas can be communicated between people. 
However, because one word could denote various ideas, and different words could 
denote the same idea, it was not always clear which idea a word referred to. Imperfect 
linguistic denotation corrupted communication. Dawson does not stress this as a 
problem for exegesis, but, as the passage above shows, Locke clearly saw it as one. When 
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conveyed by language, God’s unerring will was susceptible to misinterpretation. 
Fortunately, Locke argued, God’s will was more clearly inscribed in nature.  
   The Essay is about the origins and effects of linguistic and ideational confusion. It 
therefore made sense for Locke to compare the Bible’s liability to be misinterpreted with 
the apparent legibility of natural theology and its resistance to controversy and 
manipulation. So, in 1689, Locke regarded reason or natural philosophy as the surest 
route to God. However, all this changed in the 1690s. As the doctrine of predestination 
gained increasing prominence in English intellectual life, Locke moved to reassert the 
role of faith in salvation. He did this, in part, by downgrading the utility of natural 
theology. 
 
 
IV. Bibl i ca l  theo logy 
 
The Essay made a strong case in favour of natural theology. Nevertheless, Locke’s 
enthusiasm for such argumentation ebbed in subsequent works, principally The 
Reasonableness. This change occurred on two fronts. Not only did Locke question the 
likelihood of all individuals properly exercising their reason and thus arriving at particular 
theistic and moral conclusions, but he also began emphasising the salvific importance of 
biblical faith. This changed the disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy and 
theology in two ways. On the one hand, it severed their connection. Natural philosophy 
no longer gave rise to theology, for man was unable to reason from natural observations 
to the existence of God. On the other, it drew them closer together epistemologically. As 
theology prioritised belief over knowledge, it became more like natural philosophy, 
which was incapable of certain knowledge.  
   However, before charting this development, we must assess the significance of the Two 
Treatises. Although it was published the same year as the Essay, the Two Treatises was far 
more optimistic about the intelligibility of scripture. Referring to God’s communication 
with man, Locke said, ‘I do not think, he [God] speaks differently from them [i.e. men]’. 
For, if he did, God would ‘lose his design in speaking’.128 Consequently, nothing can 
‘Authorize us to understand Scripture contrary to the direct and plain meaning of the 
Words’.129 By implication, and contrary to Locke’s claims in the Essay, the meaning of 
important biblical passages was clear and obvious. This is odd. Nevertheless, the textual 
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history of the Two Treatises establishes a more nuanced picture. It was written long before 
the Essay’s publication – in response to the Exclusion crisis, 1679-1681.130 Moreover, 
Locke began writing the second treatise, setting out his political theory, before he 
composed the first. The first treatise emerged when Locke added a refutation of Robert 
Filmer’s (1588-1653) Patriarcha (1680), the doctrinal touchstone for anti-Exclusion 
Tories.131 Both treatises frequently referred to scripture. But at no point in its 
composition was the Two Treatises intended as a work about hermeneutics. On the 
contrary, the finished text, and particularly the first treatise, had political and party 
political goals. Locke’s remarks about exegesis must be understood in this polemical 
context. He set out to show that Filmer’s reading of scripture was ‘contrary to the direct 
and plain meaning of the Words’. But this was to strengthen his – Locke’s – political 
thesis, not to make hermeneutical assertions. For example, he opposed Filmer’s doctrine 
of inherited kingly dominion, which, according to Filmer, had a scriptural warrant, 
starting with Adam. In response, Locke posited a different reading of Genesis, in which 
God gifted the world to man-as-a-species, rather to Adam exclusively. In the end, then, 
Locke’s disagreements with Filmer about the meaning of scripture corroborate Locke’s 
claim, in the Essay, that exegetical problems were unavoidable.  
   Discounting the Two Treatises, the major shift in Locke’s theological thinking came 
between the Essay, which championed natural theology, and the Reasonableness, which 
argued for biblical faith. In the latter, Locke said scripture was basically intelligible in its 
most important aspects. Thus, he concluded: ‘This [Christianity] is a Religion suited to 
vulgar Capacities’.132 His more sanguine view of exegesis did not reflect a change in 
epistemic concerns, (away, say, from the problems of language). Of course, discrepancies 
between the Essay and the Reasonableness owed, in part, to their different literary 
purposes.133 The former was interested in the boundaries between knowledge and belief, 
certainty and probability; the latter hoped to establish the beliefs necessary for salvation, 
namely, that Jesus was the Messiah. But, ultimately, Locke adjusted his view of scripture 
                                                
130 See Peter Laslett, ‘Introduction’, in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited with introduction by 
Peter Laslett, (Cambridge, 1960), 3-126, pp. 45-66. For a slightly revised textual history, see Mark Goldie, 
‘Introduction’, in John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited by Mark Goldie, (London, 1994), xv-xliii, 
pp. xviii-xxi. 
131 James Tully, ‘The Framework of Natural Rights in Locke’s Analysis of Property’, in An Approach to 
Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts, (Cambridge, 1993), 96-117, pp. 101-2; Goldie, ‘Introduction’, pp. xviii-
xxi. 
132 Locke, Writings on Religion, p. 209. 
133 David Wootton argues that Locke’s epistemology, political thought and theology all made different 
demands on, or had different implications for, his moral philosophy, which Locke was not able to 
reconcile. See David Wootton, ‘John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist?’, in James E. Crimmins 
(ed.), Religion, Secularization and Political Thought: Thomas Hobbes to J.S. Mill, (London, 1989), 39-67, pp. 59-63. 
 202 
in order to position himself within various sectarian disputes that took place in England 
in the 1690s. He rejected the Presbyterian or Independent view that faith was 
unnecessary because salvation was predetermined. He likewise rejected the deistic 
dismissal of scriptural religion based on the supposed moral sufficiency of natural 
religion. Faith, Locke countered, was necessary for salvation, and for this reason, the 
biblical text was uniquely clear and intelligible. Crucially, though, Locke’s argument (in 
the Reasonableness) in favour of Christian revelation, hinged on the assumption that 
natural theology (discussed in the Essay) was usually defective or unobtainable. In the 
Reasonableness, in other words, he doubted that theology could be effectively grounded on 
natural philosophy and/or rational deductions. 
   Locke accepted that, in conjunction with exegesis, nature might occasionally furnish 
theological insight. For ‘The works of Nature shew his [God’s] Wisdom and Power; But 
’tis his peculiar Care of Mankind, most eminently discovered in his Promises to them [i.e. 
in scripture], that shews his Bounty and Goodness’.134 But, overwhelmingly, the 
Reasonableness emphasised scriptural theology. According to Locke, ‘The Law of Works’ – 
knowable by reason – ‘is that Law, which requires perfect Obedience, without any 
remission or abatement’, known as ‘Righteousness’.135 Obedience guaranteed eternal life; 
failure resulted in damnation. This stringency, coupled with man’s natural frailty, meant 
perfect obedience was virtually impossible. However, in this goodness, God sanctioned 
‘the Law of Faith’, whereby ‘Faith is allowed to supply the defect of full Obedience; and 
so the Believers are admitted to Life and Immortality as if they were Righteous’.136 This 
faith, which ‘distinguished Believers from Unbelievers’, involved no more than assenting 
to the proposition ‘That Jesus was the Messiah, the Son of the living God’.137 Thus, Locke 
aligned himself with clerics like Whichcote and Tillotson who also said perfect 
righteousness eluded most people, and that faith in Jesus was the only way to gain 
salvation.138  
   Ultimately, Locke sought to establish a link between faith and the Bible. The life and 
teachings of Jesus – which one assented to in order to guarantee salvation – were New 
Testament issues. Salvific belief, in other words, was derivable from scripture, not 
philosophy or reason. In fact, Locke argued, scriptural theology was a compensation for 
failed natural theology. ‘Natural Religion…was no where, that I know, taken care of by the 
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force of Natural Reason’.139 Belief in Jesus was critical, because reason and philosophy 
were showing no signs of apprehending God, or understanding and following his moral 
law.  
   For Locke, the story of Jesus, and his presence in the world, had two major 
consequences. First, it provided widespread proof of God’s existence. Although, Locke 
admitted, ‘the Works of Nature, in every part of them, sufficiently Evidence a Deity’. 
The ‘World made so little use of their Reason, that they saw him not’.140 Moreover, 
although ‘The Rational and thinking part of Mankind…when they sought after him, 
found the One, Supream, Invisible God…[reason] had never Authority enough to 
prevail on the Multitude’.141 The abeyance of reason inhibited natural theology by 
retarding natural inquiries that might otherwise produce divine knowledge. It also 
undermined belief, which, according to Locke, ought to be rational.  
   When Locke noted these defects in the Essay, they were not considered common or 
widespread. This changed in the Reasonableness, as Locke suggested reason was 
consistently overwhelmed by passion or interest.142 For example, love (of something 
other than truth) often induced the mind to believe something that lacked an adequate 
evidentiary basis.143 A prominent strand of scholarship attributes this destabilisation of 
the mind to the Fall, noting that post-lapsarian man lacked the capacity to fully know or 
observe God’s law.144 Indeed, Peter Harrison argues that the various theories of 
knowledge and methodological innovations developed in the seventeenth century, but 
particularly those pioneered by experimental natural philosophers associated with the 
Royal Society, were all, variously, founded on particular doctrines of the Fall.145 However, 
Locke’s assessment of man’s cognitive failings does not tally with Harrison’s model. In 
the Essays on the Laws of Nature, Locke – who, several years later was elected to the Royal 
Society – said the Fall should ‘not particularly concern philosophers’.146 Further, when he 
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discussed the effects of the Fall in the Reasonableness – a work of theology – he spoke of 
the damage done to man’s immortality, not his rational faculty.147 Locke agreed that 
reason was misused or left idle. But he cited different causes. ‘Sense and Lust’, he said, 
‘blinded their minds in some; And a careless Inadvertency in others’. To make matters 
worse, ‘the Priests every where, to secure their Empire…excluded Reason from having 
any thing to do with Religion’.148 It was in, and because of, ‘this state of Darkness and 
Error, in reference to the True God’, that Jesus entered the world. According to Locke, it 
was ‘the clear Revelation he brought with him’, which ‘dissipated this Darkness; [and] 
made the One Invisible True God known to the World’.149 
   The second consequence of Christ’s coming was his exposition of moral conduct, and 
the establishment of moral obligations. These were theological matters – Locke’s 
definition of theology in the Conduct included ‘our Duty to him [God] and our fellow 
Creatures’.150 But Locke’s treatment of morality in the Reasonableness marked a departure 
from the Essay. Again, this can partly be explained by their respective agendas: the 
Reasonableness sought to establish a scriptural foundation for theology; the Essay was 
interested in the connections between ideas, words and knowledge. Ultimately, though, 
Locke’s treatment of morality changed as he became less convinced that reason alone 
was able to arrive at moral truth. In the earlier work, Locke said morality was ‘capable of 
Demonstration, as well as Mathematicks: Since the precise real Essence of the Things moral 
Words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the Congruity, or Incongruity of the 
Things themselves, be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect Knowledge’.151 
Morality was knowable in a way that substances were not. The connection between a 
substance’s real and nominal essence was unknowable. However, like all mixed modes, 
moral ideas were ‘the Workmanship of the Mind, and not referred to the real Existence 
of Things’.152 The names of mixed modes therefore referred directly to an archetype – 
the ideas in one’s mind – and not to an external (and unknowable) reality. Consequently, 
the nominal and real essences of moral concepts were the same. And because ethical 
ideas were ‘all real Essences’, it was possible to discover the ‘connexion and agreement 
one with another…[and] be possessed of certain, real, and general Truths’.153 
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   In 1693, William Molyneux (1656-1698) wrote to Locke urging him to fulfil his 
promise of a demonstrable, a priori morality.154 Locke never obliged him. In fact, he 
argued in the Reasonableness, ‘’tis too hard a task for unassisted Reason, to establish 
Morality in all its parts upon its true foundations’.155 Catherine Wilson refuses to see this 
as a volte-face. Instead, she argues, the Reasonableness is merely evidence that Locke came to 
see moral knowledge as deriving from both the analysis of ideas and experiential and 
historical research.156 That may be true, but Locke’s pessimism about morality ran far 
deeper. ‘Necessities, Passions, Vices, and mistaken Interests’ ensured that man had ‘never 
from unquestionable Principles, by clear deductions, made out an entire Body of the Law 
of Nature’.157And human faculties were now too underdeveloped or neglected to perform 
the task.158 Locke said the ‘trains of reasonings’ involved in deducing morality, ‘the 
greatest part of Mankind have neither leisure to weigh; nor, for want of Education and 
Use, skill to judge of’.159 ‘Philosophy’, he lamented, ‘seemed to have spent its strength’, 
but people still lacked the ‘leisure or capacity for Demonstration’. Thus, despite arguing 
in the Essay that natural theology was the clearest path to God and morality, in the 
Reasonableness, Locke claimed it was ‘Hearing plain commands’, which was ‘the sure and 
only course to bring them to Obedience and Practice’.160 Scripture was the key to 
morality, for the ‘Law of Morality, Jesus Christ hath given us in the New Testament’.161 
Locke became so committed to the moral force of the Bible that, in Some Thoughts 
concerning Education, he said morality could be taught, in its entirety, from scripture.162   
   Man’s inability to demonstrate the existence of God or morality was a twinned failure. 
If man failed to establish the existence of God, he would also fail to deduce principles of 
morality – the same rational deficiency would derail both projects. There was also the 
question of morality’s obligatory force. For Locke, obligation ‘could not be, without a 
clear knowledge and acknowledgment of the Law-maker, and the great Rewards and 
Punishments, for those that would or would not obey him’.163 Before the spread of the 
Gospel, natural theology was the only way to have knowledge of God, which, in turn, 
was the only way to make moral law obligatory. If or when reason and philosophy failed 
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in this task, morality – even demonstrative morality – lost its obligatory force. The 
solution to this problem was scripture. For only ‘The view of Heaven and Hell, will cast 
a slight upon the short pleasures and pains of this present state; and given attractions and 
encouragements to Virtue, which reason, and interest, and the Care of our selves, cannot 
but allow and prefer…And thus the Gospel of Jesus Christ has delivered it to us’.164 In 
sum, moral behaviour was incentivised by scripture.165   
   The move from natural to biblical theology forced Locke to place theology on new 
cognitive foundations. Natural theology produced knowledge of God. But Locke cast 
doubt on man’s ability to reason and acquire knowledge, and, in the Reasonableness, 
accepted that ‘The greatest part cannot know, and therefore they must believe’.166 In 
epistemic terms, this drew theology closer to natural philosophy, a discipline that also 
failed in certain knowledge. Locke’s phraseology is also significant: many people ‘cannot 
know’ God, ‘therefore’ they believe. This implies that scriptural faith was a theological 
back-up or insurance policy, deployed following the collapse of natural theology. Those 
unable to establish knowledge of God and morality, either due to errant passions, or lack 
of time and education, must believe in Jesus if they wished to be saved. However, 
knowing and believing were distinct cognitive acts. And, Locke warned, anyone who 
makes ‘Jesus Christ nothing but the Restorer and Preacher of pure Natural Religion’ does 
‘violence to the whole tenor of the New Testament’.167  
   However, scriptural faith did not remain a theological back-up for long. Within a few 
years, Locke appeared happy to bypass the quest for theological knowledge, making faith 
the primary mode of theological understanding. In 1697, Edward Stillingfleet attacked 
the Essay’s account of substance, and its implications for the Trinity in particular.168 
Locke responded, and there followed a public correspondence. In Locke’s Reply to the 
Bishop of Worcester’s Answer to his second Letter, written three years after the Reasonableness, 
Locke argued that religious belief took precedence over religious knowledge. He said 
that: 
 
‘to suppose a divine revelation, it is not necessary that a man should know that 
there is such an intelligent being in the world: I say, know, i.e. from things that 
he does know, demonstratively deduce the proof of such a being: it is enough 
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for the receiving divine revelation, to believe, that there is such a being, without 
having by demonstration attained to the knowledge that there is a God. Every 
one that believes right, does not always reason exactly, especially in abstract 
metaphysical speculations: and if nobody can believe the Bible to be of divine 
revelation, but he that clearly comprehends the whole deduction, and sees the 
evidence of the demonstration, wherein the existence of an intelligent being, on 
whose will all other beings depend, is scientifically proved; there are, I fear, but 
few christians among illiterate people, to look no farther. He that believes there 
is a God, though he does no more than believe it, and has not attained to the 
certainty of knowledge, i.e. does not see the evident demonstration of it, had 
ground enough to admit of divine revelation’.169 
 
Locke reiterated that faith was sufficient for theological practice. But unlike in the 
Reasonableness, he did not say faith was a compensation for failed knowledge. Christianity 
was now grounded in belief, and knowledge and natural theology were superfluous – for 
‘Every one that believes right, does not always reason exactly’. The significance of this is 
twofold. First, it shows that, for Locke, in the end, natural philosophy and rational 
calculations were not an adequate basis for theology. Instead, theology was founded on 
belief in God and scripture. And second, despite it being the highest science, theology 
did not (usually) admit of certain knowledge. This epistemic qualification is crucial. For, 
as the following sections will demonstrate, Locke’s eventual understanding of the 
disciplinary relationship between natural philosophy and theology was shaped by the fact 
that neither discipline was capable of absolute certainty. 
 
 
V. Reason and fai th 
 
Locke said natural philosophy was established by reason, theology (at least since the 
Reasonableness) by faith. Despite their differences, reason and faith were not entirely 
disunited: faith drew upon and was informed by reason. This guaranteed the 
compatibility of natural philosophy and theology. However, the content of revelation or 
theology was above reason, and theology existed where certain knowledge was 
unattainable. Theology, in other words, was probabilistic. But, importantly for Locke, it 
was the most secure type of probabilistic knowledge. 
   The differences between reason and faith were nevertheless pronounced: Locke 
described them as ‘contradistinguished’.170 Reason, he argued, was ‘the discovery of the 
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Certainty or Probability of such Propositions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at by 
Deductions made from such Ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties’. 
‘Faith, on the other side, is the Assent to any Proposition, not thus made out by the 
Deductions of Reason; but upon the Credit of the Proposer, as coming from GOD, in 
some extraordinary way of Communication. This way of discovering Truths to Men we 
call Revelation’.171 In short, reason created knowledge by combining ideas, and faith 
assented to revelation or the testimony of others. Consequently, as Locke explained to 
Stillingfleet, although one could have great ‘steadiness and assurance’ in faith, the correct 
use of language ‘appropriates certainty only to knowledge’.172 The upshot was that 
knowledge could not impinge on or damage an article of faith, for ‘knowledge, which 
was one act of the mind, did not at all concern faith, which was another act of the mind 
quite distinct from it’.173 Knowledge and faith were discrete cognitive domains, with 
different epistemic criteria and limits. This separation meant that, even in the Essay – 
where Locke expressed confidence in the viability of natural theology – he understood 
that fundamentally ‘the Christian Religion…’Tis from Revelation we have received it’.174 
   However, although reason was more obviously associated with knowledge – 
connecting and comparing ideas – it actually cut across, and governed, both knowledge 
and belief. Locke hinted at this unity by pointing to the closeness of reason and 
revelation. ‘Reason’, he claimed:  
 
‘is natural Revelation, whereby the eternal Father of Light, and Fountain of all 
Knowledge communicates to Mankind that portion of Truth, which he has laid 
within the reach of their natural Faculties: Revelation is natural Reason enlarged by 
a new set of Discoveries communicated by GOD immediately, which Reason 
vouches the Truth of, by the Testimony and Proofs it gives, that they come 
from GOD. So that he that takes away Reason, to make way for Revelation, puts 
out the Light of both’.175 
 
This passage somewhat broadens Locke’s conception of reason. As contradistinguished 
from faith, reason was what deduced certain or probable truth from the association of 
ideas. However, more generally, reason referred to ‘our natural Faculties’, which, 
according to Locke, vouchsafed the truth of revelation.176 In the Essay, Locke gave four 
examples of how both types of reason affected faith. The broad, natural-faculties-
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understanding-of-reason was responsible for examining the grounds of faith, and 
establishing rational belief.177 And, exerting a less direct influence, the narrow, basis-for-
knowledge-understanding-of-reason established cognitive boundaries, clarifying faith’s 
separation from knowledge. I will examine these instances in that order.  
   First, Locke described faith as ‘a firm Assent of the Mind’. Therefore, ‘He that believes, 
without having any Reason for believing…neither seeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the 
Obedience due to his Maker’. Assent ‘cannot be afforded to any thing, but upon good 
Reason; and so cannot be opposite to it’.178 In short, genuine or legitimate faith needed 
to invoke man’s native reasoning faculty. This argument had a theological premise. God 
gifted man his natural faculties, and enjoined him to use them in the discovery of truth. 
Consequently, man had a duty to use reason judiciously. In fact, Locke maintained it was 
more important to use reason sincerely, than to reason to correct judgements. For ‘he 
that makes use of the Light and Faculties GOD has given him, and seeks sincerely to 
discover Truth’ discharges his duty as a rational creature, and even if ‘he should miss 
Truth [i.e. assent to erroneous propositions], he will not miss the [God’s] Reward of it.179 
Furthermore, anybody who assents to the truth by chance, without following reason, 
‘transgresses against his own Light, and misuses those Faculties’.180  
   This argument formed a major part of Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration. Exiled in 
Holland and concerned about the accession of a Catholic, James II, to the English 
throne, Locke argued that sovereigns had neither the right, nor the ability, to coerce 
belief. This distinguished Locke from his latitudinarian colleagues, who favoured 
comprehension and a broad church, but denied outright toleration. According to 
Stillingfleet, plurality was dangerous because ‘diversity of Sects…will be alwayes thought a 
plausible argument to draw Men to the Popish pretences of Unity’, and ‘the allowed Sects will in 
probability grow more insolent’.181 Therefore, Tillotson argued, the magistrate must 
homogenise national religious sentiment: ‘To countenance and support the true Religion, 
and to take care that the people be instructed in it, and that none be permitted to 
debauch and seduce men from it, properly belongs to the Civil Magistrate’.182 However, 
for Locke, salvation was a personal issue with no bearing on the security of the 
                                                
177 See Jolley, ‘Locke on Faith and Reason’, pp. 442-3. 
178 Locke, Essay, p. 687. 
179 Ibid., p. 688. 
180 Ibid., p. 688. 
181 Edward Stillingfleet, The Unreasonableness of Separation: or An Impartial Account of the History, Nature, and 
Pleas of the Present Separation from the Communion of the Church of England, (London, 1682), ‘Preface’, p. lxxx. 
182 John Tillotson, The Protestant Religion Vindicated, from the charge of Singularity & Novelty, (London, 1680), p. 
9. 
 210 
Commonwealth. As such, even dissenters who resisted comprehension should be 
tolerated.183 The only essential Christian belief was that Jesus was the Christ, and ‘Faith 
only, and inward Sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God’.184  Coerced 
belief, regardless of its veracity, would not work. Salvific belief must be rational belief, 
for it was impossible to sincerely believe something disowned by one’s reason or 
understanding.  
   The second way that reason affected faith was by validating scripture. Revelation was 
the source of faith. But in order to believe the contents of the Bible, one had to be 
persuaded that it was in fact the word of God. Crucially, it ‘belongs to Reason, to judge of 
the Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the signification of the Words, wherein it is 
delivered’.185 Consequently, ‘the believing, or not believing that Proposition, or Book, to 
be of Divine Authority, can never be Matter of Faith, but Matter of Reason; and such, as 
I must come to an Assent to, only by the use of my Reason’.186 Assenting to biblical 
truths was a rational act because assent was only granted when the man’s faculties were 
assured that the source of revelation was divine.  
   Of course, this did not guarantee the rationality of biblical truths. ‘Reason’, Locke said, 
‘must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing’, but ‘I do not mean, that we must 
consult Reason, and examine whether a Proposition revealed from God can be made out 
by natural Principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it’.187 In fact, turning to the 
ways that reason-as-knowledge effected faith, Locke said that when propositions were 
objects of knowledge and gifts from revelation, ‘there is little need or use of Revelation, 
GOD having furnished us with natural, and surer means to arrive at the Knowledge of 
them’.188 Faith was subordinate to knowledge because ‘whatsoever Truth we come to the 
clear discovery of, from the Knowledge and Contemplation of our own Ideas, will always 
be certainer to use, than those which are conveyed to us by Traditional Revelation’.189 
(Traditional revelation was the biblical account of an original revelation, or a direct 
interaction with God). Belief in the divinity of revelation could never be as certain as the 
knowledge gleaned from the association of our own ideas. Thus, if knowledge and faith 
both pointed to the same thing, it made no sense to merely believe it. 
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   However, Locke had one exception to the rule that knowledge effaces belief: his 
discussion of moral law in the Reasonableness. Reason disclosed fragments of the law, and, 
on occasion, Locke championed demonstrative morality. But, in general, he assumed 
reason was unlikely to deduce an entire system of morality, and consequently, scripture 
was called upon to provide moral instruction. Scriptural morality could and should be 
vouchsafed by reason. But, ‘’Tis no diminishing to Revelation, that Reason gives its 
Suffrage too to the Truths Revelation has discovered. But ’tis our mistake to think, that 
because Reason confirms them to us, we had the first certain knowledge of them from 
thence, and in that clear Evidence we now possess them’.190 So, even if scriptural 
morality could be reformulated demonstratively, it remained a biblical truth. 
   The fourth part of the reason-faith dynamic stated that if faith contradicted knowledge, 
faith must be abandoned. ‘We can never receive for a Truth any thing’, Locke said, ‘that 
is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge’.191 To do so, would undercut the 
foundations of knowledge and undermine man’s faculties. God, moreover, would not 
grant us the ability to acquire knowledge, and then require man to ingest knowledge that 
violated the basis of his knowing anything. Therefore, ‘no Proposition can be received for 
Divine Revelation, or obtain the Assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive 
Knowledge’. For example, Locke rejected the doctrine of transubstantiation. The ideas of 
body and place agreed so clearly, he said, that the understanding ought never to assent to 
a proposition that held a body to be in two places simultaneously, even if ‘it should 
pretend to the Authority of a divine Revelation’.192 Of course, many people accepted the 
doctrine. But this was because when ‘the Idea of Infallibility be inseparably join’d to any 
Person’, namely, the Pope, the doctrine of ‘one Body in two Places at once, shall 
unexamined be swallowed for a certain Truth, by an implicit Faith, when ever that 
imagin’d infallible Person dictates and demands assent without enquiry’.193 
   In theory, though, knowledge established what faith could not be. In other words, faith 
deferred to, and never contradicted, rational knowledge. For scholars like Ayers and 
Jolley, Locke therefore subordinated faith and curtailed the role of revelation.194 
However, this disregards the many ways Locke asserted and consolidated the importance 
of revelation or theology. It was true that, where certainty existed, faith had no place. But 
faith was not subsumed by knowledge; it was merely shaped by boundaries set by 
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knowledge and reason. These boundaries were not hugely restricting. The knowledge 
ascertained by human faculties was partial because not everything about the world 
conformed to our limited cognitive capacities. ‘’Tis overvaluing our selves’, Locke said, 
‘to reduce all to the narrow measure of our Capacities; and to conclude, all things 
impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our Comprehension. This is to 
make our Comprehension infinite, or GOD finite’.195 It was in the areas beyond the 
scope of reason and knowledge that faith came into play. Locke said faith existed above 
reason: it pertained to those ‘Propositions, whose Truth or Probability we cannot by 
Reason derive from those Principles’ of ideational deduction.196 Things ‘beyond the 
Discovery of our natural Faculties, and above Reason, are, when revealed, the proper Matter 
of Faith…which Reason has, directly, nothing to do’.197  
   As well as holding sway over questions beyond the scope of reason, faith also had a 
determining influence over areas of probable knowledge. Probability was ‘likeliness to be 
true…without certain Knowledge that it is so’.198 If the mind failed to discern a clear 
dis/agreement between ideas, it could believe a proposition, depending on its probability. 
Probability was established by weighing up a propositions compatibility with one’s own 
experience and knowledge, and/or its conveyance by large numbers of reliable, 
disinterested witnesses.199 In cases such as these – and Locke recognised that ‘most of the 
Propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay act upon, are such, as we cannot have 
undoubted Knowledge’ – faith (potentially) had considerable influence.200 ‘Revelation’, he 
argued, ‘where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it, against the probable Conjectures of 
Reason. Because the Mind, not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently 
know, but only yielding to the Probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its 
Assent to such a Testimony, which, it is satisfied, comes from one, who cannot err, and 
will not deceive’.201 No matter how likely, a probable proposition carried some doubt. 
Thus, Locke argued, if a probable proposition conflicted with what reason vouched to be 
a divine dictate, the latter must override the former.  
   Faith and revelation therefore had a double mandate: to operate where reason could 
not deduce truth from ideas, and to govern probable knowledge. This theological 
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mandate impinged upon important natural philosophic topics, demonstrating that, for 
Locke, natural philosophy was, at least in part, governed by theology. 
 
 
VI. Theology governing natural  phi losophy 
 
In the Conduct, Locke described theology as the ‘Comprehension of all other 
Knowledge’.202 This notion clearly applied to natural theology, which used, and grew out 
of, natural philosophy. But theology-as-biblical-faith was also superior to natural 
philosophy because revelation had the authority to settle issues which reason was unable 
to answer with certainty.  
   It was a pedagogical commonplace to describe theology as the highest discipline. 
Before studying theology, one must complete the arts curriculum. For Locke, however, 
theology’s status had a particular effect on the structure of his argumentation. Theology 
corrected and governed natural philosophy because, as a discipline, it was capable of 
greater certainty. In this section, I discuss two examples of this dynamic: the first, 
regarding the existence of spirits; the second, regarding the immateriality of spirit and 
thought. As these debates demonstrate, Locke used disciplines to order his thought and 
establish legitimate or viable claims about the world. Natural philosophy worked within 
limits set by man’s rational understanding; theology then determined what reason was 
unsure of. The viability of a proposition was therefore contingent on disciplinary 
context.  
   Natural philosophy was probabilistic: it asserted likelihoods, not certainties. Like 
theology, or scriptural faith, it was therefore an object of belief. However, Locke said, in 
‘probable Propositions’, the sort found in natural philosophy: 
 
‘an evident Revelation ought to determine our Assent even against Probability. 
For where the Principles of Reason have not evidenced a Proposition to be 
certainly true or false, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, and 
Ground of Assent, may determine; and so it may be Matter of Faith, and be also 
above Reason. Because Reason, in that particular Matter, being able to reach no 
higher than Probability, Faith gave the Determination, where Reason came short; 
and Revelation discovered on which side the Truth lay’.203 
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Once satisfied that revelation was authentic, the understanding accepted its content as 
divinely authored. This assurance was less secure than our certainty in knowledge – 
sensory, intuitive or demonstrative. But when knowledge was only probable, our 
(superior) assurance in the validity of the Bible ought to compel the understanding and 
settle uncertainties. In principle, then, theology could legitimately exercise control over 
all probable knowledge, including disciplines like natural philosophy. 
   The Essay provides two examples of this disciplinary relationship working in practice. 
The first concerned the existence of spirits, an example of faith ruling where reason had 
no way of determining the issue. In the final chapter, Locke said, ‘Knowledge of 
Things…not only Matter, and Body, but Spirits also…[was called] natural Philosophy’.204 
Reflection furnished man with ideas of spirit – by observing the ‘Operations of our own 
Minds…we are able to frame the complex Idea of an immaterial Spirit’.205 However, this ‘does 
not make us know, that any such Things do exist without us, or that there are any finite 
Spirits, or any other spiritual Beings, but the Eternal GOD’. This was because, ‘our 
Senses not being able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular 
Existences’. Therefore, Locke concluded, ‘concerning the Existence of finite Spirits…we 
must content our selves with the Evidence of Faith’.206  
   This granted theology a considerable role in natural philosophy. As discussed, in Some 
thoughts concerning Education Locke advised students to undertake scriptural study before 
engaging in natural inquiries. This, he argued, would ensure that matter and spirit were 
given equal weight in natural philosophy.207 In the Essay, however, Locke went further, 
saying that scripture should actively intervene in natural philosophical inquiry. It was 
beyond man’s sensory capacities to know if spirits existed. To settle the issue, we only 
had recourse to scripture. Natural philosophy, in this instance, relied entirely on biblical 
testimony. Theology, in other words, fleshed out our understanding of the world, left 
incomplete by reason and natural philosophy.   
   The second example of theology arbitrating in natural philosophy concerned the 
possibility of thinking matter. In this instance, faith discounted what reason held to be 
possible. At various points in the Essay, Locke wondered if matter, configured in a 
particular way, could acquire the power of thought. This idea was a logical consequence 
of his substance scepticism. The human faculties were incapable of accessing the real 
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essences of substances. This was as true of spiritual substances as it was for body. Thus, 
it was doubtful anybody had ‘any more, or clearer, primary Ideas belonging to Body, than they 
have belonging to immaterial Spirit’.208 
   It was true that ‘Sensation convinces us, that there are solid extended Substances; and 
Reflection, that there are thinking ones’. But ‘the simple Ideas we receive from Sensation 
and Reflection, are the Boundaries of our Thoughts; beyond which, the Mind…is not 
able to advance one jot’. In other words, ‘we are no more able to discover, wherein the 
Ideas belonging to Body consist, than those belonging to Spirit’. Some things are 
extended and some things think; but ‘If we would enquire farther into their Nature, 
Causes, and Manner, we perceive not the Nature of Extension, clearer than we do of 
Thinking’.209 Thus, the cohesion of bodies is ‘incomprehensible’, and motion by impulse 
‘is as obscure and unconceivable, as how our Minds move or stop our Bodies by 
Thought’.210 In short, observing the qualities associated with each substance did not shed 
light on the nature of those qualities, nor the substances themselves.  
   The unknowability of real essences also made it impossible to know how or why 
particular substances related to particular qualities. Consequently, it was impossible to 
know if a quality related exclusively to a particular substance, or whether various 
substances exhibited the same quality. Thus, it was ‘no harder to conceive how Thinking 
should exist without Matter, than how matter should think’.211 Gottfried Leibniz read this 
as evidence that Locke was both a materialist and – because material souls must die with 
the body, only to be resurrected at the day of judgement – a mortalist too.212 In a similar 
vein, some modern commentators argue that Locke was ambivalent towards, and quite 
possibly sympathetic to, materialist hypotheses.213 These judgements are false. Locke was 
not endorsing materialism, nor claiming matter could think; he was making an argument 
about the scope of man’s understanding. Namely, despite having ‘clear and distinct Ideas 
in us of Thinking…[and] Solidity…whensoever we would proceed beyond these simple 
Ideas…and dive farther into the Nature of Things, we fall presently into Darkness and 
Obscurity’.214 The essences of body and spirit were equally opaque.215 Both substances’ 
discernable qualities were therefore inexplicable, both in themselves, and in relation to 
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their respective essences. For Locke, these cognitive limitations meant it was impossible 
to make certain judgements about substances and their qualities. And, without an 
adequate explanation of either substance, it was not inconceivable that the qualities 
associated with one of them, might be present in the other.216 
   Later in the Essay, Locke added a theological dimension to this discussion, stressing 
God’s omnipotence and freedom of action. ‘It being impossible’, he said: 
 
‘by the contemplation of our own Ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether 
Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power 
perceived and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking 
immaterial Substance: It being, in respect of our Notions, not much more 
remote from our Comprehension to conceive, that GOD can, if he pleases, 
superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it 
another Substance, with a Faculty of Thinking; since we know not wherein 
Thinking consists, not to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased 
to give that Power’.217 
 
Again, the limitation of our ideas, and our consequent ignorance of substances, meant 
the compatibility of particular substances and particular qualities could not be ruled out. 
Furthermore, it was plausible that God could produce natural phenomena that 
confounded man’s limited understanding of substance. The connection between our 
ideas of sensory qualities and the imperceptible motions in bodies that gave rise to them 
was incomprehensible. There was no obvious connection between a type of motion and 
the colour yellow; God merely annexed the latter (a sensation) to the former (a power). 
Likewise, the fact that man could not comprehend the idea of thinking matter was not 
grounds to assume God was incapable of fabricating such matter.218 God’s power 
dwarfed man’s ability to understand. Anybody with ‘the confidence to conclude, that 
Omnipotency it self, cannot give Perception and Thought to a Substance, which has the 
modification of Solidity’ was therefore overstating their ability to know.219  
   Unfortunately, not all Locke’s readers grasped the import of this argument. Locke had 
to remind Stillingfleet that he was not positing ‘matter [as] a thinking thing, as thereby to 
question the being of a principle above matter and motion in the world’; rather, he was 
using the possibility of thinking matter as a way of affirming God’s omnipotence. In fact, 
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he argued, it was impious to suggest the ‘infinite omnipotent Creator’ was incapable of 
infusing certain parcels of matter with thought.220 Locke’s underlying point was 
epistemological, not ontological. Based on the information contained in our ideas, one 
could not rule out the possibility of thinking matter. This was not an ontological 
assertion, but an observation about the limitations of man’s faculties, and the restrictions 
placed upon knowledge. Consider Locke’s remark in the Essay about the soul’s 
immateriality: ‘I say not this [that matter might be made to think], that I would any way 
lessen the belief of the Soul’s Immateriality: I am not here speaking of Probability, but 
Knowledge’.221 The soul’s immateriality could not be known because man lacked the ideas 
necessary to produce knowledge. But one could – and Locke did – believe that spirit or 
the soul were immaterial, on the basis of (very high) probability.222  
   This returns us to the issue of theology governing natural philosophy. Locke was sure 
the soul was immaterial. However, his assurance did not derive from his faculties, which 
conceded the possibility of material thought, but rather from theology or revelation. 
‘What we hope to know of separate Spirits in this World’, he said, ‘we must, I think, 
expect only from Revelation’.223 Advocating the importance of non-material explanations 
of natural phenomena in Some Thoughts concerning Education, Locke claimed that ‘Notions 
of Spirits and their Power’, which were ‘beyond bare Matter and its Motion’, were 
‘deliver’d in the Bible’.224 Divine testimony therefore allowed Locke to assert in the Essay 
that ‘the more probable Opinion is, that this consciousness is annexed to, and the 
Affection of one individual immaterial substance’.225 Actually, he went further, claiming 
that matter was ‘evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought’, and that ‘the 
thinking Substance in Man must be necessarily suppos’d immaterial’.226 Whatever the 
nature of Locke’s assurance, the point is that his ability to determine the issue with 
confidence owed to the weight, on one side, of theological testimony.227 In natural 
philosophic terms, ‘a solid extended Substance, [was] as hard to be conceived, as a thinking 
immaterial one’.228 Consequently, philosophical discourse conceded the possibility of 
thinking matter. It fell to revelation to settle what reason and natural philosophy could 
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227 Not very convincingly, Locke also said that God’s immateriality – known demonstratively – was a 
reason to believe that finite thinking substances were probably immaterial. See Ayers, Locke, II, p. 46. 
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not. Therefore, when it came to establishing the immateriality of spirit, theology guided 
and, if necessary, corrected natural philosophy. 
   However, although theology had the right to govern natural philosophy, it only 
exercised that right regarding issues broached in scripture, like spirit. As such, theology 
could not, and would not, constantly, or even regularly, dictate the outcomes of natural 
philosophical questions. Neither, moreover, did Locke regard natural philosophy as 
unimportant, or without value. On the contrary, in Some Thoughts concerning Education, he 
said he ‘would not deterr any one from the study of Nature, [just] because all the 
Knoweldge we have, or possibly can have of it, cannot be brought into a Science’.229 In 
good Baconian fashion, he claimed there were ‘very many things in it that are convenient 
and necessary…And a great many other, that will abundantly reward the Pains of the 
Curious with Delight and Advantage’.230 Lending support to Anstey’s view that Locke 
was an experimentalist before he was a corpuscularian or a mechanist231, Locke held that 
the advantages of natural philosophy were ‘rather to be found amongst such Writers, as 
have imploy’d themselves in making rational Experiments and Observations, than in 
starting barely speculative Systems’.232  
   Furthermore, he argued, ‘Systems of Natural Philosophy…are to be read, more to know 
the Hypotheses, and to understand the Terms and Ways of Talking of the several Sects, 
than with hopes to gain thereby a comprehensive, scientifical, and satisfactory 
Knowledge of the Works of Nature’.233 Natural philosophical systems were flawed 
inasmuch as they pretended a comprehension and certainty unattainable by man’s 
faculties. Natural knowledge could not be demonstrative, and therefore it was not 
systematic. Hypotheses were useful for stimulating and directing the collection of 
empirical data, which produced natural histories.234 But theories of nature could only ever 
track our limited experiences. Consequently, when he spoke about metaphysical systems, 
Locke was cautious, claiming that ‘the Modern Corpuscularians talk, in most Things, more 
intelligibly than the Peripateticks’.235 This echoed his more circumspect remarks in the 
Essay. ‘The corpuscularian Hypothesis’, he said, goes ‘farthest in an intelligible 
Explication of the Qualities of Bodies’, though ‘the Weakness of human Understanding 
is scarce able to substitute another’. Corpuscular matter theory provided the most 
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sensible account of bodies, but until we know ‘what Qualities and Powers of Bodies have 
a necessary Connexion or Repugnancy one with another’, it remained merely a best guess.236  
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
In keeping with virtually all his peers, Locke was anxious to ensure natural philosophy 
was compatible with basic religious tenets or conceptual assumptions. He was therefore 
sceptical of out-and-out mechanism or corpuscularianism, (especially after the 
publication of Isaac Newton’s Principia in 1687).237 Not only did divine providence, or 
superaddition, underpin gravity, it also mediated the relationship between primary and 
secondary qualities, and the connection between thought and motion.238  
   Within this general framework, natural philosophy and theology had a complex and 
shifting disciplinary relationship. In the Essay (1689), Locke argued that natural 
philosophical inquiries yielded theological conclusions. This meant both disciplines 
studied God and substance, and proceeded by natural observation. These conceptual and 
methodological overlaps were the foundations of natural theology. However, in the 
1690s, Locke reconceptualised theology, and reconstituted its disciplinary relationship 
with natural philosophy. Responding to English debates about predestination, and deistic 
claims against revealed religion, Locke said salvation required faith and scripture. 
Consequently, in the Reasonableness (1695), he downplayed the importance of natural 
theology, and argued that Christianity hinged on biblical faith in Jesus. Jesus’ divinity was 
not proved or suggested by natural inquiries, it was simply believed as a biblical truth. 
Theology, therefore, was detached from natural philosophy.  
   Although theology was no longer grounded in natural philosophy, it still had the 
authority to govern it. This was because articles of faith were known with more certainty 
than natural philosophical propositions. The real essences of substances were 
unknowable. So, the connection between, and explanation for, a substance’s inner 
constitution and its recurring observable qualities was a mystery. It was therefore 
impossible to acquire demonstrative knowledge of substances, and natural philosophy 
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dealt only in probabilities. Biblical faith also lacked certainty, as belief was less certain 
than knowledge. But the authenticity of the Bible was more evident to reason than claims 
about nature. Therefore, Locke argued, the content of the Bible should be believed more 
willingly than propositions about nature. In short, theological truths took precedence 
over – i.e. could correct or overrule – philosophical probabilities, or issues for which 
knowledge was lacking. For example, theology made the final judgement on the existence 
of spirit, and the substantial origins of thought.  
   The relationship between natural philosophy and theology reveals much about Locke’s 
conceptualisation of disciplines. Disciplines were more than a means of parcelling 
subjects and concepts into appropriate bundles. They also enabled Locke to situate 
knowledge on scales of certitude and intelligibility. By reflecting the scope and limits of 
human understanding in different areas of learning, disciplines defined the structure and 
presentation of thought and argument. Thus, natural philosophy’s subordination to 
theology was not due to the latter’s lofty subject matter. After all, ‘God…Angels, [and] 
Spirits’ also fell within the purview of natural philosophy.239 Rather, both disciplines were 
ranked by epistemic credibility: theology being placed higher. The inner structures of 
nature were opaque to man. Contrarily, important theological truths were easy graspable 
– disclosed by either basic ratiocination (the Essay), or scriptural dogma (the 
Reasonableness). When it came to understanding the fundamentals of each discipline, the 
mind was simply more suited to theology than natural philosophy. 
   Locke therefore demonstrates that, at the start of the eighteenth century, theology was 
still the dominant, most authoritative discipline. Arguably, however, in relative terms, its 
status was reduced. Not only did Locke cast doubt on the viability of theological 
knowledge, he also construed biblical faith as merely less uncertain than natural 
philosophy.
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
In the medieval scholastic tradition, theology was the pinnacle of learning. As one of 
three graduate subjects, it was the most prestigious university discipline, and an obvious 
and respectable route to employment. Moreover, it engaged the most important subjects 
– the divine and the spiritual. Natural philosophy inquired into the constitutions, causes 
and effects of natural phenomena – usually, though not always, construed as material 
substances. It could be, and was, studied in its own right. But its place on the arts course 
meant that – at universities, at least – it was considered a propaedeutic for higher 
subjects. In particular, natural philosophy was used to explicate, or expand upon, 
theological doctrine, which, in turn, set conceptual parameters for natural philosophy. 
   Both disciplines underwent changes in the seventeenth century. Theology was 
ultimately concerned with knowledge of God. But the relationship between types of 
religious writing – e.g. ecclesiology, church governance, and sectarian polemic – was 
constantly changing. At the same time, natural philosophy became increasingly 
corpuscular and mechanistic. Nevertheless, the hierarchy between the disciplines 
remained relatively undisturbed. The case studies in this thesis had varied professional 
and institutional commitments, and represent dissimilar views on philosophy, theology 
and religion. Clerics like Thomas White and Henry More predictably asserted the pre-
eminence of theology, and the instrumentality of natural philosophy to higher subjects. 
But even John Locke, who avoided taking holy orders, and was famed for his 
philosophical treatises on the understanding and civil government, respected theology’s 
place at the top of the disciplinary pile. For the most part, then, judgements about 
disciplinary hierarchy transcended intellectual orientation. Therefore, the status of 
theology, and its relationship to natural philosophy, or vice versa, was not determined by 
sectarian interest – religious or philosophical.   
   It was widely assumed that natural philosophy and theology promoted, informed, or 
enforced one another. Francis Bacon counselled against their admixture, and Thomas 
Hobbes mandated a very strict separation. Nevertheless, each case study – Bacon 
included – promoted natural theology: endorsing or describing instances of rational and 
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natural philosophical inquiry leading to theological understanding. This says something 
about disciplinary boundaries. Strict and absolute boundaries – such as Hobbes’s – 
prohibited theological inferences being made from natural philosophical observations 
and propositions. As Hobbes famously remarked, ‘we understand nothing of what he 
[God] is, but only that he is’.1 However, natural theology – formed by reasoning and/or 
observing nature – occurred at the disciplinary intersection between natural philosophy 
and theology proper. Drawing attention to the profusion of seventeenth-century natural 
theology, this thesis demonstrates that, in the majority of cases, the disciplinary boundary 
between natural philosophy and theology was porous and flexible.  
   As well facilitating natural theology, this type of boundary affected the basic 
functioning of both disciplines, and allowed each to influence the other. White provides 
perhaps the best example of theology’s reliance on natural philosophy. For him, elements 
of the latter (method, conceptual glosses etc.) were responsible for clarifying, qualifying 
and developing theological doctrine. But porous boundaries also worked the other way. 
Locke, for instance, said theological or scriptural accounts of spirit should govern and 
correct natural philosophical inquiries struggling to apprehend incorporeality.   
   Thus, although the generic, structural relationship between the two disciplines was 
broadly agreed upon, there was no consensus about the exact role played by each, or the 
type of influence they exerted on one another. These disagreements were a product of 
the looseness and changeability of disciplines. Disciplines contained bodies of knowledge 
and doctrine, but they were composed of, and constituted by, many other, disparate 
elements. Not only were they underpinned by particular methods and conceptual 
preoccupations; they also invoked a multitude of cognitive processes and apparatuses; 
and admitted of varying degrees of certitude and belief – resulting in different categories 
of knowledge or opinion. Moreover, authors could emphasise or combine the different 
elements of disciplines as they saw fit. Therefore, within loose but usually consensual 
parameters, different people constituted the same discipline in different ways. Disciplines 
were capable of so much variety that, despite an established hierarchy, the details of 
disciplinary relationships were complex and varied.  
   Natural philosophy and theology could never, or only very rarely, be described as 
straightforwardly connected or separate. Like many early modern disciplines, they related 
to one another on a number of levels simultaneously. They might derive from the same 
source material, but focus on different subject matter. Or they might operate by different 
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methods, but interrogate the same ideas and concepts. In sum, they could both pull 
together, creating areas of overlap, and pull apart, courtesy of particular incompatibilities.  
   Bacon associated each discipline with particular (and incommensurable) cognitive 
processes, subject matters, and methods; and forbade their admixture. However, he 
endorsed natural theology, and consented to the extraction of philosophical premises 
from theology, via mythopoetics. For White, natural philosophy and theology were 
founded on reason and faith respectively. Nevertheless, to establish theological doctrine, 
articles of faith were philosophically or syllogistically glossed. Both disciplines therefore 
relied on the accuracy and effectiveness of language. More said philosophical and 
theological knowledge had originally been united in a single cabbalistic textual tradition. 
His philosophy was informed and hemmed in by the (theological) doctrines of 
necessitarianism and Origenism. Yet the truth of theological doctrine was uncertain, and 
thus philosophy was needed to defend it. Finally, Locke argued that studying nature 
offered clearer and more certain truths about God than about nature itself. However, he 
later reconstituted theology as a faith-based discipline. In this guise, theology governed 
natural philosophy, but did not spring from natural inquiries. 
   These studies demonstrate that, in seventeenth-century England, natural philosophy 
and theology were in flux, and that their disciplinary relationship was complex, entailing 
degrees of overlap and alienation. Primarily, natural philosophy and theology investigated 
the nature and constitution of the world, and, together, determined the relationship 
between its constituent parts – natural and divine. However, they also reflected the scope 
of man’s cognitive faculties, establishing which bits of the world were knowable, and 
outlining the grounds for, and appropriate degrees of, certainty and belief. Thus, both 
disciplines, and their relationship with one another, contributed to broad discussions 
about, truth, certainty and opinion. This, in turn, established normative guidelines. To 
some extent, the rightness or wrongness of belief and behaviour was determined by 
particular definitions of, and relationship between, natural philosophy and theology. As 
such, man’s place in the world – his relationship with nature, God and his fellow man – 
was triangulated through these disciplines.  
   The intermingling of natural philosophy and theology, and, further, the profusion of 
natural theological writing, shows that the seventeenth century bore witness to the early 
stages of what is now called “interdisciplinarity”. Sharing doctrine, method, or source 
material, each discipline operated in keeping with, and in due consideration of, the other. 
In many cases, it was said they explicated and promoted the same or similar ends – the 
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existence of God, his attributes and laws. Even when their origins, remits and conceptual 
preoccupations were not considered the same, they were thought to be related or 
complementary.  
   These specific assumptions about natural philosophy and theology were subject to 
greater critical scrutiny in the eighteenth century. For example, in David Hume’s Dialogues 
Concerning Natural Religion (1779), the character Philo remarks that:  
 
‘To say that all this order in animals and vegetables proceeds ultimately from 
design is begging the question; nor can that great point be ascertained otherwise 
than by proving, a priori, both that order is, from nature, inseparably attached to 
thought, and that it can never of itself or from original unknown principles 
belong to matter’.2  
 
This undercuts a major premise of the design argument for God’s existence, found 
variously in Bacon, More and Locke. It also reiterates Locke’s scepticism about the 
relationship between thought and substance, without falling back on his biblical 
assurance that thought was annexed to spirit. 
   However, this does not change the fact that disciplines are useful tools for assessing 
intellectual change. In fact, it demonstrates how important and necessary disciplines are 
to the way we create knowledge and understand the world. In the eighteenth century, 
compared to the seventeenth, it became less tenable to assert that natural philosophical 
observations regarding the orderliness of nature supported, or led to, providential claims 
about creation. As the logical inference from one discipline (natural philosophy) to 
another (theology) was challenged or undermined, the boundary between them was 
strengthened or widened. In turn, this reduced the range of things one could say about 
certain (theological) subjects. Thus, when the scope of a discipline or disciplines changes, 
our understanding of the world and ourselves changes also. 
   This is as true now as it was in the early modern period. Knowledge is constituted 
through, and in, disciplines. “Scientific” knowledge, in particular, is characterised by 
exponential disciplinary and sub-disciplinary fragmentation.3 Modern scientific disciplines 
are more specialist than their seventeenth-century counterparts. However, in both cases, 
the content of a discipline, and its relationship with others, established the nature and 
limits of knowledge.
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